Joint actions, commitments and the need to belong

Abstract

We would like to thank John Michael and two anonymous referees for their valuable comments and suggestions on earlier drafts of this paper. We would also like to thank the participants to the workshop "Layers of Collective Intentionality" held in Vienna in August 2018, the participants to the workshop "Human-Robot Joint Action: Refining the understanding of joint action through an interdisciplinary perspective" held in Paris in September 2018, and the members of the Philosophy Department at the University of Granada.

Robots and Resentment: Commitments, Recognition and Social Motivation in HRI

“…Elsewhere, we have argued that a major human motivation for explaining why commitments are credible is the need to belong (Fernández Castro & Pacherie, 2020). The need to belong is the need that individuals have for frequent, positively valenced interactions with other people within a framework of long-lasting concern for each other's welfare (Baumeister and Leary 1995;Over 2016).…”

Commitments and the sense of joint agency

“…In closing, we would like to suggest that this question and the question what motivates us to abide by our commitments have closely related answers. We recently argued (Fernández Castro & Pacherie, 2021), that the need to belong, that is, the need to affiliate with others and form long‐lasting bonds with them (Baumeister & Leary, 1995), is what primarily motivates us to interact and engage with those around us and act as committed so as to preserve and reinforce the bonds we have forged (see also Godman, 2013; Godman et al, 2014).…”

What Does It Take to Be a Social Agent?

“…Several authors argue that many types of prosocial behavior depend on individualist and selfish inclinations, so they are oriented, for instance, to protect individual reputation [15]. However, it can be argued [16,17] that, although the reputation management mechanism is a strong source of motivation, it can hardly be a general explanation for prosocial tendencies. Moreover, it is doubtful that reputation management could be developmentally prior to general dispositions to engage in positively valenced interactions with other people within a framework of long-lasting concern for each other's welfare [16].…”

“…However, it can be argued [16,17] that, although the reputation management mechanism is a strong source of motivation, it can hardly be a general explanation for prosocial tendencies. Moreover, it is doubtful that reputation management could be developmentally prior to general dispositions to engage in positively valenced interactions with other people within a framework of long-lasting concern for each other's welfare [16]. Whatever the mental structures behind human social motivation are, what we can be sure of is that an object that can be called social in a minimal sense must, at least, be capable of exhibiting certain behavioral profiles that we can associate with an inclination or tendency to seek social encounters and care about the behavior of others and, at least in some cases, find social interactions intrinsically rewarding.…”