Influence of rent-seeking on safety supervision in Chinese construction: Based on a simulation technology

Feng, Qun; Shi, Xuejun; Zhang, Jianghua

doi:10.1016/j.techfore.2018.10.016

Cited by 21 publications

(13 citation statements)

References 25 publications

Supporting

Mentioning

Contrasting

Order By: Relevance

“…According to rent-seeking theory and evolutionary game theory, the four factors on rent-seeking are obvious to obtain based on practices of construction project, including supervision cost, supervision likelihood, supervision success rate and penalty intensity factor. Similar studies can be seen in previous related researches (Feng et al, 2019;Mei et al, 2017;Shurong & Miao, 2012). Additionally, complexity and the unprecedented scales of projects make them difficult to manage, the cost often increases with the scale of the project (Yang et al, 2018).…”

Section: Fundamental Hypothesis Of Evolutionary Gamesupporting

confidence: 80%

“…Mei et al (2017) suggested that BIM and IPD have a positive impact on rentseeking activities of construction projects. A simulation technology was run to study the interactions among the stakeholders to observe the impact of rent-seeking on the related benefits and safety statuses (Feng et al, 2019). Qin (2017) analyzed the rent-seeking from the prospective of legislation, regulation, mechanism and motivation and gave his suggestions on how to prevent such behaviors.…”

Section: Literature Review 1rent-seeking In Constructionmentioning

confidence: 99%

See 1 more Smart Citation

Rent-Seeking Decisions of the Main Participants in Construction Projects Based on Evolutionary-Game and System Dynamics

Zuo

Wang

2022

Journal of Civil Engineering and Management

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

The performance of a construction project can be severely harmed by its participants’ rent-seeking. In order to prevent such attempt, this research integrates the evolutionary game theory with system dynamics method to simulate the impact of the change of some factors that may cause/reduce rent-seeking. Based on the analysis of the behavioral characteristics and interactive relationships of the main participants (the owner, supervisor, and contractor), an evolutionary game model is constructed and simulated with the method of system dynamics based on the replication dynamic equation of the mixed strategy solution of the three-party static game model. By assigning the parameters of project scale, supervision likelihood, supervision success rate, supervision cost, and penalty intensity, the interaction mechanism of the participants on each factor is revealed through a case-based simulation. The results show that the impacts of these factors on participants’ rent-seeking decisions are significantly different. Furthermore, some management suggestions are provided to prevent rent-seeking for project owner according to the research conclusions. This research can help the project owners take proper measures to prevent rent-seeking of the supervisors and the contractors to improve the performances of the projects.

show abstract

Section: Fundamental Hypothesis Of Evolutionary Gamesupporting

confidence: 80%

Section: Literature Review 1rent-seeking In Constructionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Rent-Seeking Decisions of the Main Participants in Construction Projects Based on Evolutionary-Game and System Dynamics

Zuo

Wang

2022

Journal of Civil Engineering and Management

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

“…In China, the supervision of green buildings involves many governmental departments, such the housing and construction departments, environmental protection departments, and other governmental functional agencies. Because the current policies are relatively general, various departments and agencies have not been closely linked, leading to a phenomenon of prevarication or overlapping responsibilities among different departments [90]. Thus, the supervision system of green buildings needs to be improved.…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

What Hinders the Development of Green Building? An Investigation of China

Jiang

Cai

et al. 2019

IJERPH

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

With the rapid development of the economy, people are paying more and more attention to the environmental problems. In this circumstance, the concept of a circular economy is proposed for making efficient use of resources and minimizing the production of waste and other emissions. Each year, the construction sector consumes a vast volume of resources and makes impacts on the environment. To align with the development of the circular economy, the concept of green building is proposed. In China, though the concept of green building has been promoted for decades, the development status is far from optimistic. Thus, this paper aims to investigate the barriers that hinder green building development (GBD) in China. Through a systematic review and semi-structured interviews with experienced industrial practitioners, 24 potential barriers of GBD in China were identified. A questionnaire survey was then conducted for data collection. After descriptive and inferential statistical analyses, a partial least squares structural equation model (PLS-SEM) was established to investigate the impacts of different barriers on GBD. Results showed that the lack of policy and industry guidance, the immature market environment, and the lack of environmental awareness are the most important GBD barriers in China. This research can assist stakeholders in better understanding the status of GBD in China and enable decision-makers to formulate appropriate strategies to promote green building.

show abstract

“…According to the simulation results in Figure 10 , Figure 13 and Figure 15 , the government’s strategy selection can be influenced by the government’s penalty on contractors and contractors’ rule-breaking behavior, which is in line with the previous study [ 19 , 66 ]. However, when considering rent-seeking between the government and contractors, Feng et al raised the argument that rent-seeking weakens the regulation utility of safety supervision [ 67 ] and Chen et al found that government supervision probability is influenced by penalties and bribery [ 68 ]. Therefore, rent-seeking can make relationships between the government and contractors much more complicated and could be included in a further study.…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Developing a Dynamic Supervision Mechanism to Improve Construction Safety Investment Supervision Efficiency in China: Theoretical Simulation of Evolutionary Game Process

Gong

Gao

Zhou

et al. 2021

IJERPH

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

The construction industry suffers from poor safety performance caused by the joint effect of insufficient safety investment by contractors and inefficient safety supervision by the government because of the information gap between the two sides. The present study aims to put forward a new pathway to improve safety investment supervision efficiency and analyze the decision-making interactions of stakeholders under this new pathway. For this purpose, this study establishes a safety investment information system to eliminate the information gap between the government and contractors for construction projects in China and further develops a dynamic safety investment supervision mechanism based on this. Evolutionary game theory is used to describe the decision-making interactions among stakeholders under the current static supervision mechanism and the dynamic supervision mechanism proposed in this research. Moreover, system dynamics is adopted to simulate the evolutionary game process and analyze the supervision effect and equilibrium state of different supervision mechanisms. The results reveal that the proposed safety investment information system could facilitate the transition of the supervision mode from static to dynamic; the evolutionarily stable strategy does not exist in the current static penalty scenario; and the dynamic supervision mechanism that correlates penalties with contractors’ unlawful behavior probability can restrain the fluctuation of the evolutionary game model effectively and the players’ strategy choices gradually stabilize in the equilibrium state. The results validate the effectiveness of the proposed dynamic supervision mechanism in improving supervision efficiency. This study not only contributes to the literature on safety supervision policy-making but also helps to improve supervision efficiency in practice.

show abstract

Influence of rent-seeking on safety supervision in Chinese construction: Based on a simulation technology

Cited by 21 publications

References 25 publications

Rent-Seeking Decisions of the Main Participants in Construction Projects Based on Evolutionary-Game and System Dynamics

Rent-Seeking Decisions of the Main Participants in Construction Projects Based on Evolutionary-Game and System Dynamics

What Hinders the Development of Green Building? An Investigation of China

Developing a Dynamic Supervision Mechanism to Improve Construction Safety Investment Supervision Efficiency in China: Theoretical Simulation of Evolutionary Game Process

Contact Info

Product

Resources

About