Impulsive and self-control choices in opioid-dependent patients and non-drug-using control patients: Drug and monetary rewards.

Madden, Gregory J.; Petry, Nancy M.; Badger, Gary J.; Bickel, Warren K.

doi:10.1037/1064-1297.5.3.256

Cited by 830 publications

(780 citation statements)

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“…(1999) showed that substance abusers discounted delayed outcomes at greater rates than non-abusers. Similar findings have been reported with abusers of nicotine (Bickel et al, 1999), opioids (Madden et al, 1997), and alcohol (Petry, 2001;Vuchinich and Simpson, 1998). Despite the fact that a correlation between drug abuse (and other behaviors often characterized as impulsive) and delay discounting has been demonstrated, it is not clear whether increased delay discounting underlies drug abuse and other disorders or if long-term exposure to drugs or other variables underlie increased delay discounting.…”

Section: Introductionsupporting

confidence: 60%

“…This definition has led to the development of a quantitative model referred to as delay discounting (Mazur, 1987) that suggests that the value of a reinforcer is discounted or devalued as a result of its delay to presentation. This model has been supported by the findings from numerous experiments (e.g., Green et al, 1994;Madden et al, 1997;Mazur, 1987Mazur, , 1998Myerson and Green, 1995;Petry and Casarella, 1999). (1999) showed that substance abusers discounted delayed outcomes at greater rates than non-abusers.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 70%

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Effects of clomipramine on self-control choice in Lewis and Fischer 344 rats

Anderson

Woolverton

2005

Pharmacology Biochemistry and Behavior

118

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Rates of delay discounting (impulsive choice) have been shown to vary among individuals, particularly people who abuse drugs relative to those who do not, but factors that may contribute to these differences have not been identified. To explore a role for possible genetic and neurochemical determinants, Lewis (n=8) and Fischer 344 (n=8) rats were allowed to choose between one food pellet delivered immediately and three food pellets delivered after increasing delays. The delays to the large reinforcer (0, 10, 20, 40, 60 s) were increased across five blocks of trials in daily experimental sessions. For both groups of rats, choice for the larger reinforcer decreased as the delay to presentation increased. However, the Lewis rats were more likely to choose the smaller, immediate reinforcer earlier in the session, i.e., at shorter large-reinforcer delays, than the Fisher 344 rats. This difference in choice was statistically significant. Repeated administration of 3.0 mg/kg, i.p. clomipramine (mean of last five sessions) did not significantly alter choice, relative to baseline, for either strain. The present findings suggest that differences in delay discounting/impulsive choice may involve genetic, e.g., neurochemical, differences.

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Section: Introductionsupporting

confidence: 60%

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 70%

Effects of clomipramine on self-control choice in Lewis and Fischer 344 rats

Anderson

Woolverton

2005

Pharmacology Biochemistry and Behavior

118

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“…That is, a given amount of a drug might be discounted more steeply than a given amount of money if the drug reward was worth less than the monetary reward. It is important to note that the Madden et al (1997), Odum et al (2000), Giordano et al (2002), and Coffey et al (2003) studies all tried to control for possible effects of amount when comparing the monetary and drug rewards. For example, Madden et al (1997) compared hypothetical choices between amounts of money available immediately and $1,000 available after a delay with choices between amounts of heroin available immediately and $1,000 worth of heroin (based on the current street price) available after a delay, whereas Odum et al (2000) also adjusted the amount of heroin based on price, but did so on an individual basis.…”

Section: Applications To Group Differencesmentioning

confidence: 99%

A Discounting Framework for Choice With Delayed and Probabilistic Rewards.

Green¹,

Myerson²

2004

Psychological Bulletin

1,387

1,294

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When choosing between delayed or uncertain outcomes, individuals discount the value of such outcomes on the basis of the expected time to or the likelihood of their occurrence. In an integrative review of the expanding experimental literature on discounting, the authors show that although the same form of hyperbola-like function describes discounting of both delayed and probabilistic outcomes, a variety of recent findings are inconsistent with a single-process account. The authors also review studies that compare discounting in different populations and discuss the theoretical and practical implications of the findings. The present effort illustrates the value of studying choice involving both delayed and probabilistic outcomes within a general discounting framework that uses similar experimental procedures and a common analytical approach.Choice is relatively predictable when the alternatives differ on only one dimension. For example, if individuals are offered a choice between two rewards that differ only in amount, they generally choose the larger rather than the smaller reward. Similarly, if offered a choice between two rewards that differ only in delay, individuals tend to choose the reward available sooner rather than the one available later, and if offered a choice between two alternatives that differ only in probability, they tend to choose the more certain reward. These same general principles, and a complementary set of principles for negative outcomes (e.g., smaller punishments will be chosen over larger ones), apply both to humans and other animals. These behavioral tendencies obviously make both economic and evolutionary sense.Problems arise, however, when choice options differ on more than one dimension-for example, when an individual must choose between a smaller reward available sooner and a larger reward available later. It is also unclear, in general, which alternative an individual would (or should) select when choosing between a smaller, more certain reward and a larger, less certain one or between a less certain reward available sooner and a more certain, but more delayed, reward. These problems are only compounded when rewards differ on all three dimensions (i.e., amount, delay, and probability). The central issue is how individuals make trade-offs among their preferences on these dimensions (Keeney & Raiffa, 1993).This issue is not only of theoretical interest; it also has implications for everyday decision making, which often involves outcomes that differ on multiple dimensions. Examples of such decisions include deciding whether to purchase a less expensive item that can be enjoyed now or to save for a more expensive one; whether to choose a risky investment that potentially could pay off at a high rate or one that pays a low but guaranteed rate of return; and whether to buy

