Global Antidumping Database Version 1.0

Bown, Chad P.

doi:10.1596/1813-9450-3737

Cited by 125 publications

(171 citation statements)

References 38 publications

(8 reference statements)

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“…However, Allison and Waterman (2002) demonstrate that no such bias emerges. 12 Before moving to discussing the data and the results, a few observations are in order. First of all, our key regressors (i.e., the ones related to negotiation and implementation of PTAs by importer ) only take into consideration PTAs affecting at least a minimum level of country 's imports in the year before their entry into force, or if not yet in force by the end of our sample period, in the year before the launch of their negotiation.…”

Section: Empirical Predictions and Methodologymentioning

confidence: 99%

“…14 12 In addition, for some country pairs, our sample covers a period of 36 years (see Table A2 in the Appendix). 13 As expected, the effects become less precisely estimated when using lower thresholds.…”

Section: Empirical Predictions and Methodologymentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Data on the worldwide usage of AD (since 1980) come mainly from the Global Antidumping Database (Bown, 2015) and are complemented by data from Moore and Zanardi (2009) for some countries and years. 16 In particular, these sources allow us to construct the dependent variable,   , as the count of AD measures introduced by an importer  against an exporter  in year .…”

Section: Datamentioning

confidence: 99%

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Preferential Trade Agreements and Antidumping Protection

Tabakis¹,

Zanardi

2017

SSRN Journal

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Are preferential trade agreements (PTAs) stumbling blocks or building blocks towards multilateral trade liberalization? We address this question by investigating the effects of the negotiation and implementation of PTAs on the use of antidumping (AD) (i.e., the most common form of contingent trade protection) by member countries against non-members, as there has been a concurrent surge in regionalism and AD activity since the 1990s. Theoretically-derived empirical predictions are supported by the empirical analysis based on the 15 most intense users of AD. The results demonstrate that both the negotiation and the implementation of PTAs lead to fewer AD measures against non-member countries, except for members of customs-union agreements in force facing large import surges from non-members. Thus, our results highlight a building-block effect of PTAs on multilateral trade cooperation when it comes to AD protection.

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Section: Empirical Predictions and Methodologymentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Empirical Predictions and Methodologymentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Datamentioning

confidence: 99%

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Preferential Trade Agreements and Antidumping Protection

Tabakis¹,

Zanardi

2017

SSRN Journal

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“…The second data source is the World Bank's Global Antidumping Database (GAD), covering all antidumping cases around the world from 1980 to 2014 (Bown, 2010). GAD has detailed information on each antidumping case, such as product information (classified at the HS 10-digit level for Argentina and Colombia, and at the HS 8-digit level for Brazil and Mexico), initiation date, and final decision and final determination dates.…”

Section: Datamentioning

confidence: 99%

Impact of Latin-American and Caribbean Antidumping Measures on Chinese Exports

Zhang¹

2017

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work is licensed under a Creative Commons IGO 3.0 AttributionNonCommercial-NoDerivatives (CC-IGO BY-NC-ND 3.0 IGO) license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/igo/ legalcode) and may be reproduced with attribution to the IDB and for any non-commercial purpose, as provided below. No derivative work is allowed.Any dispute related to the use of the works of the IDB that cannot be settled amicably shall be submitted to arbitration pursuant to the UNCITRAL rules. The use of the IDB's name for any purpose other than for attribution, and the use of IDB's logo shall be subject to a separate written license agreement between the IDB and the user and is not authorized as part of this CC-IGO license.Following a peer review process, and with previous written consent by the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB), a revised version of this work may also be reproduced in any academic journal, including those indexed by the American Economic Association's EconLit, provided that the IDB is credited and that the author(s) receive no income from the publication. Therefore, the restriction to receive income from such publication shall only extend to the publication's author(s). With regard to such restriction, in case of any inconsistency between the Creative Commons IGO 3.0 Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives license and these statements, the latter shall prevail.Note that link provided above includes additional terms and conditions of the license. The paper uses the difference-in-differences identification strategy, and finds a substantial trade-dampening effect of these measures at the product level which operates through the intensive margin (i.e., a decrease in export volume per exporter) rather than the extensive margin (i.e., a decrease in the number of exporters) on average. Although we do not find a significant extensive margin effect, we still observe a positive number of exporters exited the LAC market after antidumping measures, specifically, less productive firms and trade intermediaries are more likely to exit the market. The pattern of Chinese exporters exiting the protected market was the same in ARG, BRA, MEX and COL. The antidumping measures taken by different countries had different impacts on Chinese exporters. MEX and BRA antidumping measures not only had an intensive margin but also an extensive margin effect on Chinese exports. ARG antidumping measures only had an intensive margin effect. COL antidumping measures had no effect. The paper also finds that MEX antidumping measures caused a significant increase in the export prices of the affected Chinese products, but no significant increase in the export prices for the other three countries. The paper does not find any shift in the destinations of the affected Chinese exports.

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“…As Table 2 indicates, the percentage of initiations aimed at firms from countries with a larger (2008) income per capita is 99% for India, the largest initiator of AD measures, and range between 34% and 95% for other new users. Sources: GDP per capita from the World Bank; authors' own calculations based on the Global Antidumping Database (Bown, 2010).…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Antidumping, Intra‐industry Trade, and Quality Reversals

Moraga-González

Viaene

2015

Int Economic Review

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We examine an export game where two firms (home and foreign), located in two different countries, produce vertically differentiated products. The foreign firm is the most efficient in terms of R&D costs of quality development and the foreign country is relatively larger and endowed with a relatively higher income. The unique (risk-dominant) Nash equilibrium involves intra-industry trade and the foreign producer manufactures a good of higher quality than the domestic firm. For low enough transport costs, this equilibrium is characterized by unilateral dumping; otherwise, reciprocal dumping emerges. We show that the implementation of antidumping (AD) policy can change significantly the nature of the game and give rise to various new Nash equilibria. For some parameters, an AD policy leads to a quality reversal in the international market whereby the low-quality firm becomes leader. We show that such a policy is desirable for the implementing country, though world welfare decreases. The paper also establishes an equivalence result between a price undertaking and an anti-dumping duty.JEL Classification: F12, F13

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Global Antidumping Database Version 1.0

Cited by 125 publications

References 38 publications

Preferential Trade Agreements and Antidumping Protection

Preferential Trade Agreements and Antidumping Protection

Impact of Latin-American and Caribbean Antidumping Measures on Chinese Exports

Antidumping, Intra‐industry Trade, and Quality Reversals

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