Is altruism evolutionarily stable?

Bester, Helmut; Güth, Werner

doi:10.1016/s0167-2681(97)00060-7

Cited by 267 publications

(240 citation statements)

References 11 publications

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“…This line of reasoning has been used to provide an evolutionary foundation for a number of types of other-regarding preferences. 4 Di¤erent attitudes towards members of the own group than towards members of the out-group may be desirable from an evolutionary perspective. Indeed, our analysis con…rms that a large set of combinations of in-group altruism and spiteful preferences with respect to the competing members in the out-group are evolutionarily stable preferences.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…5 Altruism or harming or spiteful behavior have been derived and explained by evolutionary arguments in the context of group selection, 6 4 Related to this approach, Frank (1987) highlighted the importance of strategic effects of other-regarding preference traits in strategic situations, and the implications for evolution of preferences. 5 For recent reviews and contributions in evolutionary biology see Lehmann and Keller (2006), West and Gardner (2010) and Marshall (2011).…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…In-group altruism may develop along one activity dimension and out-group spite may develop along the second activity dimension in this context, and the combination of both types of other-regarding preferences in one model approach nicely addresses the well-documented phenomenon of in-group favoritism. They consider an in…nitely large population and what is sometimes called the 'transparent disposition' approach, in the spirit of Bester and Güth (1998). The driving force for evolutionary stability of these two types of other-regarding preferences in their context is type observability.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…7 For a survey on altruism and spite in the context of kin selection see West and Gardner (2010). 8 See, e.g., Güth and Yaari (1992), Sethi (1996), Bester and Güth (1998) and does not require observability of type or relatedness.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Type observability has strategic implications: a player's type may induce the equilibrium actions of co-players, and a change in a player's type can therefore cause a change in co-players equilibrium actions. As has been shown by Bester and Güth (1998), the direction of this strategic e¤ect of a player's own type for co-players'actions is crucial for the evolutionary success of particular preference traits, including altruism. With observed altruism or spite parameters, these induce a strategic e¤ect on other players: other players' optimal e¤ort choices become a function of the preference type of player i, as they anticipate that player i's e¤ort choice depends on i's own preference, and di¤erent choices x i induce di¤erent optimal replies for other players.…”

mentioning

confidence: 98%

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Evolutionarily stable in-group favoritism and out-group spite in intergroup conflict

Konrad

Morath

2012

Journal of Theoretical Biology

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We study con ‡ict between two groups of individuals. Using Schaffer's (1988) concept of evolutionary stability we provide an evolutionary underpinning for in-group altruism combined with spiteful behavior towards members of the rival out-group. We characterize the set of evolutionarily stable combinations of in-group favoritism and out-group spite and …nd that an increase in in-group altruism can be balanced by a decrease in spiteful behavior towards the out-group.

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Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

mentioning

confidence: 98%

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Evolutionarily stable in-group favoritism and out-group spite in intergroup conflict

Konrad

Morath

2012

Journal of Theoretical Biology

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Balancing cooperation and competition in human groups: the role of emotional algorithms and evolution

2006

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We examine emotional algorithms and their role in a fundamental dilemma that confronts human groups-whether actors should take care of 'me' (compete) or take care of 'we' (cooperate). We argue that human emotions, triggered in algorithmic fashion through four common, although culturally specified, mechanisms, powerfully direct humans to compete or cooperate. Drawing on evolutionary psychology, we first define and characterize these hard-wired emotional algorithms, presenting evidence for their independent influence. Their regulatory influence on human groups, however, can only be appreciated once we examine them as a system. We show how, as a system, these algorithms help explain the dynamic balance that members of human groups can (and often must) achieve between competition and cooperation. We derive three propositions regarding how these algorithms play out in groups. We suggest that understanding these dynamics can help leaders better manage cooperation and competition in organizational groups. Copyright © 2006 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

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The manufacturer's quality‐improvement decisions and evolutionary stable strategy of retailers' marketing objectives under network externality

Sun,

Yi,

Yang

et al. 2023

Manage Decis Econ

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To analyze the influence of network externality (NE) and bargaining power of retailers on the quality‐improvement decisions of the manufacturer, evolutionary stable strategy (ESS) of retailers' marketing objectives, and profits of retailers and the manufacturer, we developed an evolutionary game model of supply chain composed of a monopoly manufacturer and one population of retailers under NE. We found that the retailers' ESS is influenced by both NE and product quality‐improvement levels. With the improvement of NE or product quality‐improvement levels, the marketing objectives of retailers will experience three evolutionary stable states: profit maximization, coexistence of profit maximization and revenue maximization, and revenue maximization. The product quality‐improvement levels and retailers' profits do not necessarily improve with the increase of NE, which depend on the retailers' ESS, but the manufacturer's profits always benefit from NE. When retailers' bargaining power reaches a certain level, it can influence the ESS of retailers' marketing objectives. Interestingly, the retailers' bargaining power does not necessarily enhance their own profits; it is related to the ESS of retailers' marketing objectives but consistently reduces the manufacturer's profits.

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Is altruism evolutionarily stable?

Cited by 267 publications

References 11 publications

Evolutionarily stable in-group favoritism and out-group spite in intergroup conflict

Evolutionarily stable in-group favoritism and out-group spite in intergroup conflict

Balancing cooperation and competition in human groups: the role of emotional algorithms and evolution

The manufacturer's quality‐improvement decisions and evolutionary stable strategy of retailers' marketing objectives under network externality

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