Knowledge and Legal Proof

Moss, Sarah

doi:10.1093/oso/9780192868978.003.0006

Cited by 28 publications

(19 citation statements)

References 3 publications

Supporting

Mentioning

Contrasting

Unclassified

Order By: Relevance

“…After all, it appears to be rather lightweight. Additionally, Moss (2018a, 2021) relies on closure in her arguments for moral encroachment on credences.…”

mentioning

confidence: 99%

See 1 more Smart Citation

Probabilistic Truth, Relativism, and Objective Chance

Schimmelpfennig

2023

Episteme

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

In Probabilistic Knowledge Sarah Moss proposes that our credences and subjective probability judgments (SPJs) can constitute knowledge. Mossean probabilistic knowledge is grounded in probabilistic beliefs that are justified, true, and unGettiered. In this paper I aim to address and solve two challenges that arise in the vicinity of the factivity condition for probabilistic knowledge: the factivity challenge and the challenge from probabilistic arguments from ignorance (probabilistic AIs). I argue that while Moss's deflationary solution to the factivity challenge formally works, it leaves us ill-equipped to handle probabilistic AIs. An account of probabilistic knowledge that cannot overcome probabilistic AIs makes knowledge of thoroughly probabilistic contents a rare and unstable phenomenon, at best, or, at worst, impossible. I hold that establishing a metaphysically enriched account of probabilistic truth is therefore mandatory. I go on to develop a truth-conditional approach on probabilistic factivity that is relativistic in its nature and centers on objective chances. I show that while the approach is still compatible with Moss's overall semantics for probabilistic knowledge, it provides us with a simple but forceful answer to probabilistic AIs.

show abstract

“…After all, it appears to be rather lightweight. Additionally, Moss (2018a, 2021) relies on closure in her arguments for moral encroachment on credences.…”

mentioning

confidence: 99%

“…After all, it appears to be rather lightweight. Additionally, Moss (2018aMoss ( , 2021 relies on closure in her arguments for moral encroachment on credences. 9 Formally this can be derived from the fact that ψ and w are disjoint sets of probability spaces.…”

mentioning

confidence: 99%

Probabilistic Truth, Relativism, and Objective Chance

Schimmelpfennig

2023

Episteme

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

“…Yet clearly it should be admissible, and a guilty verdict based on that evidence, in the right circumstances, would be justified. A natural explanation of this is that W's testimony and D's act share a common cause, 26 For a selection of the recent philosophical literature on the topic, see Gardiner (2018), Moss (2022) and Smith (2018).…”

mentioning

confidence: 99%

What's Wrong with Prepunishment?

Kaiserman

2023

Pacific Philosophical Qtr

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Punishing someone for a crime before they have committed it is widely considered morally abhorrent. But there is little agreement on what exactly is supposed to be wrong with it. In this paper, I critically evaluate several objections to the permissibility of prepunishment, making points along the way about the connections between time, knowledge, desert, deterrence and duty. I conclude that, although the conditions under which it could permissibly be administered are unlikely ever to arise in practice, nevertheless in principle, nothing is wrong with prepunishment after all.

show abstract

“…11Bolinger (2018), Blome‐Tillman (2017), Gardiner (2019b, 2021), Hoskins, Z., & Robson, J. (2021), Moss (2018a, 2018b, 2021b), Pardo (2010, 2018), Pritchard (2018), Smith (2017, 2018, 2021a, 2021b), Stein (2018). For a comprehensive bibliography see Gardiner (2019a) and for critical surveys of central epistemological views see Gardiner (2018) and Ross (2020).…”

mentioning

confidence: 99%

Does legal epistemology rest on a mistake? On fetishism, two‐tier system design, and conscientious fact‐finding

Enoch¹,

Fisher²,

Spectre³

2021

Philosophical Issues

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Legal epistemology seems to be exploding. More and more philosophers seem to be taking an interest in the theory of evidence law, and to bring along with them to legal theory the freshest news from the abstract study of epistemology 1 . This is understandable, of course: The law in general, and evidence law in particular, seems to be employing the same natural-language terms epistemologists are (or are at least supposed to be) interested in ("knew or should have known", "reasonable doubt", "evidence", "presumption" (of innocence), and so on) 2 . Perhaps for this reason, an interest in legal epistemology has been there long before the current explosion 3 . Still, the extent of attention paid by epistemologists to legal epistemology seems unprecedented (whether this interest is reciprocated by legal theorists, let alone legal practitioners, is of course another matter).In this paper we want to argue that a large part of this project is based on a mistake, roughly analogous to the mistake involved in thinking of studies of intelligence as relevant to the understanding of military intelligence. With qualifications shortly to emerge, epistemology is not, we think, intrinsically and directly relevant to normative evidence law theory, at least, that is, as long as the relevant perspective is that of designing the evidence law regime. When it comes to the conscientious fact-finder, things may be -we're not sure about this -importantly different. Now, many things go by the name "legal epistemology", and it's not as if we think all are based on a mistake. It makes perfect sense to ask how different standards of proof are best understood, or -in * For comments on earlier versions we thank Matt Kotzen and Sarah Moss. Earlier versions of this paper were given as

show abstract

Knowledge and Legal Proof

Cited by 28 publications

References 3 publications

Probabilistic Truth, Relativism, and Objective Chance

Probabilistic Truth, Relativism, and Objective Chance

What's Wrong with Prepunishment?

Does legal epistemology rest on a mistake? On fetishism, two‐tier system design, and conscientious fact‐finding

Contact Info

Product

Resources

About