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“…We will deal here with only the latter two mechanisms Across a range of addicted populations, the evidence has been at least consistent with the hypothesis that steep discounting is a factor in substance abuse. Relative to control participants, significantly steeper delay discounting has been observed in a heterogeneous group of substance-dependent subjects (Ainslie and Haendel, 1983), heavy social drinkers and problem drinkers (Vuchinich and Simpson, 1998), smokers (Mitchell, 1999, Fuchs, 1982, methamphetamine dependent individuals (Monterosso et al, in press), and opiod dependent individuals (Kirby et al, 1999, Wallace, 1979, Madden et al, 1997, Bretteville-Jensen, 1999. Also of interest, heroin addicts who shared needles have been observed to discount money more steeply than heroin addicts that did not share needles (Odum et al, 2000).…”

Section: Empirical Studies Of Discounting In Addicted Populationsmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…A set of such inferred indifference points over a range of delays allows the estimation of an overall delay discount function relating delay to value. Such studies have been carried out with choices between points on a counter (Forzano and Logue, 1994), hypothetical health outcomes (Chapman, 1996, Chapman, 2000, Chapman et al, 2001, van der Pol and Cairns, 2001, hypothetical drug or alcohol (Madden et al, 1997, Petry, 2001, hypothetical money with context (Thaler, 1981, Chapman, 1996, Chesson and Viscusi, 2000, Bohm, 1994, hypothetical money without context (Fuchs, 1982, Ainslie and Haendel, 1983, Madden et al, 1997, actual money (Crean et al, 2000, Ainslie and Haendel, 1983, Kirby and Herrnstein, 1995, Richards et al, 1999, Wallace, 1979, consumer goods (Kirby and Herrnstein, 1995), food (Kirby and Herrnstein, 1995, Mischel et al, 1969, Mischel and Grusec, 1967, Forzano and Logue, 1994; and juice (Logue et al, 1990). Less frequently, choices among punishments have been used as well, including shocks (Cook and Barnes, 1964, Hare, 1966, Mischel et al, 1969 and aversive noise (Navarick, 1982).…”

Section: Hyperbolic Discounting As a Factor In Addictive Behaviormentioning

confidence: 99%

The behavioral economics of will in recovery from addiction

Monterosso

Ainslie

2007

Drug and Alcohol Dependence

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Behavioral economic studies demonstrate that rewards are discounted proportionally with their delay (hyperbolic discounting). Hyperbolic discounting implies temporary preference for smaller rewards when they are imminent, and this concept has been widely considered by researchers interested in the causes of addictive behavior. Far less consideration has been given to the fact that systematic preference reversal also predicts various self-control phenomena, which may also be analyzed from a behavioral economic perspective.Here we summarize self-control phenomena predicted by hyperbolic discounting, particularly with application to the field of addiction. Of greatest interest is the phenomenon of choice bundling, an increase in motivation to wait for delayed rewards that can be expected to result from making choices in whole categories. Specifically, when a person's expectations about her own future behavior are conditional upon her current behavior, the value of these expectations is added to the contingencies for the current behavior, resulting in reduced impulsivity. Hyperbolic discounting provides a bottomup basis for the intuitive learning of choice bundling, the properties of which match common descriptions of willpower. We suggest that the bundling effect can also be discerned in the advice of 12-step programs.Recovery from addiction is a distinctly human phenomenon (Logan, 1993), can be extraordinarily abrupt without any obvious changes in contingencies (Premack, 1970, Miller andC'de Baca, 2001), and is commonly described in spiritual terms (Bien and Bien, 2002). Thus it may seem that although behavioral economic and other reductionist approaches are productively applied to the onset of addiction, they are not applicable to studying recovery from addiction (for example, see Miller's 2003 discussion of his skepticism). Here we want to make the case that behavioral economics sheds new light on recovery from addiction.Address correspondence to either: John Monterosso, PhD, Department of Psychiatry, University of California at Los Angeles, 760 Westwood Plaza; Rm C8-532, Los Angeles, CA 90024, Phone: (310) 794-1736, email: jmont@ucla.edu, George Ainslie, M.D., Department of Psychiatry, Coatesville VA Medical Center, Coatesville, PA 19320, Phone (610) 384-7711, Email: george.ainslie@va.gov. With reference to formulas 1 and 2, consider the following example. If Rate is .5 and Amount is 10 the exponential value at Delays =1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 will be 5, 2.5, 1.25, .625, .3125, .15625; the hyperbolic value at those Delays will be 5, 3.33, 2.5, 2., 1.67, 1.43. If a subject repeatedly is presented with an alternative reward of 4, two units of Delay before each 10 is due, the 4 will win under both formulae: 4 vs. 2.5 for exponential, 4 vs. 3.33 for hyperbolic. But if these options occur three times, two units apart, and must be chosen as a category all at once, exponential → [2.5 + .

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Impulsive and self-control choices in opioid-dependent patients and non-drug-using control patients: Drug and monetary rewards.

Cited by 830 publications

References 16 publications

Effects of clomipramine on self-control choice in Lewis and Fischer 344 rats

Effects of clomipramine on self-control choice in Lewis and Fischer 344 rats

A Discounting Framework for Choice With Delayed and Probabilistic Rewards.

The behavioral economics of will in recovery from addiction

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