Lattice‐based revocable attribute‐based encryption with decryption key exposure resistance

Abstract

Attribute-based encryption (ABE) is a promising management method that enables finegrained access control in large-scale systems. Revocable ABE (RABE) can support a key revocation mechanism in an ABE system. With the advent of the Internet of Things, users may need to delegate their decryption capacity to other devices, which requires that RABE meet a necessary feature called decryption key exposure resistance (DKER). Although many constructions about RABE from bilinear maps have been proposed, the situation of lattice-based constructions with DKER is less satisfactory. In order to narrow this gap, this paper propose the first lattice-based RABE with DKER. First, a formal description of RABE with DKER and the corresponding security models is proposed. Subsequently, a lattice-based RABE scheme without DKER is constructed and it is proved to be selective indistinguishability under chosen-plaintext attack (IND-CPA) security based on Learning with Errors (LWE). To achieve DKER, this paper construct a RABE scheme by using the RABE scheme without DKER and a key extension mechanism as its building blocks. Finally, this paper show that this scheme is selective IND-CPA security, with the DKER based on LWE.This is an open access article under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial License, which permits use, distribution and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited and is not used for commercial purposes.

Efficient lattice-based revocable attribute-based encryption against decryption key exposure for cloud file sharing

“…However, the public key size of scheme [9] is large, and the revocation workload of scheme [23] increases linearly with the increase of the number of system users, which makes the efficiency and scalability of the two schemes low. Takayasu et al [24] and Dong et al [25] proposed lattice-based IBE scheme and KP-ABE scheme for decryption key exposure resistance, respectively. But in the lattice-based CP-ABE scheme, which is more suitable for CFS system, there is no formal solution.…”

“…In this subsection, we gave a theoretical analysis in functions of schemes, storage cost, and computational cost by comparing related schemes in [8,9,12,13,17,18,25] with our scheme.…”

“…Table 1 shows the comparison of related schemes and our scheme in terms of security assumptions and the scheme's functions. Observe that schemes in [9,17,18,25] only support single attribute authority. While schemes in [8,12,13] and our scheme support multi-attribute authority, which can effectively reduce the computational burden of each attribute authority.…”

“…While schemes in [8,12,13] and our scheme support multi-attribute authority, which can effectively reduce the computational burden of each attribute authority. In addition, the schemes in [8,9,25] and our scheme also support user revocation, allowing the system to manage users dynamically, improving the practicability of the scheme. On this basis, the scheme in [25] and our scheme also considers more possible security issues with decryption key exposure resistance.…”

“…In addition, the schemes in [8,9,25] and our scheme also support user revocation, allowing the system to manage users dynamically, improving the practicability of the scheme. On this basis, the scheme in [25] and our scheme also considers more possible security issues with decryption key exposure resistance. Table 2 shows the storage cost of related schemes and our scheme in terms of public parameter size, private key size, and ciphertext size.…”