Judicial Supremacy

Hodges, Donald Clark

doi:10.2307/2022252

Cited by 1 publication

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“…Strikingly, in a broad sample of articles defending both supremacy and departmentalism, this notion-pouvoir constituant or potentia-is hardly mentioned. This is true of Whittington's articles, but also of Kramer's and Christopher Wolfe's, and, it turns out, of those of several other prominent theorists (Hodges 1958), A few examples include Ides (1999), Hodges (1958), Whittington (2001), Mendelson (1947), andFleming (2005). 41 The argument presented by Carlos Rios suggests that pouvoir constituant, in an international context at least, receives attention.…”

Section: Two Kinds Of Power and Hobbes And Spinozamentioning

confidence: 94%

An American Notwithstanding Clause? Between Potestas and Potentia

Kabala

Johnson

2021

Laws

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Debates about judicial review and departmentalism have continued to rage, and in the wake of the last three Supreme Court appointments and current Presidential Commission on the Court, only look to intensify. Should the US adopt a notwithstanding or override provision, of the kind that exits in Canada and Israel? These countries take a departmentalist approach to allow the legislature to override the Court, “notwithstanding” its ruling. Although America is a presidential framework, a paradox emerges: evidence exists that its system already makes possible the equivalent of a notwithstanding clause. This consists of Congress and the President together “overruling” the Supreme Court. In another sense, however, this is not an accepted practice—large parts of the legal community hold that the US Constitution establishes judicial supremacy. To better understand this dynamic, we consider two kinds of power: formal and authorized (potestas) as well as direct and concrete (potentia). The contrast between the positions on both power and sovereignty of Thomas Hobbes (associated with potestas) and Baruch Spinoza (linked to potentia) helps clarify these issues in a contemporary context. It turns out that a robust departmentalist equivalent of the notwithstanding clause already exists in the US, as a matter of Hobbesian potestas but not of Spinozist potentia. Another term for the latter is pouvoir constituant. Spinoza’s perspective on political activity further clarifies the in-between nature of the American override capacity: the active or passive character of a multitude is not binary, but is a matter of degree. Without making an institutional recommendation, we note that Spinoza’s understanding of power also allows for dynamic interaction between potentia and potestas: formal authorization can contribute to the expression of direct power. It is, therefore, conceivable that additional codification of the existing American override capacity, either through a joint declaration of Congress and the Presidency or a Constitutional Amendment, can strengthen the effective sovereignty of the American people in relation to the courts.

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