Intentional Binding Without Intentional Action

Abstract

The experience of authorship over one’s actions and their consequences—sense of agency—is a fundamental aspect of conscious experience. In recent years, it has become common to use intentional binding as an implicit measure of the sense of agency. However, it remains contentious whether reported intentional-binding effects indicate the role of intention-related information in perception or merely represent a strong case of multisensory causal binding. Here, we used a novel virtual-reality setup to demonstrate identical magnitude-binding effects in both the presence and complete absence of intentional action, when perceptual stimuli were matched for temporal and spatial information. Our results demonstrate that intentional-binding-like effects are most simply accounted for by multisensory causal binding without necessarily being related to intention or agency. Future studies that relate binding effects to agency must provide evidence for effects beyond that expected for multisensory causal binding by itself.

Temporal Binding, Causation, and Agency: Developing a New Theoretical Framework

“…We therefore think that it is at least worth considering the idea that temporal binding in general is a measure of causal belief, and in the next section, we will outline an alternative theoretical framework elaborating this idea. As Suzuki et al (2019, p. 851f.)…”

“…Borhani et al (2017) do not consider the possibility that an explanation of temporal binding on which it is construed as a measure of causal belief might actually provide an alternative to explanations of temporal binding that invoke the idea of a pre‐reflective sense of agency. A recent study showing that this possibility needs to be taken seriously comes from Suzuki et al (2019). They used a virtual reality setup with tactile stimulation to match perceptual stimuli for temporal and spatial information in a condition involving intentional action and a condition involving mere observation of a causal sequence, and they found binding effects of identical magnitude across both types of condition.…”

“…The series of more recent findings demonstrating that temporal binding occurs even in the absence of agency (e.g., Borhani et al, 2017; Buehner, 2012; Suzuki, Lush, Seth, & Roseboom, 2019) seems to force the conclusion that there are at least some circumstances in which temporal binding occurs as a top‐down effect reflecting a belief in causality, rather than as the product of a sense of agency. How should we think of the relationship between explanations of temporal binding as a measure of a sense of agency and explanations of temporal binding as a top‐down effect reflecting a belief in causality?…”

“…Clearly, the two types of explanation need not be in competition with one another, as they might simply single out two separate mechanisms by which binding can occur. If so, this might be thought to provide one possible explanation as to why studies that have compared a condition involving voluntary action with one containing only the observation of a cause–effect sequence have typically found stronger temporal binding in the voluntary action condition (Borhani et al, 2017; though see also Suzuki et al, 2019)—the idea being that both mechanisms are operative in the case of an event brought about by a voluntary action, leading to an additive effect. We can call this general approach a two mechanisms account.…”

Effect of alcohol on the sense of agency in healthy humans

“…A potential limitation of the present study is intrinsic to the IB task. Previous studies show stronger binding between voluntary actions and outcomes than between pairs of sensory stimuli; see also). Thus, we focused here on the effects of alcohol on a task that can reflect SoA, as previously done in studies with dopaminergic medications).…”