Habermas in the Lab: A Study of Deliberation in an Experimental Setting

Abstract

This study outlines a new paradigm for the investigation of the effects of deliberation on political decisions. Specifically, it uses the ultimatum game as a situation in which the opportunity to deliberate and the placement of this opportunity are experimentally manipulated. Structural factors, such as the players' roles and their ability to vote on the proposal being offered, are also manipulated as a basis for comparison. Two outcomes are examined: the games' allocations, and players' perceptions of fairness. After controlling for structural factors, deliberative opportunity creates a more equitable distribution of money and enhances fairness perceptions. However, these results hold only when such an opportunity occurs before the proposal stage. Deliberative opportunity after the proposal stage has no discernible impact. A survey of participants found that their personal characteristics and political predispositions influence perceptions of fairness for proposers, but not for acceptors. These findings demonstrate the potential benefits of deliberation while highlighting the importance of the nature of its implementation in determining its level of success.The empirical study of deliberation and its effects is enjoying increasing attention among scholars of political psychology and political communication. A number of recent studies have attempted to determine whether the advantages ascribed to deliberation by most democratic theorists actually exist (see, e.g., . These studies, most of which have examined the effects of deliberation in real-world settings, have revealed much about the nature and extent of deliberation's effects. In this paper, we outline a new research program that we believe will complement this literature. Specifically, we advocate experimental investigations based on the ultimatum game that can be used to

Editorial introduction: The fourth generation of deliberative democracy

“…The debate, then, blossomed around the notion of mini-publics and their potential to foster deliberative practice (Ackerman and Fishkin 2003;Fung 2003;Fung and Wright 2003;Gastil and Levine 2005;Avritzer 2009;Elstub 2014;Grönlund, Bächtiger, and Setälä 2014). Besides their strong interest in implementing deliberation in the context of 'real-life' politics, the third-generation scholars have also sought for suitable methods enabling the systematic and close investigation of deliberative processes and to determine the required parameters for institutional design (Sulkin and Simon 2001). In doing so, however, the third generation adopted mainly a micro approach to deliberation that isolated mini-publics and other institutions from the broader discursive environment and macro context within which they operate (Thompson 2008;Chambers 2009;Dryzek 2010b;Mansbridge et al 2012).…”

Combatting corruption with public deliberation

“…Observed positive effects include increase in legitimisation and rationality of decision-making, increase in the sophistication of participants' political thinking, and even increase in civic activity following deliberation (Gastil and Dillard 1999;Dryzek and Braithwaite 2000;Gastil et al 2002Gastil et al , 2005. Some research has shown that debates can often turn chaotic leading to more polarisation and sometimes no conclusion (Sulkin and Simon 2001;Sunstein 2002). But there is a crucial distinction: most scholars are in agreement that perversion of key deliberative criteria (which usually leads to dysfunction) does not count as deliberation, and that putative deliberation that falls below a certain threshold is no longer deliberation (see Neblo 2007: pp.…”

Entity/Event-Level Sentiment Detection and Inference

“…Deliberative democratic theory posits that civic discussion yields to increased involvement in public affairs (Gastil et al 2002). Thus, deliberation can produce more sophisticated, tolerant, and participative citizens (Luskin and Fishkin 1998, Gastil and Dillard 1999a, Fung 2001, Fung and Wright 2001, Sulkin and Simon 2001, Gastil et al 2002, Walsh 2004). …”