High-rate measurement-device-independent quantum cryptography

Pirandola, Stefano; Ottaviani, Carlo; Spedalieri, Gaetana; Weedbrook, Christian; Braunstein, Samuel L.; Lloyd, Seth; Gehring, Tobias; Jacobsen, Christian S.; Andersen, Ulrik L.

doi:10.1038/nphoton.2015.83

Cited by 402 publications

(496 citation statements)

References 42 publications

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“…(12) or Eq. (17). In the literature, there were some precursory but restricted arguments, as those in Refs.…”

Section: Remarkmentioning

confidence: 99%

General bounds for sender-receiver capacities in multipoint quantum communications

Laurenza

Pirandola

2017

Phys. Rev. A

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We investigate the maximum rates for transmitting quantum information, distilling entanglement and distributing secret keys between a sender and a receiver in a multipoint communication scenario, with the assistance of unlimited two-way classical communication involving all parties. First we consider the case where a sender communicates with an arbitrary number of receivers, so called quantum broadcast channel. Here we also provide a simple analysis in the bosonic setting where we consider quantum broadcasting through a sequence of beamsplitters. Then, we consider the opposite case where an arbitrary number of senders communicate with a single receiver, so called quantum multiple-access channel. Finally, we study the general case of all-in-all quantum communication where an arbitrary number of senders communicate with an arbitrary number of receivers. Since our bounds are formulated for quantum systems of arbitrary dimension, they can be applied to many different physical scenarios involving multipoint quantum communication.

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“…(12) or Eq. (17). In the literature, there were some precursory but restricted arguments, as those in Refs.…”

Section: Remarkmentioning

confidence: 99%

General bounds for sender-receiver capacities in multipoint quantum communications

Laurenza

Pirandola

2017

Phys. Rev. A

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“…Recently it was shown that two-photon interference [11] from independent light sources can be exploited to avoid the use of detectors at the two ends of the communication channel [12,13]. This new form of detection-safe quantum cryptography, called Measurement-Device-Independent Quantum Key Distribution (MDI-QKD), has been experimentally demonstrated [13][14][15][16][17][18], but with modest delivered key rates.Here we introduce a novel pulsed laser seeding technique to obtain high-visibility interference from gain-switched lasers and thereby perform quantum cryptography without detector vulnerabilities with unprecedented bit rates, in excess of 1 Mb/s. This represents a 2 to 6 orders of magnitude improvement over existing implementations and for the first time promotes the new scheme as a practical resource for quantum secure communications.…”

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confidence: 99%

“…If Charlie violates the protocol and measures the pulses separately, he can learn the absolute values of the bits, but not their correlation. Therefore he cannot announce the correct correlation to the users, who will then unveil his attempt through public discussion.Irrespective of Charlie's choice, the users' apparatuses no longer need a detector and the detection vulnerability of Quantum Cryptography is removed.This striking feature of MDI-QKD has fostered intense experimental work and various demonstrations have been provided so far [13][14][15][16][17][18]. However, to achieve high-visibility interference at Charlie's beam splitter, the light source in previous experiments was set to emit long pulses at modest clock rates, thus restricting the key rate to less than a hundred bit/s (see Table I).…”

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confidence: 99%

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confidence: 99%

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Quantum key distribution without detector vulnerabilities using optically seeded lasers

Comandar¹,

Lucamarini²,

Fröhlich³

et al. 2016

Nature Photon

238

189

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Security in quantum cryptography [1, 2] is continuously challenged by inventive attacks [3][4][5][6][7] targeting the real components of a cryptographic setup, and duly restored by new countermeasures [8][9][10] to foil them. Due to their high sensitivity and complex design, detectors are the most frequently attacked components. Recently it was shown that two-photon interference [11] from independent light sources can be exploited to avoid the use of detectors at the two ends of the communication channel [12,13]. This new form of detection-safe quantum cryptography, called Measurement-Device-Independent Quantum Key Distribution (MDI-QKD), has been experimentally demonstrated [13][14][15][16][17][18], but with modest delivered key rates.Here we introduce a novel pulsed laser seeding technique to obtain high-visibility interference from gain-switched lasers and thereby perform quantum cryptography without detector vulnerabilities with unprecedented bit rates, in excess of 1 Mb/s. This represents a 2 to 6 orders of magnitude improvement over existing implementations and for the first time promotes the new scheme as a practical resource for quantum secure communications. * marco.lucamarini@crl.toshiba.co.uk arXiv:1509.08137v2 [quant-ph] In Quantum Cryptography, a sender Alice transmits encoded quantum signals to a receiver Bob, who measures them and distils a secret string of bits with the sender via public discussion [1].Ideally, the use of quantum signals guarantees the information-theoretical security of the communication [2]. In practice, however, Quantum Cryptography is implemented with real components, which can deviate from the ideal description. This can be exploited to circumvent the quantum protection if the users are unaware of the problem [19].Usually the most complex components are also the most vulnerable. Therefore the vast majority of the attacks performed so far have targeted Bob's single photon detectors [3][4][5][6][7]. 13] is a recent form of Quantum Cryptography conceived to remove the problem of detector vulnerability. As depicted in Fig. 1(a), two light pulses are independently encoded and sent by Alice and Bob to a central node, Charlie. This is similar to a quantum access network configuration [20], but in MDI-QKD the central node does not need to be trusted and could even attempt to steal information from Alice and Bob. To follow the MDI-QKD protocol, Charlie must let the two light pulses interfere at the beam splitter inside his station and then measure them. The result can disclose the correlation between the bits encoded by the users, but not their actual values, which therefore remain secret. If Charlie violates the protocol and measures the pulses separately, he can learn the absolute values of the bits, but not their correlation. Therefore he cannot announce the correct correlation to the users, who will then unveil his attempt through public discussion.Irrespective of Charlie's choice, the users' apparatuses no longer need a detector and the detection vulnerability of Quantum Cryp...

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“…Such systems can convey simultaneously the equivalent of many qubits, which makes them appealing for use in high-rate quantum communications 6 . But because the range of distances over which they can teleport is currently limited, continuous-variable systems are used less frequently than are qubits.…”

Section: Two Approachesmentioning

confidence: 99%