Governança corporativa e sensibilidade investimento-fluxo de caixa no Brasil

Abstract

This study aimed to investigate the investment-cash flow sensitivity for Brazilian companies with different degrees of financial constraint according to the quality level of their corporate governance practices. An investment model was estimated through GMM for a panel data of 248 Brazilian publicly traded companies, which were a priori classified in two groups of financial constraint degrees (high and low) according to the Corporate Governance Practices Index (IPGC). The results showed that the quality of corporate governance influences the investment-cash flow sensitivity, and this sensitivity is negative and significant only for firms with poor governance, classified with high financial constraint. Furthermore, it can be concluded that IPGC proved to be an interesting variable for a priori classification of companies and an important determinant of the investment-cash flow sensitivity to identify potentially financially constrained firms.

Relationship Between Free Cash Flows and Corporate Governance Levels in the Light of Agency Theory

“…In this way, companies with higher Corporate Governance quality indexes are expected to offer a more consistent protection to their investors, through a professional, responsible, transparent and fair management for shareholders, executives and third parties, taking into account that good Corporate Governance practices allow minimizing the impacts of managers' opportunistic behaviors (Silva, Caixe & Krauter, 2019). In completeness, Dylewski (2010) highlights the hypothesis that a management not committed to good Corporate Governance practices would present higher levels of cash flow, being this an expected relationship.…”

“…Studies such as those by Silva et al (2019) and Sprenger and Lazarevab (2021), which specifically analyze the sensitivity of investment to cash flow, can also assist in understanding the results of this research. According to Silva et al (2019), one possible explanation for the positive impact of cash flow on investment, tied to corporate governance practices, is that managers would tend to overinvest excess cash flows when pursuing their private benefits, so that better corporate governance practices would also reduce the positive influence of cash flow on investment (Francis, Hasan, Song & Waisman, 2013).…”

“…The empirical results observed by Silva et al (2019) pointed out that companies with worse governance practices have negative sensitivity of investment to cash flow, a fact that can be attributed to the willingness of these companies to raise their cash reserves for reasons associated with financial constraints and/or agency problems. Sprenger and Lazarevab (2021) observed that better shareholder protection, which is associated with Corporate Governance mechanisms, decreases the sensitivity of investment to cash flow.…”

Relação entre fluxos de caixa livres e níveis de governança corporativa à luz da teoria da agência

“…Desse modo, espera-se que empresas com maiores índices de qualidade de Governança Corporativa ofereçam uma proteção mais consistente aos seus investidores, por meio de uma gestão profissional, responsável, transparente e justa para acionistas, executivos e terceiros, levando-se em conta que boas práticas de Governança Corporativa permitem minimizar os impactos de comportamentos oportunistas dos gestores (Silva, Caixe & Krauter, 2019). Em completude, Dylewski (2010) destaca a hipótese de que uma gestão não comprometida com boas práticas de Governança Corporativa apresentaria maiores níveis de caixa, sendo uma relação esperada.…”

“…Estudos como os de Silva et al (2019) e de Sprenger e Lazarevab (2021), que analisaram especificamente a sensibilidade do investimento ao fluxo de caixa, também podem auxiliar no entendimento dos resultados desta pesquisa. Segundo Silva et al (2019), uma possível explicação para o impacto positivo do fluxo de caixa no investimento, atrelada às práticas de governança corporativa, é a de que os gestores tenderiam a superinvestir os fluxos de caixa excedentes ao buscarem seus benefícios privados, de modo que melhores práticas de governança corporativa reduziriam, também, a influência positiva do fluxo de caixa no investimento (Francis, Hasan, Song & Waisman, 2013).…”