Institutions and local growth coalitions in China's urban land reform: The case of Hangzhou High‐Technology Zone

Abstract

China's urban land reform is a gradualist process of transforming a planned land allocation system to an open land market system, while the ownership of the land remains under the control of the state. This process defines the relationships between local government and emerging non-public interest groups in the land development process. These issues can be most clearly seen in the State-Approved Development Zones, where municipalities have been encouraged to promote economic development and test out land policy initiatives. Using the institutionalist and urban growth machine analytical approaches to land development processes, this study examines the operation of development processes and the role of local government and its relationship with other interest groups. By employing a case study research strategy, focused upon the Hangzhou High-Technology Zone, the study uncovered a local government-led growth coalition which featured participation by other interest groups and revealed the applicability and variations when applying two strands of theories to a socialist economy in transition. Besides the land reform policy implications drawn from the case study evidence, the study concludes that the presence of interest groups and the missing community organisations unique to China give new theoretical implications and that both theories work much better with the economic domain than with the political domain largely because of a lagged political reform.Figure 2. Binjiang District and Hangzhou High-Technology Industry Zone (defined by bold lines) Source: http://www.hangzhou.gov.cn (revised by the author). China's urban land reform

Shifting land-based coalitions in Shanghai's second hub

“…It is likely therefore that not all coalition members will benefit equally, and indeed coalitions may even become prey to fissiparous tendencies. Such can be the case when personal interests are involved, as noted by (Qian, 2007), or when the market falters and cools, prompting developers to lose interest (Zhang and Wu, 2008). Finally, there might also be government agencies such as large state-owned enterprises or central government affiliated organisations, that fail to join the coalition or even oppose it (Qian, 2013).…”

“…That local government plays a leadership role is not in dispute (Qian, 2007;Zhang and Wu, 2008;Liu et al, 2012;Qian, 2013). Several writers on Shanghai emphasize specifically the leadership role played by district governments (Yang and Chang, 2007;Zhang 2002;, but to be successful coalitions need to have a vertical as well as horizontal element (Zhang, 2014).…”

“…Local community interests are excluded, whether in inner city neighbourhoods (He and Wu, 2005;Zhang and Wu, 2008) or in peri-urban areas, where it is very difficult to form anti-growth coalitions (Qian, 2007). This is not to say that anti-growth coalitions cannot develop among villagers; on the contrary, popular resistance especially to land grabs by local governments have proliferated (Cai, 2008), but formidable obstacles exist, not least because of the ambivalent role by village committees, whose leaders are often working in collusion with government officials (Wu et al, 2013;Ong, 2014;Li et al, 2014).…”

The role of geographical proximity in the establishment and development of science parks –evidence from Nanjing, China

“…Unlike in Western nations, where the instigators of science parks can be universities, local authorities or public development agencies (Macdonald, 1987;Quintas et al, 1992), it is believed that in China, governments at different administrative levels act as major initiators of science parks, which frequently serve as policy instruments to stimulate the development in high--tech sector (Sutherland, 2005;Tan, 2006;Qian, 2007;Hu et al, 2010). Led by the first 53 state--level science parks built during the 1980s and 1990s, there were 129 national--level science and industry parks as of 2015, 107 provincial--level science parks as of 2007 and no reliable data about municipal or lower administrative levels (Chen, 2009;MOST, 2015).…”

Advancing the knowledge of local health care policy through the growth machine thesis.

“…Bae and Sellers (2007) found temporary a growth coalition in the booming Koyang, South Korea that succumbed to a growth management movement of affluent middle class residents. Qian (2007) identified a regional,…”