Key Establishment Using Group Information for Wireless Sensor Networks

Claycomb, William R.; Lopes, Rodrigo; Shin, Dongwan; Kim, Byunggi

doi:10.1007/978-3-642-11528-8_5

Cited by 2 publications

(4 citation statements)

References 18 publications

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“…With advances in hardware, asymmetric cryptography is fast becoming a viable option for small devices [9,18]. Nevertheless, we believe that there will always exist devices, ever smaller, with computational capabilities similar to the least powerful devices of today.…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

On the (im)possibility of perennial message recognition protocols without public-key cryptography

Muñiz

Laud

2011

Proceedings of the 2011 ACM Symposium on Applied Computing

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A message recognition protocol (MRP) aims to exchange authenticated information in an insecure channel. During the initialization session of the protocol, the parties exchange some authenticated information which the adversary can passively observe. Then, one party wants to send authenticated messages to the other party over an insecure channel. Such security requirements are often found in wireless sensor networks.A perennial MRP is one that is able to recover from the adversarial interference, no matter how long the adversary has been active before it stops. MRPs based on hash chains are not perennial because after fixing the length of the hash chain in the initialization phase, authentic communication is not possible if the adversary interferes until all elements of the hash chain have been consumed.Perennial MRPs can be trivially built from public-key primitives. In this paper we present very strong evidence that they cannot be constructed from "cheap" primitives. Namely, we show in the symbolic model of cryptography, perennial MRPs cannot be built using just hash functions and XORing. The result also covers other symmetric primitives, e.g. encryption. The result explains why all previous attempts to construct perennial MRPs from those primitives have failed. The result also has interesting implications regarding authentication protocols in general, and the gap between formal and computational models of cryptography.

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Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

On the (im)possibility of perennial message recognition protocols without public-key cryptography

Muñiz

Laud

2011

Proceedings of the 2011 ACM Symposium on Applied Computing

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“…The lack of group ID in the return message is a trigger to x that the return key information in intragroup. In this case, x is able to verify the identity of y, because Kyx = Kxy, due to the symmetry of our key establishment scheme in [3]. Node x responds with a h K xy (n x ||n y ||2), verifying to y that x has established the correct key.…”

Section: Pairwise Key Establishmentmentioning

confidence: 94%

“…Therefore, it is desirable to have a solution which provides secure key establishment without requiring specific location knowledge for each node. Claycomb et al proposed in [3] that in a group-based distribution, assuming nodes deployed together end up near each other, each group of nodes deployed be pre-keyed using key information unique to that group. Doing so would allow nodes containing keying information for a specific group A to establish pairwise keys with nodes from group A.…”

Section: Group-based Key Establishmentmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…In [3], the authors propose using an IBC technique called pairing [2,18] to facilitate secure key establishment between nodes in WSNs. First proposed by [19], identity based cryptography (IBC), or identity based encryption, is similar to traditional public-key based cryptography systems, but instead of using a randomly generated public key, entities use unique strings or other short identifiers, such as email addresses, as their public key.…”

Section: Identity Based Cryptographymentioning

confidence: 99%

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A group-based security policy for wireless sensor networks

Claycomb

Lopes

Shin

et al. 2010

Proceedings of the 2010 ACM Symposium on Applied Computing

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The protection of wireless sensor networks is an important task, especially for critical situations such as intrusion detection, tamper monitoring, or military applications. To date, much of the emphasis on protecting sensor networks has focused on key management and secure routing. However, as sensors become more capable and ubiquitous, the need for more fine-grained control over their resources grows. In this paper, we present a security policy for wireless sensor networks which provide designers and administrators the ability to fine-tune access to sensor resources. We build on the notion of group-based key establishment to show how group membership can be utilized in deploying a dynamic, robust, and flexible security policy for wireless sensor networks.

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Key Establishment Using Group Information for Wireless Sensor Networks

Cited by 2 publications

References 18 publications

On the (im)possibility of perennial message recognition protocols without public-key cryptography

On the (im)possibility of perennial message recognition protocols without public-key cryptography

A group-based security policy for wireless sensor networks

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