This thesis aims to identify and defend the main rights of transgender people, particularly those related to the state's duty to treat all citizens with equal consideration and respect. To do that, this thesis is grounded on the different meanings of "right" presented by Ronald Dworkin, especially on the distinction between moral rights and policies. It is also based on a conception of the juridical concept of gender, which has two central dimensions: the expression of one's gender (on the masculinity/femininity spectrum) and the social recognition that one belongs to a certain gender category. It is argued that this conception of gender is fundamental for the proper interpretation and solution of legal issues involving gender, such as civil identification (name and sex/gender assignment), retirement scheme, protective laws and affirmative policies etc. These arguments are preceded by a brief explanation of transgenderism, which goes far beyond what is typically analyzed by jurists. An analysis of the state and sexual morality relations is offered as well, which is done mainly through the criticism of John Finnis and Christopher Tollefsen's conception of sex and gender. In short, Finnis and Tollefsen argue that one's gender should be determined by one's biological sex. Instead, this thesis defends the conceptual separation between biological sex and gender, considering gender the most relevant category for legal and social purposes. Moreover, based on Ronald Dworkin's theorization, it is argued that genders freedom of expression corresponds to one of the leading moral rights of transgender people, ensuring the autonomy and the ethical independence of such individuals. It concludes that the conceptions and theory defended in this thesis correspond to the rationale for answering legal problems of transgender people, even those that are not mentioned.