Information, Candidate Selection, and the Quality of Representation: Evidence from Nepal

Abstract

How do we improve the quality of representation in new democracies? This paper studies candidate selection by party leaders and asks whether poor information about public preferences can lead elite choices to diverge from mass opinion. Working with a political party in Nepal, we show that while elites value voter preferences, these preferences only explain onethird of elite candidate selection. Next, we embed an experiment in actual candidate selection deliberations for this party and find that party leaders not only select different candidates when polling data are presented to them, but that their updated decisions also improve the party's vote share. By opening the black-box of candidate selection, this paper demonstrates that closing the information gap between elites and voters has the power to improve the quality of representation.

Understanding and Reducing Biases in Elite Beliefs About the Electorate

“…Time-constrained politicians are exposed to a vast array of cues available through different channels: direct contacts from constituents, lobbyists, the media, social networks, political parties, or peers. To condense these overlapping demands is a daunting task, and the information available to legislators is often incomplete (Butler and Nickerson 2011;Gulzar et al 2020;Pereira 2019). This context offers fertile ground for the adoption of cognitive shortcuts.…”

Understanding and Reducing Biases in Elite Beliefs About the Electorate

“…Timeconstrained politicians are exposed to a vast array of cues available through different channels: direct contacts from constituents, lobbyists, the media, social networks, political parties, or peers. To condense these overlapping demands is a daunting task, and the information available to legislators is often incomplete (Butler and Nickerson 2011;Gulzar, Haai, and Paudel 2020;Pereira 2019). This context offers fertile ground for the adoption of cognitive shortcuts.…”

Who Enters Politics and Why?

“…For instance, gatekeepers in parties often identify and recruit candidates from their own networks, a process that disadvantages women candidates (Cruz et al 2017, Karpowitz et al 2017. Party elites actively alter the choice of candidates available to voters by directing resources and attention to their preferred candidates (Cohen et al 2009, Dancygier et al 2015, Galasso & Nannicini 2011, Gulzar et al 2021a, Hassell 2017, Shaukat 2019). In the absence of party support, candidates struggle to compete and may be more likely to drop out of the race (Broockman 2014).…”

“…Even when these decisions are taken with electability as a chief concern, party leaders' beliefs about who is electable might not be accurate. However, Gulzar et al (2021a) and Casey et al (2019) show in field experiments in Nepal and Sierra Leone, respectively, that party leaders may be responsive to polling information when it exists and that this responsiveness may improve electoral returns for both parties and voters. Smith & Tsutsumi (2016) show that in Japan, recruitment by party elites that allowed party outsiders to apply led to candidates who were closer to voter preferences.…”