Ideational Apraxia

Renzi, Ennio De; Lucchelli, Federica

doi:10.1093/brain/111.5.1173

Cited by 420 publications

(295 citation statements)

References 0 publications

Supporting

Mentioning

267

Contrasting

Unclassified

Order By: Relevance

“…These findings are in line with clinical studies, showing that cerebral lesions in middle frontal and parietal circuits can cause ideational apraxia (Hécaen, 1972;Bolognini et al, 2015;De Renzi and Lucchelli, 1988). Further investigations will be necessary to explore whether patients with movement disorders, such as patients with Parkinson's disease, would engage the same neural circuits during motor ideation.…”

Section: Resultssupporting

confidence: 82%

“…In conclusion, ideational apraxia might not constitute a higherorder programming deficit of movement per se, but a combination of executive, language, and memory deficits or a diffuse reduction of cognitive resources (Gross and Grossman, 2008). Different lesion sites have been indicated as responsible for ideational apraxia, showing an involvement of mainly left temporo-parieto-occipital regions (Hécaen, 1972;Bolognini et al, 2015) even if patients with ideational apraxia have also been reported following frontal lesions, or basal ganglia damage (De Renzi e Lucchelli, 1988;Manuel et al, 2013;Huey et al, 2009). Patients with ideational apraxia can retain mental imagery abilities (Tomasino et al, 2003).…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Helping to draw a distinction between motor ideation and motor imagery, and further illustrating the hierarchical organisation of the motor system, clinical studies have described patients with ideational apraxia -a disorder of voluntary movement caused by a specific impairment of motor planning, in the absence of any perceptual, strength or motor coordination disorders -who as a result of brain damage are unable to represent a movement mentally, for example how to light a candle (De Renzi and Lucchelli, 1988), because the corresponding motor programme has been damaged. For these reasons patients with ideational apraxia suffer from incapacity to represent an action in its entirety and sequence.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

See 2 more Smart Citations

Brain Activation Patterns Characterizing Different Phases of Motor Action: Execution, Choice and Ideation

et al. 2016

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Motor behaviour is controlled by a large set of interacting neural structures, subserving the different components involved in hierarchical motor processes. Few studies have investigated the neural substrate of higher-order motor ideation, i.e. the mental operation of conceiving a movement. The aim of this functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging (fMRI) study was to segregate the neural structures involved in motor ideation from those involved in movement choice and execution. An index finger movement paradigm was adopted, including three different conditions: performing a pre-specified movement, choosing and executing a movement and ideating a movement of choice.The tasks involved either the right or left hand, in separate runs. Neuroimaging results were obtained by comparing the different experimental conditions and computing conjunction maps of the right and left hands for each contrast. Pre-specified movement execution was supported by bilateral fronto-parietal motor regions, the cerebellum and putamen. Choosing and executing finger movement involved mainly left fronto-temporal areas and the anterior cingulate. Motor ideation activated almost exclusively left hemisphere regions, including the inferior, middle and superior frontal regions, middle temporal and middle occipital gyri. These findings show that motor ideation is controlled by a cortical network mainly involved in abstract thinking, cognitive and motor control, semantic and visual imagery processes.

show abstract

Section: Resultssupporting

confidence: 82%

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

See 1 more Smart Citation

Brain Activation Patterns Characterizing Different Phases of Motor Action: Execution, Choice and Ideation

et al. 2016

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

“…For example, one anticipation error commonly produced by patients involves attempting to pour from a sealed container (e.g., De Renzi & Lucchelli, 1988;Schwartz et al, 1991). Within the domain investigated by Botvinick and Plaut (2004), this error might be manifest by the model attempting to pour from the coffee, sugar, or cream packets before opening them.…”

Section: On the Importance Of The Training Setmentioning

confidence: 99%

Hierarchical schemas and goals in the control of sequential behavior.

