If Anyone Should Be an Agent-Causalist, then Everyone Should Be an Agent-Causalist

Abstract

forthcoming in MindNearly all defenses of the agent-causal theory of free will portray the theory as a distinctively libertarian one-a theory that only libertarians have reason to accept. According to what I call 'the standard argument for the agent-causal theory of free will', the reason to embrace agent-causal libertarianism is that libertarians can solve the problem of enhanced control only if they furnish agents with the agent-causal power. In this way it is assumed that there is only reason to accept the agent-causal theory if there is reason to accept libertarianism. I aim to refute this claim. I will argue that the reasons we have for endorsing the agent-causal theory of free will are nonpartisan. The real reason for going agent-causal has nothing to do with determinism or indeterminism, but rather with avoiding reductionism about agency and the self. As we will see, if there is reason for libertarians to accept the agent-causal theory, there is just as much reason for compatibilists. It is in this sense that I contend that if anyone should be an agent-causalist, then everyone should be an agent-causalist.

Epistemic control without voluntarism

“…You are claiming the benefits of honest philosophical toil without even having a theory of human action (622-623). 5 One can see the same sentiment, more recently, in O'Connor (2000), Pereboom (2014), Clarke (1993Clarke ( , 2018 and Franklin (2016), although the latter two views have a somewhat deflationary stance about the nature of agentcausation. 6 Note that it's not obvious that Velleman is carrying Frankfurt's torch, at least if we look past the project of making good on some notion of "identification" within the event-causal nexus.…”

“…55One can see the same sentiment, more recently, in O'Connor (2000), Pereboom (2014), Clarke (1993, 2018) and Franklin (2016), although the latter two views have a somewhat deflationary stance about the nature of agent‐causation.…”

A new solution to the problem of luck

“…Agent causal theorists can concur with Franklin when he argues that the agent's causal power to determine one's actions is consistent with it being the case that, to use Franklin's example, Jones’ motives determine him to choose Yale over Harvard. Given his reasons, the probability that Jones chooses Yale could well be 1 (2016, p.13). Nevertheless, agent causal libertarians can argue that for Jones to act in virtue of his reasons, it must also be the case that, at the physical level, his action is undetermined.…”

Deliberating in the presence of manipulation

“…12.Franklin (2016) argues that this motivation for a libertarian agent-causal theory fails, and that the motivation for being an agent-causal theorist cuts across the compatibilism/incompatibilism debate. If Franklin is correct, this will arguably not provide the distinctness strategy with any advantage.…”