Is there a Problem about Propositional Unity?

Abstract

The problem of the 'Unity of the Proposition' is the problem of explaining the difference between a content-expressing declarative sentence and a 'mere list' of referents. The prevailing view is that such a problem is to be solved metaphysically, either by reducing our ontology to exclude propositions or universals, or by explaining how it is possible for a certain kind of complex entity -the 'proposition' -to 'unify' its constituents. I argue that these metaphysical approaches cannot succeed; instead the only viable approach is linguistic, identifying features of the (type-) sentence itself that enable it to express a content. Thus the problem of the 'Unity of the Proposition' (distinguishing sentences from lists) is distinct from the problem of 'propositional unity' (explaining how the constituents of propositions form a unified content). I suggest that, while the latter problem is not pressing, the former does not permit of an answer which applies in generality in all languages; we can only fully explain the Unity of the Proposition for single languages or groups of similar languages.

Regress, unity, facts, and propositions

“…Sometimes a certain problem concerning sentences is presented under the heading of the unity of the proposition: what explains the difference between a declarative sentence and a mere list? As Howard Peacock (2011) argues, no maneuvering dealing with the metaphysics of propositions could help with this problem, for whatever we say about propositions, the question of how linguistic items get to be linked to propositions remain.…”

“Somos criaturas de la lógica y no del silencio”: la unidad proposicional según Alberto Moretti

“…Peacock (2011) se refiere, a modo de ejemplo, a las lenguas muy flexivas (como el latín), que utilizan muchas variaciones en la terminación de las palabras y no sólo el orden para indicar diferencias en la estructura del contenido, y obligan a relativizar algunas explicaciones de la unidad proposicional reflejadas sólo por la estructura sintáctica, sugiriendo que todas las expresiones y no sólo los predicados, juegan un rol en la explicación de la unidad. Wittgenstein señaló el mismo punto, mediante el ejemplo de una oración del latín, "ambulo" (Tractatus, 4.032), de una única palabra, que no obstante expresa un contenido estructurado.16 Wikforss (2016) cuestiona la interpretación de Strawson sobre el tipo de "combate" que enfrentaría a Davidson con Wittgenstein en relación con ambos tipos de enfoques acerca del lenguaje, identificando afinidades importantes, aunque no al nivel de sus respectivas explicaciones (o descripciones) semánticas, sino a nivel metasemántico o fundamental.…”

Recent Work on Structured Meaning and Propositional Unity

“…8 8 Recent attempts to contain the unity problem to the syntactic level include Peacock (2011) and Peregrin (forthcoming). …”