2015
DOI: 10.1086/681058
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Institutions as Incentives for Civic Action: Bureaucratic Structures, Civil Society, and Disruptive Protests

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Cited by 28 publications
(31 citation statements)
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References 34 publications
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“…Previous studies have found a connection between corruption perceptions and more unconventional means of participation, like protests and demonstration (Cornell and Grimes 2015;Gingerich 2009;McCann and Domínguez 1998). Given their disillusionment with formal political institutions, I propose that citizens with higher education instead are more likely to use non-institutionalized forms of participation to channel their political engagement when corruption is high.…”
Section: Corruption and Education In Democraciesmentioning
confidence: 80%
“…Previous studies have found a connection between corruption perceptions and more unconventional means of participation, like protests and demonstration (Cornell and Grimes 2015;Gingerich 2009;McCann and Domínguez 1998). Given their disillusionment with formal political institutions, I propose that citizens with higher education instead are more likely to use non-institutionalized forms of participation to channel their political engagement when corruption is high.…”
Section: Corruption and Education In Democraciesmentioning
confidence: 80%
“… The COCOPS Executive Survey data set is used, for example, in Fernández‐Gutiérrez and Van de Walle (); George, Van de Walle, and Hammerschmid (); Hammerschmid et al (); Jeannot, Van de Walle, and Hammerschmid (); Lapuente, Suzuki, and Van de Walle (); Suzuki and Hur (); and Van der Voet and Van Walle (). The QoG Expert Survey is used, for example, in Charron, Dahlström, and Lapuente (); Cornell (); Cornell and Grimes (); Dahlström and Lapuente (); Nistotskaya and Cingolani (); Schuster (, ); and Suzuki and Demircioglu ().…”
mentioning
confidence: 99%
“…That a separation of executive, legislative, and judicial powers benefits accountability is a well-established precept in state building and constitutional thinking. While insights on the importance of separation between the political and administrative spheres of government also have historical roots (Weber, 1921(Weber, /1978Wilson, 1887), this article contributes to the growing appreciation of the benefits of institutional safeguards that keep politics from excessively infusing state organizations and, in particular, bureaucratic careers (Cornell & Grimes, 2015a, 2015bDahlstr€ om & Lapuente, 2017;Geddes, 1994;Gingerich, 2013;Robinson & Verdier, 2013;Nistotskaya & Cingolani, 2016;Shefter, 1994).…”
Section: Co Ncl Us Io Ns An D I M Plica Tio Nsmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…The identification of bureaucratic politicization as a key source of biased policy knowledge draws on insights from two separate strands of prior research. First, scholars studying developing states, in particular, have shed light on the extent and mechanisms through which bureaucratic politicization affects the functioning of government, including the prevalence of clientelist electoral strategies, corruption, service delivery failures, and lower democratic stability (see, among many, Cingolani, Thomsson, & de Crombrugghe, 2015;Cornell & Grimes, 2015a, 2015bCornell & Lapuente, 2014;Dahlstr€ om & Lapuente, 2017;Dahlstr€ om et al, 2012). These scholars have, however, yet to explore the implications of political control of the bureaucracy for policy knowledge.…”
Section: Kno Wledg Ementioning
confidence: 99%
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