Informational Robustness of Competitive Equilibria

Krasa, Stefan; Shafer, Wayne

doi:10.1006/jeth.2000.2771

Journal of Economic Theory

2001

DOI: 10.1006/jeth.2000.2771

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Informational Robustness of Competitive Equilibria

Stefan Krasa¹,

Wayne Shafer²

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Cited by 4 publications

(2 citation statements)

References 12 publications

(15 reference statements)

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“…Along these lines,Krasa and Shafer (1998) analyze a related notion of informational smallness in a Walrasian market.…”

mentioning

confidence: 99%

Informational Size and Incentive Compatibility

McLean

Postlewaite

2002

Econometrica

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We examine a general equilibrium model with asymmetrically informed agents. The presence of asymmetric information generally presents a conflict between incentive compatibility and Pareto efficiency. We present a notion of informational size and show that the conflict between incentive compatibility and efficiency can be made arbitrarily small if agents are of sufficiently small informational size.

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“…Along these lines,Krasa and Shafer (1998) analyze a related notion of informational smallness in a Walrasian market.…”

mentioning

confidence: 99%

Informational Size and Incentive Compatibility

McLean

Postlewaite

2002

Econometrica

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

“…Along these lines,Krasa and Shafer (1998) analyze a related notion of informational smallness in a Walrasian market.…”

mentioning

confidence: 99%

Informational Size and Incentive Compatibility

McLean¹,

Postlewaite²

2002

Econometrica

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show abstract

Perfect competition in asymmetric information economies: compatibility of efficiency and incentives

Sun

Yannelis

2007

Journal of Economic Theory

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Informational Robustness of Competitive Equilibria

Cited by 4 publications

References 12 publications

Informational Size and Incentive Compatibility

Informational Size and Incentive Compatibility

Informational Size and Incentive Compatibility

Perfect competition in asymmetric information economies: compatibility of efficiency and incentives

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