Hybrid mechanisms for Vickrey–Clarke–Groves and generalized second-price bids

Hummel, Patrick

doi:10.1007/s00182-017-0591-9

Cited by 5 publications

(3 citation statements)

References 32 publications

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“…Moreover, they took the classes of "adaptive" or "non-adaptive" bidders as public information, while we consider the private class information. Hummel (2018) further took the externality into account, and they aimed to guarantee that VCG bidders would bid truthfully, and GSP bidders could not obtain the same allocation at a lower price by misreporting their bids. This model for GSP bidders is different from our concept of VMs, and they also took the classes of bidders as public information.…”

Section: Related Workmentioning

confidence: 99%

Utility Maximizer or Value Maximizer: Mechanism Design for Mixed Bidders in Online Advertising

Zhang

Zheng

et al. 2023

AAAI

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Digital advertising constitutes one of the main revenue sources for online platforms. In recent years, some advertisers tend to adopt auto-bidding tools to facilitate advertising performance optimization, making the classical utility maximizer model in auction theory not fit well. Some recent studies proposed a new model, called value maximizer, for auto-bidding advertisers with return-on-investment (ROI) constraints. However, the model of either utility maximizer or value maximizer could only characterize partial advertisers in real-world advertising platforms. In a mixed environment where utility maximizers and value maximizers coexist, the truthful ad auction design would be challenging since bidders could manipulate both their values and affiliated classes, leading to a multi-parameter mechanism design problem. In this work, we address this issue by proposing a payment rule which combines the corresponding ones in classical VCG and GSP mechanisms in a novel way. Based on this payment rule, we propose a truthful auction mechanism with an approximation ratio of 2 on social welfare, which is close to the lower bound of at least 5/4 that we also prove. The designed auction mechanism is a generalization of VCG for utility maximizers and GSP for value maximizers.

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Section: Related Workmentioning

confidence: 99%

Utility Maximizer or Value Maximizer: Mechanism Design for Mixed Bidders in Online Advertising

Zhang

Zheng

et al. 2023

AAAI

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“…So, for pages that display fewer ads, advertising position will be more obvious and more easily clicked by users than those with more advertising sites. Since the valuation of advertisers is expected to be different, not all competitors compete for the best AD space, also known as the first place at the same time [8]. An Optimal Mechanism for Sponsored Search Auctions on the Web and Comparison with Other Mechanisms proposed a new mechanism, Optimal (OPT) Mechanism, to solve the profit and efficiency problems of GSP and VCG in the actual operation [9].…”

Section: Literature Reviewmentioning

confidence: 99%

Application Research Based on GSP Auction Mechanism

Cao¹,

Jiang²,

Zhou³

2021

Proceedings of the 2021 3rd International Conference on Economic Management and Cultural Industry (ICEMCI 2021)

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In order to better choose a suitable auction method and achieve the best overall return, this paper compares and analyses Generalized-Second position (GSP) from the three aspects of experimental simulation results, actual profitability and real market distribution based on the advantages and disadvantages of the two different auction mechanisms of GSP and Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG). The two auction mechanisms of VCG are combined with real data for comparative analysis. Research shows that in actual profitability and reality, the "profitability" of GSP is better than that of VCG, and the GSP auction environment is more suitable for the current network.

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“…One stream brings a game theoretic perspective and studies the equilibria of the advertisers under various auction settings. The reader may refer to the review papers Maillé et al (2012) and Qin et al (2015), and also some of the recent papers Balseiro et al (2015), Hummel (2018), Bae and Kagel (2019), Kotowski (2020) with their references for this line of work. A second stream of research focuses on the mechanism design problem of the search engine company with the objective of finding ad allocation/assignment policies to increase search engine's revenues.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Optimal dynamic multi-keyword bidding policy of an advertiser in search-based advertising

Dayanık

Sezer²

2022

Math Meth Oper Res

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Sponsored search advertisement allows advertisers to target their messages to appropriate customer segments at low costs. While search engines are interested in auction mechanisms that boost their revenues, advertisers seek optimal bidding strategies to increase their net sale revenues for multiple keywords under strict daily budget constraints in an environment where keyword query arrivals, competitor bid amounts, and user purchases are random. We focus on the advertiser's question and formulate her optimal intraday dynamic multi-keyword bidding problem as a continuous-time stochastic optimization problem. We solve the problem, characterize an optimal policy, and bring a numerical algorithm for implementation. We also illustrate our optimal bidding policy and its benefits over heuristic solutions on numerical examples.

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Hybrid mechanisms for Vickrey–Clarke–Groves and generalized second-price bids

Cited by 5 publications

References 32 publications

Utility Maximizer or Value Maximizer: Mechanism Design for Mixed Bidders in Online Advertising

Utility Maximizer or Value Maximizer: Mechanism Design for Mixed Bidders in Online Advertising

Application Research Based on GSP Auction Mechanism

Optimal dynamic multi-keyword bidding policy of an advertiser in search-based advertising

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