Is anything just plain good?

Almotahari, Mahrad; Hosein, Adam

doi:10.1007/s11098-014-0361-5

Cited by 31 publications

(6 citation statements)

References 21 publications

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“…9 Thus, Aristotle would think that a correct analysis of normative terms could not straightforwardly extracted from common usage. On this point, there is agreement withKraut (2011) contraThomson (2008) andAlmotahari and Hosein (2015). Nevertheless, Aristotle could accept neitherKraut's (2007, 269-271) revisionary account of "good thief" (on which either a good thief is morally good or there are no good thieves) norRoss's (1930, 65) assumption that "good" is used in the same sense when saying "good liar" and "good doctor.…”

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confidence: 96%

The metaphysics of goodness in the ethics of Aristotle

Baker

2016

Philos Stud

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Kraut (2011) and other neo-Aristotelians have argued that there is no such thing as absolute goodness. They admit only good in a kind, e.g. a good sculptor, and good for something, e.g. good for fish. What is the view of Aristotle? Mostly limiting myself to the Nicomachean Ethics [NE], I argue that Aristotle is committed to things being absolutely good and also to a metaphysics of absolute goodness where there is a maximally best good that is the cause of the goodness of all other things in virtue of being their end. I begin (in Section 2) by suggesting that the notion of good as an end, which is present in the first lines of the NE, is not obviously accounted for by good in a kind or good for something. I then give evidence that good in a kind (in Section 3) and good for something (in Section 4) can explain neither certain distinctions drawn between virtues nor the determinacy ascribed to what is good "in itself." I argue (in Section 5) contra Gotthelf (2012) that because several important arguments in the Nicomachean Ethics rely on comparative judgments of absolute value-e.g. "Man is the best of all animals"-Aristotle is committed to the existence of both absolute goodness and an absolutely best being. I focus (in Section 6) on one passage, Aristotle's division of goods in NE I 12, which presupposes this metaphysical picture.

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confidence: 96%

The metaphysics of goodness in the ethics of Aristotle

Baker

2016

Philos Stud

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“…'good to others'). It is uncontroversial that some such phrases contain occurrences of 'good' that are logically attributive (Almotahari andHosein 2015, 1488;Peace 2017Peace , 2992. That is, some sentences of the form 'A is good+modifier' are not equivalent to the conjunction of 'A is good' with a sentence that captures the modifier.…”

Section: Ii2 Expanded Contentsmentioning

confidence: 99%

The Expansion View of Thick Concepts

Kyle

2019

Nous

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This paper proposes a new Separabilist account of thick concepts, called the Expansion View (or EV). According to EV, thick concepts are expanded contents of thin terms. An expanded content is, roughly, the semantic content of a predicate along with modifiers. Although EV is a form of Separabilism, it is distinct from the only kind of Separabilism discussed in the literature, and it has many features that Inseparabilists want from an account of thick concepts. EV can also give non-cognitivists a novel escape from the Anti-Disentangling Argument. §I explains the approach of all previous Separabilists, and argues that there's no reason for Separabilists to take this approach. §II explains EV. §III fends off objections. And §IV explains how non-cognitivist proponents of EV can escape the Anti-Disentangling Argument. Ethicists often debate whether thick evaluative concepts, like kind, are composed of more fundamental concepts, like good. 1 Separabilists hold that thick concepts are combinations of more fundamental elements, such as thin concepts and non-evaluative concepts. Inseparabilists, by contrast, claim that thick concepts cannot be divided into evaluative and non-evaluative components. Separabilists must face an objection. If thin concepts are incapable of representing properties, as many non-cognitivists believe, it appears the thick concept's non-evaluative content must fully determine what property the thick concept represents. And this implies something problematic-that an outsider could know what the thick concept applies to without grasping its evaluative perspective. This is the Anti-Disentangling Argument, originating with John McDowell (1981) and advocated by many Inseparabilists. This paper proposes a new Separabilist model that's neutral between cognitivism and noncognitivism but can give non-cognitivists a novel escape from the Anti-Disentangling Argument. §I explains the basic approach of all previous Separabilists, and argues that there's no reason for Separabilists to take this approach. §II explains a different kind of Separabilist model, called the Expansion View (henceforth 1 Italicized expressions refer to concepts; expressions with single-quotes refer to terms. I assume concepts are the semantic contents of terms that express them, and that concepts and semantic contents are on the level of sense rather than reference. forthcoming in Nous 2 EV). EV holds that thick concepts (e.g. kind) are expanded contents of thin terms (e.g. 'good'). An expanded content is, roughly, the semantic content of a predicate along with modifiers (e.g. 'good to others'). After objections are addressed, §IV shows that EV gives non-cognitivists a new escape from the Anti-Disentangling Argument. There, it's proposed that a thin concept can play a role in determining what property is represented by its associated thick concept, even if that thin concept doesn't represent a property by itself. The precedent for this idea comes from semantically incomplete expressions, such as 'ready'. These expressions arguably fail t...

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“…4 For some influential arguments to the effect that value in a way is not only more important to the ethical life but is the only kind of value that makes any sense, see e.g. Geach (1956), Foot (1985, Hursthouse (1999), Thomson (2008), Kraut (2011), and Almotahari & Hosein (2015).…”

Section: Some Illustrative Examplesmentioning

confidence: 99%

The Finality and Instrumentality of Value in a Way

Garcia

2018

Philosophia

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Final value accrues to objects that are good for their own sakes, while instrumental value accrues to objects that are good for the sake of their effects. The following paper aims to show that this distinction cuts across some surprising areas of the evaluative domain. This means that there may be some unexpected types of value that can come in a final or instrumental form. The argument proceeds by looking at two prominent types of value, namely kind-value and personal value. The former accrues to objects that are good as the kinds of things that they are, while the latter accrues to objects that are good for someone. Substantive examples are offered in support of the idea that these types of value can come in final or instrumental form. The substantive examples are then given additional support by considering the structure and behavior of fitting attitudes.

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Is anything just plain good?

Cited by 31 publications

References 21 publications

The metaphysics of goodness in the ethics of Aristotle

The metaphysics of goodness in the ethics of Aristotle

The Expansion View of Thick Concepts

The Finality and Instrumentality of Value in a Way

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