Group identity, social distance and intergroup bias

Ahmed, Ali

doi:10.1016/j.joep.2007.01.007

Cited by 132 publications

(80 citation statements)

References 22 publications

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“…We have seen here that an ingroup bias may occur quite easily in these games, and there is also empirical evidence under a minimal group paradigm (Ahmed, 2007), and that expectations of trust are an important parameter (Jansson and Eriksson, Unpublished results). In experiments, arbitrary group tags are su cient signals for people to trust each other on opting for the socially optimal strategy, and other empirical studies con rm the dynamics presented here: that intergroup competition may facilitate group co-ordination (Bornstein et al, 2002;Riechmann and Weimann, 2008).…”

Section: Discussionsupporting

confidence: 51%

“…Meanwhile, people do display an ingroup bias also in situations where these mechanisms are not at work, and have shown to have preferences based purely on group signals. The bias can be triggered by minimal cues from arbitrary group de nitions (Tajfel et al, 1971;Doise et al, 1972;Ahmed, 2007). What needs to be understood is thus how a bias that is activated among complete strangers has emerged.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

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What games support the evolution of an ingroup bias?

Jansson

2015

Journal of Theoretical Biology

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There is an increasing wealth of models trying to explain the evolution of group discrimination and an ingroup bias. This paper sets out to systematically investigate the most fundamental assumption in these models: in what kind of situations do the interactions take place? What strategic structures -games -support the evolution of an ingroup bias? More speci cally, the aim here is to nd the prerequisites for when a bias also with respect to minimal groups -arbitrarily de ned groups void of group-speci c qualities -is selected for, and which cannot be ascribed to kin selection.Through analyses and simulations of minimal models of two-person games, this paper indicates that only some games are conducive to the evolution of ingroup favouritism. In particular, this class does not contain the prisoners' dilemma, but it does contain antico-ordination and co-ordination games. Contrasting to the prisoners' dilemma, these are games where it is not a matter of whether to behave altruistically, but rather one of predicting what the other person will be doing, and where I would bene t from you knowing my intentions.In anti-co-ordination games, on average, not only will agents discriminate between groups, but also in such a way that their choices maximise the sum of the available payo s towards the ingroup more often than towards the outgroup. And in co-ordination games, even if agents do manage to co-ordinate with the whole population, they are more likely to co-ordinate on the socially optimal equilibrium within their group. Simulations show that this occurs most often in games where there is a component of risktaking, and thus trust, involved. A typical such game is the stag hunt or assurance game.Keywords ethnocentrism, minimal groups, cooperation, replicator dynamics, assurance game Graphical Abstract Both analyses and simulations show that an ingroup bias evolves in (anti-)co-ordination games. The simulations further show that the strategy becomes particularly prevalent in stag hunts. The picture depicts, to the left, the games derived from the game matrix, in the middle, for di erent values of x and y. The panel to the right shows the simulated proportional prevalence of an ingroup bias for the di erent games when there are ten groups in the population.

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Section: Discussionsupporting

confidence: 51%

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

What games support the evolution of an ingroup bias?

Jansson

2015

Journal of Theoretical Biology

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“…In addition, laboratory experiments suggest that people tend to favor/trust others with a similar ethnic background (e.g. Fershtman andGneezy, 2001 andAhmed, 2007). For quasi-experimental evidence of discrimination in actual recruitments, see Åslund and Skans (2007). documented correlations between manager race and the race of hires (Carrington and Troske 1998;Stoll et al 2004).…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Seeking Similarity: How Immigrants and Natives Manage in the Labor Market

Åslund

Hensvik

Skans

2014

Journal of Labor Economics

112

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Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. www.econstor.eu The Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) in Bonn is a local and virtual international research center and a place of communication between science, politics and business. IZA is an independent nonprofit organization supported by Deutsche Post Foundation. The center is associated with the University of Bonn and offers a stimulating research environment through its international network, workshops and conferences, data service, project support, research visits and doctoral program. IZA engages in (i) original and internationally competitive research in all fields of labor economics, (ii) development of policy concepts, and (iii) dissemination of research results and concepts to the interested public. Terms of use: Documents in D I S C U S S I O N P A P E R S E R I E SIZA Discussion Papers often represent preliminary work and are circulated to encourage discussion. Citation of such a paper should account for its provisional character. A revised version may be available directly from the author. We show that immigrant managers are substantially more likely to hire immigrants than are native managers. The finding holds when comparing establishments in the same 5-digit industry and location, when comparing different establishments within the same firm, when analyzing establishments that change management over time, and when accounting for within-establishment trends in recruitment patterns. The effects are largest for small and owner-managed establishments in the for-profit sector. Separations are more frequent when workers and managers have dissimilar origin, but only before workers become protected by EPL. We also find that native managers are unbiased in their recruitments of former coworkers, suggesting that information deficiencies are important. We find no effects on entry wages. Our findings suggest that a low frequency of immigrant managers may contribute to the observed disadvantages of immigrant workers. JEL Classification:J15, J21, J62, M51

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“…Therefore, in-group members are willing to cooperate more with individuals that share the same identity than with individuals of different identities (see e.g., Solow andKirkwood, 2002, Wit andWilke, 1992). This accounts for the intragroup (within-group) sensitivity and intergroup hostility (Chen and Li, 2009, Eaton et al, 2011, Ahmed, 2007. Likewise, field experiments also revealed that individuals in ethnically more homogeneous groups contribute more to local public goods such as education than in less homogeneous communities.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Negative Reciprocity and its Relation to Anger-Like Emotions in Homogeneous and Heterogeneous Groups

2014

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Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. Terms of use: Documents in NEGATIVE RECIPROCITY AND ITS RELATION TO ANGER-LIKE EMOTIONS IN HOMOGENEOUS AND HETEROGENEOUS GROUPSMarianna Bicskei * , Matthias Lankau and Kilian Bizer University of Göttingen, Economic Policy and SME Research Platz der Göttingen Sieben 3, 37073 Göttingen, Germany AbtractSeveral studies have shown that social identity fosters the provision of public goods and enhances the willingness to reciprocate cooperative behavior of group members dependent on the social environment. Yet, the question of how social identity affects negative reciprocity in identityhomogeneous and -heterogeneous groups has received only little attention. Consequently, we seek to fill this gap e a i i g hethe so ial ide tit affe ts i di iduals illi g ess to sa tio deviating group members in a public good context. Moreover, we devote particular attention to the role of anger-like emotions in negative reciprocity. To test our hypotheses we employ one-shot public good games in strategy method with induced social identity. Our results indicate that members of identity homogeneous groups punish much less often and in smaller amounts than of identity heterogeneous groups when they face contributions smaller than their own. We also find that anger-like emotions influence punishment behavior much stronger when individuals are matched with members of different identities than in identity homogenous groups. These findings contribute to the better understanding of the nature of social identity and its impact on reciprocity, improving economists a ilit to p edi t eha ior taking emotions also into consideration.

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Group identity, social distance and intergroup bias

Cited by 132 publications

References 22 publications

What games support the evolution of an ingroup bias?

What games support the evolution of an ingroup bias?

Seeking Similarity: How Immigrants and Natives Manage in the Labor Market

Negative Reciprocity and its Relation to Anger-Like Emotions in Homogeneous and Heterogeneous Groups

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