Incumbents and protectionism: The political economy of foreign entry liberalization

Chari, Anusha; Gupta, Nandini

doi:10.1016/j.jfineco.2007.07.006

Cited by 103 publications

(57 citation statements)

References 27 publications

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“…Prior research suggests that foreign institutional investors play a more active role than local investors in advocating for better firm-level governance; e.g., Gillan and Starks (2003) and Ferreira and Matos (2008). Although SOEs typically lobby against these policy reversals (Chari andGupta, 2008), Stulz (1999) argues that liberalizing capital markets (i.e., opening equity markets to foreign investors) improves corporate governance practices, including the commitment to better disclosure. In the same vein, Doidge (2004) and Doidge et al (2004 show that cross-listing in the US, which imposes higher disclosure standards on firms, constrains the consumption of private benefits by controlling shareholders.…”

Section: Article In Pressmentioning

confidence: 99%

Auditor choice in privatized firms: Empirical evidence on the role of state and foreign owners

Guedhami

Pittman

Saffar

2009

Journal of Accounting and Economics

239

155

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a b s t r a c tWe rely on a unique dataset of 176 privatizations from 32 countries to extend recent research on the link between the political economy and accounting transparency by examining the importance of shareholders' proportionate holdings to auditor choice. Consistent with our predictions on shareholders' diverging interests in high-quality financial reporting that manifests in auditor choice, we report strong, robust evidence that privatized firms worldwide become less (more) likely to appoint a Big Four auditor with the extent of state (foreign) ownership. Moreover, we find that these relations between shareholders' equity stakes and auditor choice strengthen when country-level governance institutions are weaker.

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Section: Article In Pressmentioning

confidence: 99%

Auditor choice in privatized firms: Empirical evidence on the role of state and foreign owners

Guedhami

Pittman

Saffar

2009

Journal of Accounting and Economics

239

155

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“…State-owned EMNCs benefit from their connections to the government and their privileges as state-owned firms (Cuervo-Cazurra, Inkpen, Musacchio, & Ramaswamy, 2014), and thus have more to lose from promoting pro-market reforms at home (Chari & Gupta, 2008). Managers of state-owned firms may at most push to achieve autonomy from the government in their decision-making (Aharoni, 1982;Musacchio & Lazzarini, 2014), while keeping the benefits that come from connections to the government in the form of soft budgets and favorable regulation (Kornai, 1980), thus being less likely to promote additional pro-market reforms.…”

Section: Private Versus State-owned Firmsmentioning

confidence: 99%

The Co-Evolution of Pro-Market Reforms and Emerging Market Multinationals

Cuervo-Cazurra

2015

Emerging Economies and Multinational Enterprises

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If you would like to write for this, or any other Emerald publication, then please use our Emerald for Authors service information about how to choose which publication to write for and submission guidelines are available for all. Please visit www.emeraldinsight.com/authors for more information. About Emerald www.emeraldinsight.comEmerald is a global publisher linking research and practice to the benefit of society. The company manages a portfolio of more than 290 journals and over 2,350 books and book series volumes, as well as providing an extensive range of online products and additional customer resources and services.Emerald is both COUNTER 4 and TRANSFER compliant. The organization is a partner of the Committee on Publication Ethics (COPE) and also works with Portico and the LOCKSS initiative for digital archive preservation. THE CO-EVOLUTION OF PRO-MARKET REFORMS AND EMERGING MARKET MULTINATIONALSAlvaro Cuervo-Cazurra ABSTRACT I study the relationship between pro-market reforms and the expansion of emerging market multinational companies (EMNCs). Extending institutional economics, I propose a co-evolutionary process, whereby pro-market reforms in emerging markets induce the transformation of domestic firms into EMNCs, and the global expansion of EMNCs in turn facilitates the deepening of pro-market reforms in the home country. Specifically, I first explain how pro-market reforms lead to the emergence of EMNCs via international competitiveness, upgrading needs, and escape; I then explain how the global expansion of EMNCs leads to a deepening of pro-market reforms at home via learning, spillovers, and lobbying. I complement these explanations with a discussion of contingencies at the firm (private vs. state, domestic vs. foreign firms),

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“…In sectors 11 (beverage production), 13, 14, 15 (textile, wearing apparel, leather and related products), 19 (coke and refined petroleum products), 22 (rubber and plastic products) and 26 (computer electronic and optical products), the average TFP of domestic firms are higher than that of FOAs. This trend is prominent in the case of highly concentrated industries and industries employing low-income and unskilled workers (Chari and Gupta, 2008). A possible explanation is that domestic firms in these industries face weak labour regulations domestically and are therefore in a position to extract higher returns from employees, although the price of labour is the same for FOAs.…”

Section: Model Estimationmentioning

confidence: 99%