2015
DOI: 10.1590/s0100-60452015005000002 View full text |Buy / Rent full text
|
|

Abstract: I assess Tamar Gendler's (2007) account of self-deception according to which its characteristic state is not belief, but imaginative pretense. After giving an overview of the literature and presenting the conceptual puzzles engendered by the notion of selfdeception, I introduce Gendler's account, which emerges as a rival to practically all extant accounts of self-deception. I object to it by first arguing that her argument for abandoning belief as the characteristic state of self-deception conflates the state … Show more

Help me understand this report

Search citation statements

Order By: Relevance
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0

Publication Types

Select...

Relationship

0
0

Authors

Journals