2019
DOI: 10.1017/9781108649278
|View full text |Cite
|
Sign up to set email alerts
|

Knowledge from Non-Knowledge

Help me understand this report

Search citation statements

Order By: Relevance

Paper Sections

Select...
1
1

Citation Types

0
3
0
2

Year Published

2020
2020
2023
2023

Publication Types

Select...
9

Relationship

0
9

Authors

Journals

citations
Cited by 11 publications
(5 citation statements)
references
References 152 publications
0
3
0
2
Order By: Relevance
“…From an epistemological (i.e. how we develop knowledge) standpoint, Luzzi (2019) argued that individuals could draw inferences based on false knowledge or mere ignorance, thereby generating erroneous or implausible knowledge about a particular phenomenon. Therefore, identifying knowledge-based inferences when analyzing data in MMR and preparing to generate metainferences is necessary to make appropriate comparisons and linkages between these types of inferences, and experience-based and data-driven inferences, as well as to reduce the likelihood of generating biased metainferences about a particular topic.…”
Section: Process To Generating Metainferences In Convergent Mixed Met...mentioning
confidence: 99%
“…From an epistemological (i.e. how we develop knowledge) standpoint, Luzzi (2019) argued that individuals could draw inferences based on false knowledge or mere ignorance, thereby generating erroneous or implausible knowledge about a particular phenomenon. Therefore, identifying knowledge-based inferences when analyzing data in MMR and preparing to generate metainferences is necessary to make appropriate comparisons and linkages between these types of inferences, and experience-based and data-driven inferences, as well as to reduce the likelihood of generating biased metainferences about a particular topic.…”
Section: Process To Generating Metainferences In Convergent Mixed Met...mentioning
confidence: 99%
“…10 Essas teses impossibilitam também a obtenção de conhecimento inferencial a partir de crença gettierizada e de crença injustificada, por exemplo. Para mais informações, veja Luzzi (2014Luzzi ( , 2019, Olivier (2019), Murphy (2017). 11 Embora possa haver casos nos quais uma crença verdadeira e uma crença falsa, independentes entre si, sejam os fatores causais e evidenciais de uma outra crença verdadeira que é uma instância de conhecimento, perceba que esse tipo de caso não é um contraexemplo ao princípio CFC.…”
Section: Contrafecho Do Conhecimento (Cfc)unclassified
“…O objetivo dessa metodologia é empregar as ferramentas das ciências empíricas -como a ciência cognitiva, por exemplo -para avaliar a interpretação do senso comum de teses filosóficas e se essas interpretações são compatíveis com a teorização filosófica. Para mais informações, veja, respectivamente, Knobe e Nichols (2017) e Williamson (2018).15 Essa ideia de estabilidade da crença verdadeira derivada da crença falsa é melhor desenvolvida porLuzzi (2019).…”
unclassified
“…28 See Saunders and Champawat (1964), Hilpinen (1988), Klein (1996Klein ( : 106, 2008, Hawthorne (2004: 57), Warfield (2005), Coffman (2008), Fitelson (2010Fitelson ( , 2017, Feit and Cullison (2011), Arnold (2013), Hiller (2013), de Almeida (2017), Hawthorne and Rabinowitz (2017), Buford and Cloos (2018), Turri (2019), Luzzi (2019), Zhao (Forthcoming).…”
mentioning
confidence: 99%