Goal-directed control in Pavlovian-instrumental transfer.

Abstract

The current article concerns human outcome-selective Pavlovian-instrumental transfer (PIT), where Pavlovian cues selectively invigorate instrumental responses that predict common rewarding outcomes. Several recent experiments have observed PIT effects that were insensitive to outcome devaluation manipulations, which has been taken as evidence of an automatic "associative" mechanism. Other similar studies observed PIT effects that were sensitive to devaluation, which suggests a more controlled, goal-directed process. Studies supporting the automatic approach have been criticised for using a biased baseline, while studies supporting the goal-directed approach have been criticised for priming multiple outcomes at test. The current experiment addressed both of these issues. Participants first learned to perform two instrumental responses to earn two outcomes each (R1-O1/O3, R2-O2/O4), before four Pavlovian stimuli (S1-S4) were trained to predict each outcome. One outcome that was paired with each instrumental response (O3 and O4) was then devalued, so that baseline response choice at test would be balanced. Instrumental responding was then assessed in the presence of each individual Pavlovian stimulus, so that only one outcome was primed per trial. PIT effects were observed for the valued outcomes, ts > 3.99, ps < .001, but not for the devalued outcomes, F < 1, BF10 = 0.29. Hence, when baseline response choice was equated and only one outcome was primed per test trial, PIT was sensitive to outcome devaluation. The data therefore support goal-directed models of PIT.

Does acute stress influence the Pavlovian-to-instrumental transfer effect? Implications for substance use disorders

“…instructed participants to drink water until satiety), and this experimental manipulation did only reduce instrumental responding for the reward in the control condition, while participants in the negative emotional appraisal condition still responded for the devalued outcome. As previously outlined by Hogarth and colleagues (Hogarth et al 2019b ; Seabrooke et al 2017 ; Seabrooke et al 2019 ), the PIT paradigm assesses goal-directed rather than habitual behaviour as indicated by different experimental studies demonstrating that response choice in a PIT task is influenced by reward value and expected outcome probability indicating goal-directed rather than habitual behaviour (Seabrooke et al 2017 ). In line with this, Pritchard and colleagues (Pritchard et al 2018 ) interpret their finding as evidence that in a negative emotional state, the capacity to retrieve the expected value of instrumental outcomes and thus goal-directed behaviour can be impaired.…”

“…Thus, it is not clear whether this paradigm measures the same mechanisms as a standard PIT paradigm calling the interpretation of the results into question, especially as standard tobacco-related and alcohol-related PIT paradigm measures do not correlate with dependence as outlined above. Interestingly, the psychological mechanisms underlying the PIT effect remain a matter of debate, and only recent research using outcome devaluation procedures demonstrated that specific PIT effects are driven by propositional beliefs about the role of the stimuli in signalling the response outcome relationships and do not necessarily reflect habitual behaviour (Seabrooke et al 2017 ; Seabrooke et al 2019 ). This observation is in line with the finding that PIT effects are only observed in study participants aware of the stimulus-response-outcome contingencies and can be abolished by instructions that contradict the explicit outcome expectancy (e.g.…”

Affect-driven impulsivity impairs human action control and selection, as measured through Pavlovian instrumental transfer and outcome devaluation

“…Unfortunately, current research on this topic has yielded mixed evidence. While some studies have found, both in animals and humans, that specific PIT is observed even when the outcome is no longer desired indicating that it has an automatic component (e.g., Colagiuri & Lovibond, 2015; Colwill & Rescorla, 1990; De Tommaso, Mastropasqua, & Turatto, 2018; Hogarth & Chase, 2011; Holland, 2004; Watson, Wiers, Hommel, & de Wit, 2014), other studies with human participants have found an effect of outcome devaluation under specific circumstances (Allman, DeLeon, Cataldo, Holland, & Johnson, 2010; Eder & Dignath, 2016a, 2016b; Seabrooke, Hogarth, Edmunds, & Mitchell, 2019; Seabrooke, Le Pelley, Hogarth, & Mitchell, 2017). Therefore, it is still unclear how and when changes in outcome value may affect specific PIT, and one of the goals of the present experiments is to increase our knowledge with regard to this issue.…”

“…Taking into account the paradigm we used, which involved abstract rewards or secondary reinforcers (i.e., food images), which were not properly “obtained” or consumed (and thus may be thought to be relatively weaker), and the relatively more cognitive outcome devaluation procedure (seeing a gif image in which two cockroaches run over the snack instead of a “motivational” change, such as sensory specific satiation; see Cartoni et al, 2016), we expected to find an effect of outcome devaluation on PIT. Therefore, we implicitly considered that the specific PIT effect to be found using our procedure would be mediated by the representation of the motivational properties of the outcome, that is, mediated by a goal-directed process (see also Seabrooke et al, 2017; 2019). If this were the case, the task might be useful for assessing the incentive salience of Pavlovian cues associated with rewards (which cannot be addressed using more conventional instrumental conditioning paradigms that involve only associations between responses and outcomes).…”

Expected Value of Control and the Motivational Control of Habitual Action

“… 3 A notable exception is Experiment 1 in Seabrooke et al (2017) that showed a PIT effect despite the use of a fairly strong devaluation treatment (coating of snacks with a distasteful paste). It should be noted, however, that (1) this study presented pictures of the food outcomes (and not Pavlovian cues) during the transfer test; (2) despite a clear reduction in subjective liking ratings, working for the devalued food (in the baseline condition) was still on a sizeable level (~25%); (3) the devalued food earned during the test was not immediately consumed (see Eder and Dignath, 2016b); (4) the same devaluation treatment affected PIT tendencies in subsequent experiments after modification of the task procedure (Seabrooke et al, 2017, 2019a). …”