How do government policies affect the diffusion of green innovation among peer enterprises? - An evolutionary-game model in complex networks

Fan, Ruguo; Wang, Yitong; Chen, Fangze; Du, Kang; Wang, Yuanyuan

doi:10.1016/j.jclepro.2022.132711

Cited by 73 publications

(30 citation statements)

References 58 publications

Supporting

Mentioning

Contrasting

Order By: Relevance

“…However, recent studies focusing on a two-player or three-player game among governments, consumers and manufacturers [ 57 , 65 , 67 , 68 , 70 ] have limitations.…”

Section: Model and Resultsmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Zhao, Ma and Wang use an evolutionary game to analyze the effect of government policies on motivating cold chain logistics firms to adopt NEVs [ 69 ]. Fan et al develop an evolutionary game model, finding that green innovation incentives, environmental tax and innovation subsidies are effective policy tools to promote green innovation diffusion [ 70 ]. However, interfirm competition and alliances can make incentives ineffective [ 71 ].…”

Section: Literature Reviewmentioning

confidence: 99%

See 1 more Smart Citation

Dual Carbon Goal-Based Quadrilateral Evolutionary Game: Study on the New Energy Vehicle Industry in China

Liu

et al. 2023

IJERPH

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

In an effort to tackle climate change, the “Dual Carbon” target raised by the Chinese government aims to reach peak carbon dioxide emissions by 2030 and to achieve carbon neutrality by 2060. Accordingly, policy incentives have accelerated the new energy vehicle (NEV) sector. Whilst previous studies have focused on the bilateral game between governments and manufacturers, NEV development has witnessed interaction among multiple players. In this paper, we construct a quadrilateral evolutionary game model, considering the impact of government policies, manufacturers’ R&D investments, dealers’ support, and consumer choice on the evolutionary stabilization strategy (ESS) in the context of China. The results show that: (1) in the absence of government incentives, there is no motivation for manufacturers, dealers and consumers to consider the development of NEVs; (2) government incentives affect manufacturers and consumers on the evolutionary paths in the short term. In the long term, benefit- and utility-based limited rationality has a dominant role in the ESS. This study contributes to the understanding of the multilateral dynamics of NEV innovation and provides important implications to practitioners and policy makers.

show abstract

“…However, recent studies focusing on a two-player or three-player game among governments, consumers and manufacturers [ 57 , 65 , 67 , 68 , 70 ] have limitations.…”

Section: Model and Resultsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Literature Reviewmentioning

confidence: 99%

Dual Carbon Goal-Based Quadrilateral Evolutionary Game: Study on the New Energy Vehicle Industry in China

Liu

et al. 2023

IJERPH

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

“…Due to the significant sunk costs associated with innovation and the unpredictability of the results, some businesses choose not to pursue it (Vértesy, 2017 ; Mezzanotti and Simcoe, 2019 ; Lin et al, 2021 ). While government subsidies can help lower the sunk cost of the initial stage of technological innovation and encourage enterprises to carry out innovation activities, some businesses with the capacity to engage in technological innovation will also reduce their own innovation investment in light of the positive externalities and spillover effects of innovation results (Arza and López, 2021 ; Liu Q. et al, 2021 ; Fan et al, 2022 ; Jiang and Liu, 2022 ). Government subsidies, on the other hand, have a “signaling” function that allows businesses to get funding for innovation from more sources, increasing their capacity for technological innovation (Gao et al, 2021 ; Trotter and Brophy, 2022 ; Weiss and Nemeczek, 2022 ).…”

Section: Literature Reviewmentioning

confidence: 99%

‘Guidance' or ‘Misleading'? The government subsidy and the choice of enterprise innovation strategy

Ding

Wang²,

Liu³

et al. 2022

Front. Psychol.

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Government subsidies have a direct impact on firms' innovation strategies. The game relationship between the government, the subsidized firm and its competitors under different subsidy strategies affects firms' innovation behavior and thus innovation performance. This paper uses a dynamic evolutionary game theory approach based on cost-benefit differences to analyse the mechanisms by which government subsidy strategies affect firms' innovation strategies. It is found that the marginal benefits of a firm's innovation strategy will directly affect the game outcome, indicating that the choice of innovation strategy depends on the maximization of individual firm's interests. At the same time, a firm's innovation strategy is influenced by the firm's own innovation ability and competitors' innovation strategy, and there are two game equilibria. Government subsidies have a positive contribution to the innovation strategy choice of subsidized firms, but have a crowding-out effect on non-subsidized competing firms. The strength of the penalty (the efficiency of the implementation of government subsidies), the marginal revenue of the subsidized firms' rational use of government subsidies and the competitors' strategic choices will directly affect the game outcome.

show abstract

“…Companies will devote limited resources to more profitable Frontiers in Environmental Science frontiersin.org projects (Salmani and Partovi, 2021;Gabdullina et al, 2022). At this point, the government must subsidize and support the innovative behavior of enterprises to reduce the R&D risks of enterprises (Ma and Li, 2021;Fan et al, 2022). Especially for green production technology, government incentives can stimulate the innovation of enterprises to a certain extent.…”

Section: Literature Reviewmentioning

confidence: 99%

Assessing the effectiveness of innovative city pilots in improving urban carbon emission performance: A spatial difference-in-difference approach

Long

Tan³

et al. 2022

Front. Environ. Sci.

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Existing studies have focused on the impact of innovation on carbon emission performance but ignore the importance of government support for innovation. To overcome this challenge, this paper adopts a spatial difference-in-difference (DID) model to assess the impact of government support for innovation on urban carbon emission performance based on a quasi-natural experiment of innovative city pilots (ICP) in China. Using the high-resolution carbon emission data of 1 km × 1 km for 238 cities from 2008 to 2019 in China, this paper employees an extended stochastic frontier analysis (SFA) model to measure urban carbon emission performance. Our findings indicate that ICP implementation leads to a 1.3% improvement in local carbon emission performance. Meanwhile, there is a significant spatial spillover effect of ICP implementation, with a 3.3% improvement in the carbon performance of the surrounding areas. The results of the mechanism analysis suggest that government innovation support affects carbon emission performance by promoting total factor productivity improvement, green innovation, and industrial upgrading. Further analysis shows that ICP has the strongest impact on carbon performance in the eastern region, and the impact is stronger for large cities and resource-dependent cities. Finally, the paper carries out a series of robustness tests to ensure the reliability of the analytical results, including parallel trend tests, placebo tests and re-estimation of different methods. Based on the findings, this paper proposes feasible policy recommendations in terms of continuous promotion of government innovation support, regional cooperation and differentiated innovation support formulation.

show abstract

How do government policies affect the diffusion of green innovation among peer enterprises? - An evolutionary-game model in complex networks

Cited by 73 publications

References 58 publications

Dual Carbon Goal-Based Quadrilateral Evolutionary Game: Study on the New Energy Vehicle Industry in China

Dual Carbon Goal-Based Quadrilateral Evolutionary Game: Study on the New Energy Vehicle Industry in China

‘Guidance' or ‘Misleading'? The government subsidy and the choice of enterprise innovation strategy

Assessing the effectiveness of innovative city pilots in improving urban carbon emission performance: A spatial difference-in-difference approach

Contact Info

Product

Resources

About