Is theism capable of accounting for any natural evil at all?

Abstract

Received wisdom has it that a plausible explanation or theodicy for God's permission of at least some instances of natural evil is not beyond the reach of the theist. In this paper I challenge this assumption, arguing instead that theism fails to account for any instance, kind, quantity, or distribution of natural evil found in the world. My case will be structured around a specific but not idiosyncratic conception of natural evil as well as an examination of three prominent theodicies for natural evil. In contrast, however, to much contemporary discussion, my assessment of these theodicies will be grounded in the prior conviction that a successful theodicy for moral evil is available.

God, Geography, and Justice

“…The POE literature distinguishes between natural evils and moral evils. Natural evils are sufferings which do not arise from the deliberate actions of humans (see, for example, Hick 1966;Inwagen 1988;Trakakis 2005), including the destruction of cities, towns, and villages caused by severe storms or earthquakes; famines as caused by draughts; or any number of other naturally occurring phenomena. Call individual instances of natural evil first-order natural evils.…”

“…Contra Murphy, we can easily imagine a world with less of a potential for natural evil. Nick Trakakis has argued that God could have created a world without a potential for any natural evil at all (Trakakis 2005). Put this objection aside; perhaps Murphy has reasons we have not considered to believe a possible world without natural evil is impossible.…”