2013
DOI: 10.1177/1065912913477734
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Judicial Autonomy in Central America

Abstract: Judicial autonomy from societal actors is argued herein to be a critical aspect of the rule of law and to have been overlooked by the dominance within comparative judicial politics of the role of interbranch judicial independence. These distinct concepts are parsed and then interrelated to form a typology of four “judicial regime types”: liberal regimes, partisan control regimes, clandestine control regimes, and government control regimes. These regime types are then traced in five Central American countries.

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Cited by 7 publications
(3 citation statements)
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“…Judges in upper-level courts, called magistrates, serve five-year terms and hold much more prestige. They are chosen through a “quasi-political process” in which a selection committee proposes a list of candidates, half of whom Congress selects to serve (Bowen 2013, 838). In practice, these procedures have allowed for corruption and influence peddling in the development of the candidate list and in the selection of magistrates (Bowen 2017).…”
Section: Judging In Guatemalamentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Judges in upper-level courts, called magistrates, serve five-year terms and hold much more prestige. They are chosen through a “quasi-political process” in which a selection committee proposes a list of candidates, half of whom Congress selects to serve (Bowen 2013, 838). In practice, these procedures have allowed for corruption and influence peddling in the development of the candidate list and in the selection of magistrates (Bowen 2017).…”
Section: Judging In Guatemalamentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Probably all conceptualizations of judicial independence fall in the spectrum between perceiving independence as a feature of institutional design, and as a feature of judicial decision-making. Various terms can be applied to this dichotomy: some differ between independence as means and ends; 26 others apply labels such as 'structural insulation' 27 or refer to judicial independence as a specific mechanism 28 14 D. Kosař when speaking about the former; while others perceive it as a value in itself, 29 or label it as 'party detachment', 30 'impartiality' 31 or 'judicial autonomy', 32 when speaking about the latter. One can also distinguish between institutional, decisional and behavioral independence, 33 here the first term focuses on the level of the judiciary, while the other are understood at the level of individual judges.…”
Section: Reconciling De Iure and De Facto Definitionsmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Most reviews of the growing comparative judicial politics literature (e.g., Bowen 2013, Ferejohn et al 2009, Kapiszewski & Taylor 2008 sum up how scholars have explored a plethora of institutional, structural, and ideological variables for explaining key phenomena and processes of interest, such as judicial decision making and other manifestations of judicial behavior; appointments, promotions, and demotions; and judicial power and legitimacy. The informal dimension of judicial politics is a diverse area of inquiry that covers not only informal institutions of relevance for judicial politics (cf.…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%