2014
DOI: 10.1111/fima.12038
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Institutional Shareholder Investment Horizons and Seasoned Equity Offerings

Abstract: Firms with more short‐term institutional shareholders experience significantly more negative abnormal returns at the announcement of seasoned equity offerings. This effect is strong for primary offerings (only firms receive proceeds), but is not present for secondary offerings (firms do not receive any proceeds). Furthermore, a shorter institutional shareholder investment horizon predicts poorer postissue abnormal operating performance and the negative effect of a shorter shareholder horizon is mitigated by hi… Show more

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Cited by 38 publications
(36 citation statements)
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References 59 publications
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“…In this frame, some articles (Choie, 2016;Markoulis & Neofytou, 2016) targeted on the information asset and stock-taking intelligence of corporate investors, while others (Hao, 2014;Baker, Stein, & Wurgler, 2003;Gibson, Safieddine, & Sonti, 2004) targeted on the trading strategies, tactics and plans, but in both cases no TTF information was given.…”
Section: Motivation and Previous Literaturementioning
confidence: 99%
“…In this frame, some articles (Choie, 2016;Markoulis & Neofytou, 2016) targeted on the information asset and stock-taking intelligence of corporate investors, while others (Hao, 2014;Baker, Stein, & Wurgler, 2003;Gibson, Safieddine, & Sonti, 2004) targeted on the trading strategies, tactics and plans, but in both cases no TTF information was given.…”
Section: Motivation and Previous Literaturementioning
confidence: 99%
“…In this frame, some articles (Markoulis & Neofytou, 2016;Moskowitz, Ooi, & Pedersen, 2012) targeted on the information asset and stock-taking intelligence of corporate investors, while others (Hao, 2014;Baker, Stein, & Wurgler, 2003) targeted the trading strategies and plans, but in both cases no TTF information was given. Gibson, Safieddine, and Sonti (2004) report that seasoned equity and option initiatives, with the bigger boost in corporate share-holding, are detected between the (relative to "timing") quarters −1 and +1 and qualify this outperform to their competitive convenience asset position.…”
Section: Motivation and Previous Literaturementioning
confidence: 99%
“…Also, in Skyba"s article no TTF functionalities were discussed. Furthermore, Hao (2014) states that companies with higher short-term non-commercial shareowners (i.e. speculators) enjoy more negative atypical results at the report release timing (intraday trading) and concludes that momentary corporate shareowners and speculators are not prompted to risk their capital and profit in overnight positions (a risky TTF functionality).…”
Section: Problem Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Chen, Harford, and Li [20] and Hao [14] argue that long-term institutions tend to be passive traders not interested therefore for the IPO/TTF functionalities. On the other hand, momentary, swing, and intraday trading institutions (and speculators as well) are better informed and tend to trade short-term (or even intraday) the IPO initiatives to materialize their own informational convenience asset position.…”
Section: Corporate Share-holding Around the Equity Ipo Initiativesmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Also, in this case the TTF functionalities were not discussed. Furthermore, Hao [14] states that companies with higher short-term non-commercial shareowners (speculators) experience more negative atypical returns at the report release (TTF timing) of IPOs and concludes that momentary corporate shareowners and speculators are not prompted to control the usage of the lifted trading capital and profit [4].…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%