Ground-level bureaucrats as a source of intensification of rural poverty in China

Abstract

This article explores the context in which the policies of Chinese reforms and poverty alleviation are implemented. Drawing on data from primary and secondary sources, I examine the impact both of local government's decisions and grass-root cadres' behaviours on the rural poor. The main ideas are: (1) decentralization shapes the likelihood that a deviation of policy implementation from policy goals takes place; (2) to result in a factual misimplementation, this process must be carried through by an incorporation with the particularistic ties; and (3) in this institutionally and culturally constructed context, grass-roots level bureaucrats have intensi®ed rural poverty.

Land Rental Markets as an Alternative to Government Reallocation? Equity and Efficiency Considerations in the Chinese Land Tenure System

“…Sach an explanation would be consistent with experience from other countries where, even though land can not be owned individually., individual property rights to land-related improvements are universally recognized, very secure, and can lbe enforced at relatively low cost (Platteau 2000). Although this does not imply that institutions to check village leaders' abuses of their ability to redistribute land would not be needed (Huang 1999), it suggests that -in view of villages' apparent ability to deal with these issues in a satisfactory manner-focusing attention on the investment-impact of efforts to enhance the security of property rights alone is unlikely to bring about large increases in productivity.…”

Do visiting monks give better sermons? “Street‐level bureaucrats from higher‐up” in targeted poverty alleviation in China

“…But, many local governments lacked the capacity and the motivation to achieve this ambitious goal (Chen, 2014; Kennedy, 2007; O’Brien & Li, 1999; Waldron et al., 2006). Rural areas had divided welfare policy sectors (Han & Gao, 2019; Huang & Kim, 2020; Li & Walker, 2016, 2017; Mok et al., 2017; Qian & Mok, 2016; Yang et al., 2020; Zang, 2017), low governance capacity, and lackluster democracy (Huang, 1999; Tan, 2010). In response to these deficits, China has built a “department counterpart support village” arrangement beyond the original bureaucratic system in order to hit TPA’s targets.…”

Poverty Elimination in China by 2020: Bringing a Transformation

“…Rural poverty in China is spatially concentrated in the western fringe, including Gansu, Ningxia, Shaanxi, Yunnan, Guangxi, Sichuan, Qinghai and Guizhou provinces, where the incidence of rural poverty was 17–34% in 1989 (Huang, 1999), and 70% of the population that was extremely poor resided in 592 of the state-designated poor counties (Huang, 1999, p. 638; Kang, 1995). The government strengthened the organisational structure and financial input to eliminate poverty during the period 1986–1996.…”

“…The government strengthened the organisational structure and financial input to eliminate poverty during the period 1986–1996. The monetary values of the poverty alleviation fund increased from ¥4.2 billion to ¥10.8 billion from 1986 to 1996, increasing to 9.9% annually, and had reached ¥14.6 billion in 1997 (Huang, 1999, p. 638). However, this did not bring the desired outcomes due to various reasons such as freezing of land adjustments, taxation policy and targeted approach for poverty elimination.…”

“…However, this did not bring the desired outcomes due to various reasons such as freezing of land adjustments, taxation policy and targeted approach for poverty elimination. Because of the lack of necessary linkages between the policy formulation and policy implementation, these macro-level analyses have not provided a satisfactory explanation to why poverty alleviation funds have increased rapidly, while the incidence of rural poverty has seen a slow decrease, and why the rural economy has grown substantially without benefitting the poor as much as other social groups (Huang, 1999, pp. 638–639).…”