Information Sharing in Competing Supply Chains with Production Cost Reduction

Ha, Albert Y.; Tian, Quan; Tong, Shilu

doi:10.1287/msom.2016.0607

Cited by 236 publications

(142 citation statements)

References 47 publications

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“…Our study is also related to the literature on information sharing in supply chain settings, such as one‐manufacturer‐one‐retailer (e.g.,Guo, ; Guo & Iyer, ; Mittendorf et al, ; Jiang et al, ; Huang & Wang, ; Teunter et al, ; Zhang et al, ), one‐manufacturer‐multiple‐retailers (e.g.,Li, ; Li & Zhang, ; Wu et al, ; Wang et al, ) and competing supply chains (Guo et al, ; Shamir & Shin, ; Ha et al, ; Guan et al, ; Wei et al, ). Some studies also investigate information sharing in a dual‐channel supply chain setting (Yue & Liu, ; Zhang et al, ).…”

Section: Literature Reviewmentioning

confidence: 99%

Manufacturer product quality information disclosure with channel encroachment in the E‐commerce age

2020

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This study investigates the interplay between a manufacturer's quality disclosure and channel encroachment. We show that there exists a U-shaped pattern between the manufacturer's payoff and the disclosure cost, whereas the retailer's payoff exhibits a more complicated and nonmonotonic relationship with respect to the disclosure cost. Both firms may benefit from the increase of the disclosure cost when it falls into the intermediate range and when the channel substitution rate is not too low. The increase of the encroachment cost always hurts the manufacturer, and it may even hurt the retailer if it is medium and if the channel substitution rate is low.

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Section: Literature Reviewmentioning

confidence: 99%

Manufacturer product quality information disclosure with channel encroachment in the E‐commerce age

2020

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“…Besides, the retailer is able to make a more accurate demand forecast by obtaining demand signal y (e.g., consumers' preference), which is an unbiased estimator of θ. Also, the manufacturer can update Complexity his production cost by acquiring a signal x from the raw material market, which is an unbiased estimator of c. We assume a linear-expectation information structure: the posterior expectation of the market condition E(θ | y) is a linear function of the signal y and the posterior expectation of the production cost E(c | x) is a linear function of the signal x (these assumptions are commonly used in the literature [33,[38][39][40][41][42]).…”

Section: Information Structurementioning

confidence: 99%

Contracts Adjustment under Bilateral Information Updating in a Supply Chain

Wang

Zhou

et al. 2020

Complexity

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This paper investigates contracts adjustment between one manufacturer and one retailer under bilateral information updating. The manufacturer incurs uncertain production cost and the retailer faces uncertain demand, but they can acquire independent signals to update production cost and demand, respectively. They commit an initial agreement on an initial wholesale price, minimum order quantity, and information sharing as well as the transfer payment and decisions adjustment when information is updated. We find that due to the joint impact of production cost variation and market variation, the manufacturer may not decrease (increase) her wholesale price when the updated production cost is lower (higher) than expected. The retailer places an additional order even if the wholesale price rises when the market outlook is good, but places an order with the minimum order quantity even if the wholesale price falls when the market outlook is bad. Secondly, for a certain level of information accuracy of the production cost and market demand, the retailer is always better off with information updating, but the manufacturer may be worse off with information updating when facing a bad market outlook. Thirdly, when information accuracy of the production cost and market demand varies, the manufacturer only benefits from a high accuracy of production cost. Profits of the retailer and the supply chain are increasing (decreasing) with accuracy of production cost if the updated production cost is larger (smaller) than expected.

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“…(4) The environmental benefit is a measure of the environmental consequences of human social activities [47]. This paper referred to the environmental impact of enterprises in the process of the production and circulation of products [48]. Similar to the research on measuring environmental benefits through total carbon emissions [49][50][51][52], this study assumed that the utility function of an environmental benefits objective is the product of the greening level and market demand, which is:…”

Section: Model Hypothesesmentioning

confidence: 99%

A Multi-Objective Optimization Model for Green Supply Chain Considering Environmental Benefits

et al. 2019

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Whether the upstream and downstream members in a supply chain (considering environmental objectives) simultaneously stabilize economic benefits has become an important problem in the process of green development. However, few quantitative studies on green supply chains have considered environmental and economic benefits to realize multi-objective optimization. To study operation and cooperation strategies with a consideration of the different objective on the level of supply chain, we first establish a green supply chain game model with profit and environment objectives simultaneously considered by the manufacturer. Then, we analyze the multi-objective decisions of the supply chain members under centralized control using a manufacturer-led Stackelberg game and revenue-sharing contract. Using the manufacturer's environmental preference as a variable, the effects of environmental benefits on the supply chain are also investigated. Finally, this study determines that the manufacturer's profit will be reduced after considering the objective of environmental benefits, while the retailer's profit, product greenness, and environmental benefits will be improved. Meanwhile, the total profit of the green supply chain will first increase and then decrease. In particular, a revenue-sharing contract can facilitate the coordination of multiple objectives; in this way, both the manufacturer and the retailer achieve higher profits and environmental benefits compared to a decentralized control condition, which is of great significance in achieving a win-win situation for the economy and the environment.

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Information Sharing in Competing Supply Chains with Production Cost Reduction

Abstract: If it is the author's pre-published version, changes introduced as a result of publishing processes such as copy-editing and formatting may not be reflected in this document. For a definitive version of this work, please refer to the published version.

Cited by 236 publications

References 47 publications

Manufacturer product quality information disclosure with channel encroachment in the E‐commerce age

Manufacturer product quality information disclosure with channel encroachment in the E‐commerce age

Contracts Adjustment under Bilateral Information Updating in a Supply Chain

A Multi-Objective Optimization Model for Green Supply Chain Considering Environmental Benefits

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