Inferential Conditionals and Evidentiality

Krzyżanowska, Karolina; Wenmackers, Sylvia; Douven, Igor

doi:10.1007/s10849-013-9178-4

Cited by 40 publications

(24 citation statements)

References 29 publications

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“…There is general agreement as to what the problem is: there is no dependence in this case (e.g. Krzyzanowska et al 2013). Of course, there are many indicative conditionals that are appropriate, although there is no dependence.…”

Section: A Dependence Requirement For Conditionalsmentioning

confidence: 97%

Conditionals, Causality and Conditional Probability

Rooij

Schulz

2018

J of Log Lang and Inf

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Section: A Dependence Requirement For Conditionalsmentioning

confidence: 97%

Conditionals, Causality and Conditional Probability

Rooij

Schulz

2018

J of Log Lang and Inf

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“…Independently, Krzyzȧnowska et al (2013Krzyzȧnowska et al ( , 2014, Douven (2016), and Douven et al (2018) followed the above cited linguists in analysing conditionals as corresponding to arguments or, to put it differently, expressing inferences from their antecedents to consequents. Unlike our predecessors, in Krzyzȧnowska et al (2013Krzyzȧnowska et al ( , 2014, we base our analysis on an observation due to Douven and Verbrugge (2010) that the inferential relation connecting the premises and the conclusion of an argument expressed by a conditional does not always have to be deductive. Douven and Verbrugge argued that inferential conditionals can be classied analogously to how inferences are, ever since Peirce's seminal work on arguments (see, e.g., Burch 2014), typically classied.…”

Section: Inferential Conditionals and The Source Of The Uselessnessmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Taking the above classication of conditionals for granted, in Krzyzȧnowska et al (2014) we proposed a new analysis of the Gibbard's Poker game scenario, defending the view that conditionals are truth-evaluable, though their semantic values are highly context-sensitive. What needs to be picked up from the context, on this account, are not only the background premises, but also the kind of an inference that connects the conditional's antecedent and its consequent.…”

Section: Inferential Conditionals and The Source Of The Uselessnessmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…In Krzyzȧnowska et al (2014), we analyse Zack's assertion of (9) and Jack's (10) as expressing inferential connections of different types. Jack's assumption of the antecedent, "Pete calls," together with the background information on the distribution of cards and on the rules of the game leads him to the conclusion expressed by the consequent: "Pete will lose."…”

Section: Inferential Conditionals and The Source Of The Uselessnessmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Deliberationally Useless Conditionals

Krzyżanowska¹

2018

Episteme

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Decision theorists tend to treat indicative conditionals with reservation, because they can easily lead a deliberating agent astray. However, many indicatives can be very helpful in contexts of deliberation, so denying them all a role in such contexts seems to be overkill. We show that a recently revived inferential view on conditionals provides a straightforward explanation of why some indicatives are unassertable in contexts of deliberation and hints at a way of telling “deliberationally useless” and “deliberationally useful” conditionals apart.

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“…It is well known that conditionals and modals are related (e.g. Clancy et al 1997;Beller 2008; Kolodny & MacFarlane 2010;Schulz 2010;Kratzer 2012;Over et al 2013;Krzyżanowska et al 2013). This relationship is most obvious in the so-called explicitly modalised conditionals, where a modal expression is (typically) present in the consequent clause of the conditional.…”

Section: Conditionals and Modalsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Reporting Conditionals with Modals

Sztencel

Duffy

2018

Perspectives in Pragmatics, Philosophy &Amp; Psychology

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Conditionals and modals work in tandem in some instances of practical reasoning, or decision making. Consider the following example (from Kratzer 2012): a. I want to become a mayor. b. (q) I will become a mayor only if (p) I go to the pub. c. Therefore, I should go to the pub. Given what the cogniser wants (a) and the relevant circumstances (b), the conclusion that the cogniser goes to the pub comes out as necessary. Hence, the presence of the necessity modal should in (c). Indeed, given the context of (a), the necessity modal in (c) is simply a reflection of the necessity of p for q, which is overtly represented by the use of the 'only if p, q' construction. This chapter looks into whether indirect reports of conditionals-in particular, indirect reports which involve the use of a modal verb-are sensitive to the necessity of p for q in cases where necessity is not overtly represented in a conditional, as in 'if p, q' formulations. We report on two online experiments into the relation between (i) perceived necessity or sufficiency of the truth of a conditional antecedent for the truth of the consequent, and (ii) the formulation of an indirect report of a conditional with necessity or possibility modals (have to, should, could). In Experiment 1, the 'necessity/sufficiency of p for q' variable was manipulated by contextually altering the number of alternative antecedents (e.g. Cummins et al. 1991; Thompson 1994; Politzer 2003). It was found that modals used in indirect reports of 'if p, q' conditionals co-vary with the number of alternative antecedents in predictable ways. This suggests that modals used in indirect reports of 'if p, q' conditionals may be a diagnostic for biconditional versus material interpretations of conditionals. The aim of Experiment 2 was to find out whether the results of Experiment 1 could be replicated in contexts which lower/eliminate the believability of the conditionals. It was found that manipulating the believability variable has no reliable effect on the results.

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Inferential Conditionals and Evidentiality

Cited by 40 publications

References 29 publications

Conditionals, Causality and Conditional Probability

Conditionals, Causality and Conditional Probability

Deliberationally Useless Conditionals

Reporting Conditionals with Modals

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