Gene-culture coevolution: models for the evolution of altruism with cultural transmission.

Feldman, Marcus W.; Cavalli-Sforza, Luca; Peck, Joel R.

doi:10.1073/pnas.82.17.5814

Cited by 32 publications

(39 citation statements)

References 9 publications

(5 reference statements)

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“…Here we review research in support of the hypothesis that epigenetic rules bias the development of complex social behavior, choosing as illustrative examples, altruism and mate choice. In so doing, we contrast Lumsden and coworkers' (1)(2)(3)(4)(5)(6)(7) approach with models of cultural transmission hypothesized by Cavalli-Sforza, Feldman, and their colleagues (8)(9)(10). While the latter authors incorporated the phrase "gene-culture coevolution" in a study of the transmission of altruism (10), they have generally failed to adopt the concomitant prescription that epigenetic rules bias individual development.…”

mentioning

confidence: 82%

Gene-culture coevolution of complex social behavior: human altruism and mate choice.

Rushton¹,

Littlefield²,

Lumsden³

1986

Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. U.S.A.

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The hypothesis is examined that genes bias the development of complex social behavior in one direction over alternatives. Studies of altruism and political attitudes in twins estimate that =50% of the variance is associated with direct genetic inheritance, virtually 0% with the twin's common family environment, and the remainder with each twin's specific environment. Studies of human marriages show that spouses choose each other on the basis of similarity, assorting on the most genetically influenced of a set of homogeneous attributes. These data imply a genetic canalization of social influences such that, within the constraints allowed by the total spectrum of cultural alternatives, people create environments maximally compatible with their genotypes. Most if not all of the components of cognitive development examined to date have supported the gene-culture model of transmission (1-7). Corresponding data on personality and social development have been attended to far less. Here we review research in support of the hypothesis that epigenetic rules bias the development of complex social behavior, choosing as illustrative examples, altruism and mate choice. In so doing, we contrast Lumsden and coworkers' (1-7) approach with models of cultural transmission hypothesized by Feldman,. While the latter authors incorporated the phrase "gene-culture coevolution" in a study of the transmission of altruism (10), they have generally failed to adopt the concomitant prescription that epigenetic rules bias individual development. As a result, much of their perspective is discordant with knowledge about social learning in families. By contrast, gene-culture coevolutionary formulations, in the sense originally intended by Lumsden and Wilson (1), appear to be highly compatible with these same facts. Epigenetic Rules in Social DevelopmentExtensive theorizing in both the evolutionary and social sciences errs in not taking into account that social learning is dependent upon the innate capacities and biases of the learner (e.g., refs. 8, 9, and 11). For example, most models of cultural transmission within the family (i.e., vertical, from parent to child, and horizontal, from sibling to sibling) imply that siblings will resemble each other, over and above shared genes, as a result of a common family environment. Geneculture theory, in contrast, leads to the expectation that siblings will differ from each other in part because their nonshared genes incline them to acquire patterns of behavior best fitting their particular genotype (gene-culture transmission). While it may seem intuitively correct to assume that common family environment shapes individual development, consideration of data reveals quite a different set of relationships.Behavior 16,17). In a twin study, the raw data are the between-and within-pairs variances and covariances. The between-pairs mean squares reflect both pair resemblances and pair differences, and the within-pairs mean squares, pair differences. The genetic models are fitted to these mean squares....

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mentioning

confidence: 82%

Gene-culture coevolution of complex social behavior: human altruism and mate choice.

Rushton¹,

Littlefield²,

Lumsden³

1986

Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. U.S.A.

