Investing in Wildlife: Can Wildlife Pay its Way?

Skonhoft, Anders; Solstad, Jan Tore

doi:10.1093/oxfordjournals.jae.a020950

Cited by 9 publications

(8 citation statements)

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“…86-89). Should compensation be paid to range states based on the (globally) optimal population of elephants or on the actual population in existence at any point in time, as advocated by Skonhoft and Solstad (1998)? Analogous to optimal pollution taxes, if compensation is paid according to the stock of elephants in existence at any given time, a cartel of range states will take into account the effect of their harvest decisions on the compensation to be paid.…”

Section: Concluding Remarks and Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…We do not review cooperative solutions, but, rather, discuss the use of compensation payments for conservation of wildlife. Specifically, we study the role of international transfers to African range states that are an increasing function of the protected elephant population, as advocated by, e.g., Schulz and Skonhoft (1996) and Skonhoft and Solstad (1998). The latter authors, studying pastoralist decision making when wildlife and livestock compete for forage, write ".…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Downward sloping demand for environmental amenities and international compensation: elephant conservation and strategic culling

Bulte

Kooten

2002

Agricultural Economics

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Section: Concluding Remarks and Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Downward sloping demand for environmental amenities and international compensation: elephant conservation and strategic culling

Bulte

Kooten

2002

Agricultural Economics

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“…It also creates considerable tension over wildlife in the national parks that border the less productive farm areas. 3 See also Shulz and Skonhoft (1996), Skonhoft and Solstad (1996), and Skonhoft and Solstad (1998), on the welfare of the communities. Communities are passive in this model, receiving the revenues of the property shares and the burdens of the wildlife interactions, which take the form of intrusions.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

A Bio-Economic Model of Community Incentives for Wildlife Management Under CAMPFIRE

Fischer

Muchapondwa

Sterner

2010

Environ Resource Econ

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“…Most of these are simply not yet known in the conservation policy environment in East Africa: for example, there is no accepted function relating wildlife abundance to the costs of livestock production. Similarly, in the comparative dynamic models of Skonhoft and colleagues (Skonhoft [1998]; Schulz and Skonhoft [1996]; Skonhoft and Solstad [1996], [1998a], [1998b) the interaction between pastoralists and wildlife is expressed in terms of predation, yet the reality is quite different. Hunting, the most primitive method of eliminating wildlife, is rarely used by pastoralists who instead adopt the more subtle approach of permanently lowering the carrying capacity of the range for wildlife by changing landuse patterns, e.g., settlement, fencing, protecting water sources, and habitat modification through the use of fire.…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Wildlife Losses in Kenya: An Analysis of Conservation Policy

Norton‐Griffiths

2000

Natural Resource Modeling

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ABSTRACT. Despite massive conservation efforts backed bysignificant international support, Kenya has lost some 44% of its large mammal fauna over the last 17 years. This catastrophic example of resource degradation stems from a mixture of policy, institutional and market failures. Policy failures include an over‐reliance on Command and Control (prohibition on consumptive use of wildlife, prohibition on use of resources within Protected Areas) without the ability to enforce compliance; subsidies to agricultural and livestock production which, by reducing marginal production costs to below social opportunitycosts, has caused the over‐conversion of rangelands to livestock and agricultural production at the expense of conservation objectives and values; and the establishment of tourism cartels which divert wildlife generated benefits awayfrom landowners. The fundamental institutional failure is the lack of property rights and use rights of landowners over wildlife. Fundamental market failures reflect the absence of financial incentives to landowners to conserve their wildlife resource, thus setting marginal depletion costs to zero, and competing production incentives. The Kenya Wildlife Service (KWS) is reintroducing financial incentives to landowners by permitting some consumptive use of wildlife, bymaking substantial direct grants to landowners and communities who support wildlife and bysidelining the tourism cartels and encouraging private sector tourism on private land. However, investment in conservation is still being hampered by the continuing prohibition of high value activities such as sport hunting, and by over regulation and vacillation. Furthermore, positive net benefits to landowners from wildlife operations are not in themselves adequate to guarantee economic incentives to conserve the resource. First, significant negative externalities are associated with wildlife in that they add greatly to the production costs of livestock and agriculture; second, opportunity costs (in terms of foregone benefits of development) of leaving land undeveloped for conservation are gradually increasing in response to growing populations, expanding markets and new agricultural technology; and third, some policies are having the perverse impacts of creating poverty traps. Wildlife conservation policy must accordingly be much wider in scope and use a much broader range of economic, financial and market instruments, possibly including differential land use taxes, conservation subsidies and easements, and lease back agreements. Simply creating positive net benefits from wildlife is not enough.

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Investing in Wildlife: Can Wildlife Pay its Way?

Cited by 9 publications

References 0 publications

Downward sloping demand for environmental amenities and international compensation: elephant conservation and strategic culling

Downward sloping demand for environmental amenities and international compensation: elephant conservation and strategic culling

A Bio-Economic Model of Community Incentives for Wildlife Management Under CAMPFIRE

Wildlife Losses in Kenya: An Analysis of Conservation Policy

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