Improving Police Performance in Rajasthan, India: Experimental Evidence on Incentives, Managerial Autonomy and Training

Abstract

in on the analysis of the data or the drafting of the report. All the data collected in the course of this project is available for download and public use (including, but not limited to, replication of our results) at http://dvn.iq.harvard.edu/dvn/dv/jpal. We are grateful for funding from the Will and Flora Hewlett Foundation and the UNODC. The Hewlett Foundation was not involved in the drafting of this paper. The views expressed herein are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the National Bureau of Economic Research. NBER working papers are circulated for discussion and comment purposes. They have not been peerreviewed or been subject to the review by the NBER Board of Directors that accompanies official NBER publications.

Management of Bureaucrats and Public Service Delivery: Evidence from the Nigerian Civil Service

“…These are also the margins of management that current field experiments on bureaucracies seek to manipulate, as in Banerjee et al . ().…”

“…This is reassuring as these are the two dimensions of management highlighted by the public administration and economics literatures. These are also the margins of management that current field experiments on bureaucracies seek to manipulate, as in Banerjee et al (2014).…”

From Proof of Concept to Scalable Policies: Challenges and Solutions, with an Application

“…In practice, the Crepon et al (2013) study lacks enough statistical precision to identify differential spillover effects (despite working at the scale of half of France). Banerjee et al (2014) find a nonlinearity in overall effect of the treatment (there is no impact in treating 25 percent of the police officers, and the effect is the same when 50, 75, and 100 percent of the officers are trained), but they do not specifically track spillovers.…”

“…Crepon et al (2013) adopts this design in their experiment on the French labor market (they treat 25, 50, and 75 percent of the units). Similarly, Banerjee et al (2014) treat 25, 50, 75, or 100 percent of the police officers in police stations in Rajasthan. In practice, the Crepon et al (2013) study lacks enough statistical precision to identify differential spillover effects (despite working at the scale of half of France).…”

“…Although a similar incentive scheme had previously been proven effective when implemented in education centers run by a nongovernment organization in the same area (Duflo, Hanna, and Ryan 2012), there were no longterm effects on attendance in government health centers due to staff and supervisors exploiting loopholes in the verification system. Banerjee, Chattopadhyay, Duflo, Keniston, and Singh (2014), working with the police leadership in Rajasthan, India, to improve the attitudes of the police towards the public, find that the reforms that required the collaboration of station heads were never implemented.…”