The chapter deals with the notion of phenomenal realness, which was first systematically explored by Albert Michotte. Phenomenal realness refers to the impression that a perceptual object is perceived to have an autonomous existence in our mind-independent world. Perceptual psychology provides an abundance of phenomena, ranging from amodal completion to picture perception, that indicate that phenomenal realness is an independent perceptual attribute that can be conferred to perceptual objects in different degrees. The chapter outlines a theoretical framework that appears particularly well-suited for dealing with corresponding phenomena. According to this framework, perception can be understood as a triggering of conceptual forms by sensor inputs. It is argued that the attribute of phenomenal realness is based on specific types of internal evaluation functions which deal with the segregation of causes conceived as 'external' from those conceived as 'internal'. These evaluation functions integrate different internal sources of 'knowledge' about the potential causes for the activation of conceptual forms and provide markers by which conceptual forms can be tagged as 'external world objects'.'Reality', in our ordinary usage of the term, denotes the entirety of things that actually exist. By 'reality' we mean the mind-independent world in which we are situated, about which our senses inform us and with which we can interact. In our ordinary modes of thinking, we regard all those aspects of our world as belonging or referring to reality, for which we have no reasons to assume that they are merely the product of mental activities, such as imagination, hallucination, or fiction. When we feel or think that our contact with reality becomes endangered due to other activities of our mind, such as imagination, dreaming, telling lies (i.e. contravening facts of reality), 'reality' itself becomes an object of our attention. The ways we deal with such situations suggest that we are equipped with intricate means to distinguish mind-internal productions from what we regard as mind-independent aspects of our world. The investigation of these means is a subject matter of perceptual psychology and, more generally, cognitive science. Notions of 'reality' and 'realness' can, of course, appear in other contexts different from perception theory, notably in ordinary discourse, theoretical physics, and philosophy. Fortunately, however, the specific issues that show up in these other contexts have no bearing (or only in a highly indirect way) on issues of perceptual psychology. Theoretical issues of perception theory that can be subsumed under the heading of 'phenomenal realness' are more easily recognisable when we do not confuse them with issues associated with 'realness' in other domains.