Goal Setting in the Principal-Agent Model: Weak Incentives for Strong Performance

Corgnet, Brice; Gómez‐Miñambres, Joaquín; González, Roberto Hernán

doi:10.2139/ssrn.2837759

Cited by 11 publications

(12 citation statements)

References 18 publications

Supporting

Mentioning

Contrasting

Order By: Relevance

“…Choi et al (2016) find that goal setting can a↵ect savings: goal-based cues increased savings into 401k accounts. Finally, goals can increase worker performance even in the absence of monetary incentives for achieving the goal: see Corgnet et al (2015Corgnet et al ( , 2016 for laboratory evidence (although Akın and Karagözoglu, forthcoming, find no e↵ect of goals), Goerg and Kube (2012) for field evidence and Goerg (2015) for a concise survey. Although not focused on education, several psychologists argue for the motivational benefits of goals more generally (see, e.g., Locke, 1968, Locke et al, 1981, Mento et al, 1987, Locke and Latham, 2002, and Latham and Pinder, 2005.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Using Goals to Motivate College Students: Theory and Evidence from Field Experiments

Clark

Gill²,

Prowse

et al. 2016

SSRN Journal

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. Will college students who set goals for themselves work harder and perform better? In theory, setting goals can help time-inconsistent students to mitigate their self-control problem. In practice, there is little credible evidence on the causal effects of goal setting for college students. We report the results of two field experiments that involved almost four thousand college students in total. One experiment asked treated students to set goals for performance in the course; the other asked treated students to set goals for a particular task (completing online practice exams). We find that performance-based goals had no discernible impact on course performance. In contrast, task-based goals had large and robust positive effects on the level of task completion, and task-based goals also increased course performance. Further empirical analysis indicates that the increase in task completion induced by setting task-based goals caused the increase in course performance. We also find that task-based goals were more effective for male students. We develop new theory that reinforces our empirical results by suggesting two key reasons why task-based goals might be more effective than performance-based goals: overconfidence and uncertainty about performance. Since task-based goal setting is low-cost, scaleable and logistically simple, we conclude that our findings have important implications for educational practice and future research. Terms of use: Documents in D I S C U S S I O N P A P E R S E R I E S Using Goals to JEL Classification:I23, C93

show abstract

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Using Goals to Motivate College Students: Theory and Evidence from Field Experiments

Clark

Gill²,

Prowse

et al. 2016

SSRN Journal

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

“…This model is based on the influential contribution of Holmström and Milgrom (1991), and its empirical implications in socioeconomic transactions are wide ranging. Although game theory tools in principal-agent modelling have led to sophisticated mathematical developments (Mirrlees and Raimondo, 2013), the authors of this paper have simplified the approach to the greatest possible extent, with results quite similar to those of Debraj (2012) and Corgnet et al (2016).…”

Section: A Basic Principal-agent Model As An Analytical Frameworkmentioning

confidence: 75%

Securing Sahelian pastoralism by using a remunerated workforce for livestock keeping activities: the ambivalence of commodification

et al. 2018

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Sahelian pastoralists use mobility, diversification, and even pluriactivity as main adaptation strategies to the asymmetrical distribution of multifaceted resources. Complex relations vis-à-vis this risky environment hide slowing transitions from a traditional inward-looking to an outward-looking economy, which is characterised by increasing use of a remunerated workforce. The growing commodification of the economy of Sahelian pastoralists could generate new forms of uncertainty. The authors of this paper use a principal-agent model to analyse the remunerated workforce and demonstrate the mixed results of this strategy in the context of structural risk in the Sahel. The authors then highlight the conditions under which trust and reputation are developed to stabilise employment relations and better cope with and/or mitigate various shocks.

show abstract

“…They find that self-set goals that are tied to a monetary bonus are most effective, but even without monetary incentives goals increase motivation. In lab experiments, Corgnet et al (2016), Corgnet et al (2015) and Dalton et al (2015) examine how managers combine non-binding goals and monetary goals to motivate workers.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Motivational goal bracketing: An experiment

Koch

Nafziger

2020

Journal of Economic Theory

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

We study in an online, real-effort experiment how the bracketing of non-binding goals affects performance in a work-leisure self-control problem. We externally induce the goal bracket-daily goals or a weekly goal-and within that bracket let subjects set goals for how much they want to work over a one-week period. Our theoretical model predicts (i) that weekly goals create incentives to compensate for a lower than desired performance today with the promise to work harder tomorrow, whereas daily goals exclude such excuses; (ii) that subjects with daily goals set higher goals in aggregate and work harder than those with weekly goals. Our data support these predictions. Surprisingly, however, when goals are combined with an externally enforced commitment that requires subjects to spend less than a minute each day on the task to get started working, performance deteriorates because of high dropout rates from the task.

show abstract

Goal Setting in the Principal-Agent Model: Weak Incentives for Strong Performance

Cited by 11 publications

References 18 publications

Using Goals to Motivate College Students: Theory and Evidence from Field Experiments

Using Goals to Motivate College Students: Theory and Evidence from Field Experiments

Securing Sahelian pastoralism by using a remunerated workforce for livestock keeping activities: the ambivalence of commodification

Motivational goal bracketing: An experiment

Contact Info

Product

Resources

About