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“…Under genetic transmission, relatedness measures the extent to which two individuals sampled from the same group are more likely to bear the same genes inherited from a common ancestor than two individuals sampled from two different groups. Similarly, under cultural transmission, relatedness measures the extent to which two individuals from the same group are more likely to bear the same cultural variant (meme) inherited from a common cultural ancestor than two individuals sampled from two different groups (Werren and Pulliam 1981;Feldman et al 1985;Allison 1991).…”

Section: Genetic Versus Cultural Transmission Of Strong Reciprocitymentioning

confidence: 99%

“…When helping and punishment are perfectly linked traits, strong reciprocity can be envisioned as a cultural variant affecting Darwinian fitness (e.g., CavalliSforza and Feldman 1981;Feldman et al 1985), which is transmitted from the parental to the offspring generation between the reproduction and the dispersal stage of our life cycle. With these assumptions, different modes of vertical and/or oblique transmission of the trait will affect the change in frequency of strong reciprocity (eq.…”

Section: Genetic Versus Cultural Transmission Of Strong Reciprocitymentioning

confidence: 99%

“…While several authors have suggested similarities between the selective pressures on genetically and culturally determined helping traits (Werren and Pulliam 1981;Feldman et al 1985;Allison 1991), others (Gintis 2000;Bowles et al 2003;Fehr and Fischbacher 2003) have stressed that standard evolutionary theory cannot explain helping traits in humans and that alternatives such as "cultural group selection" are needed. Such claims are currently not supported by thorough mathematical analyses, and the conditions under which cultural and genetic transmission can lead to different selective pressures on the evolution of strong reciprocity remain to be identified.…”

mentioning

confidence: 99%

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Strong Reciprocity or Strong Ferocity? A Population Genetic View of the Evolution of Altruistic Punishment

Lehmann¹,

Rousset²,

Roze³

et al. 2007

The American Naturalist

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Strong reciprocity, defined as a predisposition to help others and to punish those that are not helping, has been proposed as a potent force leading to the evolution of cooperation and altruism. However, the conditions under which strong reciprocity might be favored are not clear. Here we investigate the selective pressure on strong reciprocity by letting both limited dispersal (i.e., spatial structure) and recombination between helping and punishment jointly determine the evolutionary dynamics of strong reciprocity. Our analytical model suggests that when helping and punishment are perfectly linked traits (no recombination occurring between them), strong reciprocity can spread even when the initial frequency of strong reciprocators is close to 0 in the population (i.e., a rare mutant can invade). By contrast, our results indicate that when recombination can occur between helping and punishment (i.e., both traits coevolve) and is stronger than selection, punishment is likely to invade a population of defectors only when it gives a direct fitness benefit to the actor. Overall, our results delineate the conditions under which strong reciprocity is selected for in a spatially structured population and highlight that the forces behind its evolution involves kinship (be it genetic or cultural).

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“…In a population without structured social interactions of agents, behaviors of the type found in our experiments and depicted in our models could not have evolved. However, multilevel selection and gene -culture coevolutionary models support cooperative behavior among nonkin (Bowles, Choi, & Hopfensitz, in press;Feldman, Cavalli-Sforza, & Peck, 1985;Gintis, 2000, in press-a, in press-b;Sober & Wilson, 1998). These models, some of which are discussed below, are not vulnerable to the classic critiques of group selection by Dawkins (1976), Maynard Smith (1976, Rogers (1990), Williams (1966), and others.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Explaining altruistic behavior in humans

Gintis

Bowles

Boyd

et al. 2003

Evolution and Human Behavior

820

500

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Recent experimental research has revealed forms of human behavior involving interaction among unrelated individuals that have proven difficult to explain in terms of kin or reciprocal altruism. One such trait, strong reciprocity is a predisposition to cooperate with others and to punish those who violate the norms of cooperation, at personal cost, even when it is implausible to expect that these costs will be repaid. We present evidence supporting strong reciprocity as a schema for predicting and understanding altruism in humans. We show that under conditions plausibly characteristic of the early stages of human evolution, a small number of strong reciprocators could invade a population of selfregarding types, and strong reciprocity is an evolutionary stable strategy. Although most of the evidence we report is based on behavioral experiments, the same behaviors are regularly described in everyday life, for example, in wage setting by firms, tax compliance, and cooperation in the protection of local environmental public goods. D

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Gene-culture coevolution: models for the evolution of altruism with cultural transmission.

Cited by 32 publications

References 9 publications

Gene-culture coevolution of complex social behavior: human altruism and mate choice.

Gene-culture coevolution of complex social behavior: human altruism and mate choice.

Strong Reciprocity or Strong Ferocity? A Population Genetic View of the Evolution of Altruistic Punishment

Explaining altruistic behavior in humans

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