Cooper¹,

Shallice²

2006

Psychological Review

220

248

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Traditional accounts of sequential behavior assume that schemas and goals play a causal role in the control of behavior. In contrast, M. Botvinick and D. C. Plaut (2004) argued that, at least in routine behavior, schemas and goals are epiphenomenal. The authors evaluate the Botvinick and Plaut account by contrasting the simple recurrent network model of Botvinick and Plaut with their own more traditional hierarchically structured interactive activation model (R. P. Cooper & T. Shallice, 2000). The authors present a range of arguments and additional simulations that demonstrate theoretical and empirical difficulties for both Botvinick and Plaut's model and their theoretical position. The authors conclude that explicit hierarchically organized and causally efficacious schema and goal representations are required to provide an adequate account of the flexibility of sequential behavior.Keywords: control of routine behavior, localist versus distributed representations, simple recurrent networks, neuropsychological impairments of action It has become a commonplace in many areas of psychology over the past 50 years that there exist discrete representations that correspond to qualitatively different states of the organism. The accessing, activation, or selection in some other way of one of these states rather than another is held to have qualitatively different effects on the selection of subsequent states and of subsequent behavior. Moreover, the selection of the current state is held to be the result of the effecting of discrete operations or rules, typically by analogy with a computer program.More recently, there has been a challenge to this perspective. It has been strongly argued that this assumed discreteness both of the representations and of the structures that select them arises from the familiarity of such concepts in other domains (e.g., computer science) rather than reflecting the operation of the underlying mechanism in the human mind. Instead, the apparent discreteness reflects inputs or outputs rather than the states of the internal mechanisms, which are better represented as regions or trajectories within continuous state spaces created by connectionist networks.The core issues in the debate, which has raged since 1985 (e.g., Broadbent, 1985;Pinker & Prince, 1988; etc.), have principally concerned areas in psycholinguistics and neurolinguistics where the existence of discrete representations (e.g., phonemes, morphemes) and of discrete operators (syntactic rules) was made plausible by developments in independent disciplines such as phonology and linguistics (e.g., Chomsky, 1957Chomsky, , 1980Chomsky & Halle, 1968). In addition, the debate has concerned areas where rule-based mappings had already been postulated on other grounds, as in spelling-to-sound translation in reading (e.g., Coltheart, Curtis, Atkins, & Haller, 1993;Plaut, McClelland, Seidenberg, & Patterson, 1996;Wijk, 1966; see also Zorzi, Houghton, & Butterworth, 1998).However, despite over 15 years of research in these areas, it would be premat...

show abstract

“…However, these are difficult to interpret due to terminological confusions and poverty of neuroanatomical information. It was claimed that ideational apraxia reflects an impairment of the praxis conceptual system including loss of knowledge related to tools [De Renzi and Lucchelli, 1988], but others argued that the term must be restricted to action sequencing disorders [Poeck, 1983]. Subsequently, Ochipa et al [1989] proposed the term conceptual apraxia to qualify disturbances of the action semantic system except action-sequencing disorders.…”

Section: Action Semantic Systemmentioning

confidence: 99%

Imaging a cognitive model of apraxia: The neural substrate of gesture‐specific cognitive processes

Peigneux

Linden

Garraux

et al. 2004

Human Brain Mapping

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Abstract:The present study aimed to ascertain the neuroanatomical basis of an influential neuropsychological model for upper limb apraxia [Rothi LJ, et al. The Neuropsychology of Action. 1997. Hove, UK: Psychology Press]. Regional cerebral blood flow was measured in healthy volunteers using H 2 15O PET during performance of four tasks commonly used for testing upper limb apraxia, i.e., pantomime of familiar gestures on verbal command, imitation of familiar gestures, imitation of novel gestures, and an action-semantic task that consisted in matching objects for functional use. We also re-analysed data from a previous PET study in which we investigated the neural basis of the visual analysis of gestures. First, we found that two sets of discrete brain areas are predominantly engaged in the imitation of familiar and novel gestures, respectively. Segregated brain activation for novel gesture imitation concur with neuropsychological reports to support the hypothesis that knowledge about the organization of the human body mediates the transition from visual perception to motor execution when imitating novel gestures [Goldenberg Neuropsychologia 1995;33:63-72]. Second, conjunction analyses revealed distinctive neural bases for most of the gesture-specific cognitive processes proposed in this cognitive model of upper limb apraxia. However, a functional analysis of brain imaging data suggested that one single memory store may be used for "to-be-perceived" and "to-be-produced" gestural representations, departing from Rothi et al.'s proposal. Based on the above considerations, we suggest and discuss a revised model for upper limb apraxia that might best account for both brain imaging findings and neuropsychological dissociations reported in the apraxia literature.

show abstract

Ideational Apraxia

Cited by 420 publications

References 0 publications

Brain Activation Patterns Characterizing Different Phases of Motor Action: Execution, Choice and Ideation

Brain Activation Patterns Characterizing Different Phases of Motor Action: Execution, Choice and Ideation

Hierarchical schemas and goals in the control of sequential behavior.

Imaging a cognitive model of apraxia: The neural substrate of gesture‐specific cognitive processes

Contact Info

Product

Resources

About