Games with permission structures: The conjunctive approach

Gilles, Robert P.; Owen, Guillermo; Brink, René van den

doi:10.1007/bf01253782

Cited by 201 publications

(190 citation statements)

References 6 publications

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“…Since a large body of literature deals with axiomatizations of the Shapley value, one possible purpose is to develop new axiomatizations of the ϕ E value and to compare them. In addition, the effects of excluding coalitions could be analyzed in the framework of other structures of cooperative game theory like partitions [16,17], levels [18,19], networks [3,20] or hierarchies [21][22][23]. Another theoretical development could be a modified version of the ϕ E value that is based on other value-like solution concepts of cooperative game theory [24].…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

The Effects of Excluding Coalitions

Hiller

2018

Games

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Abstract:One problem in cooperative game theory is to model situations when two players refuse to cooperate (or the problem of quarreling members in coalitions). One example of such exclusions is the coalition statements of parliamentary parties. Other situations in which incompatible players affect the outcome are teams in firms and markets, for example. To model these exclusions in cooperative game theory, the excluded coalitions value (ϕ E value) was introduced. This value is based on the Shapley value and takes into account that players exclude coalitions with other players. In this article, we deduce some properties of this new value. After some general results, we analyze the apex game that could be interpreted as a team situation and the glove game that models markets where sellers and buyers deal. For team situations, we show that all employees have a common interest for cooperation. On asymmetric markets, excluding coalitions affect the market players of the scarce side to a higher extent.

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Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

The Effects of Excluding Coalitions

Hiller

2018

Games

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“…The permission value for games with a permission structure is studied by Gilles et al (1992), van den Brink and Gilles (1996) and van den Brink (1997) as an adaptation of the well-known and often applied Shapley value (Shapley 1953) for cooperative games. A full characterization of the permission pay-system can be found in van den Brink (2007).…”

Section: The Pay-systemmentioning

confidence: 99%

Technology driven organizational structure of the firm

Brink

Ruys

2007

Ann Finance

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We model a corporate firm with a variable internal organizational structure that adapts to various degrees of technological cooperation. The entrepreneur determines the organizational structure that maximizes profits under participation constraints. Wages are determined by an internal cooperative pay-system, constrained by external reservation wages. We show that closer cooperation between productionworkers results in a shorter organization with enhanced positional wages relative to the external benchmarks. The corporate firm is embedded in a competitive market economy that determines reservation wages and market prices. We also allow for more general technologies and provide conditions guaranteeing a finite optimal size of the firm.

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“…In the conjunctive approach as developed in Gilles, Owen and van den Brink (1992) and van den Brink and Gilles (1996), it is assumed that each player needs permission from all its predecessors before it is allowed to cooperate. This implies that a coalition S ⊆ N is feasible if and only if for every player in the coalition it holds that all its predecessors belong to the coalition.…”

Section: Hierarchiesmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Alternatively, in the disjunctive approach as developed in Gilles and Owen (1994) and van den Brink (1997), it is assumed that each player (except the topplayers) needs permission from at least one of its predecessors before it is allowed to cooperate with other players. Consequently, a coalition is feasible if and only if every player in the coalition (except the top-players) has at least one predecessor who also belongs to the coalition.…”

Section: Hierarchiesmentioning

confidence: 99%

On hierarchies and communication

Brink

2011

Soc Choice Welf

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Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. Terms of use: Documents in AbstractMany economic organizations have some relational structure, meaning that economic agents do not only differ with respect to certain individual characteristics such as wealth and preferences, but also belong to some relational structure in which they usually take different positions. Two examples of such structures are communication networks and hierarchies. In the literature the distinction between these two types of relational structures is not always clear. In models of restricted cooperation this distinction should be defined by properties of the set of feasible coalitions. We characterize the feasible sets in communication networks and compare them with feasible sets arising from hierarchies.

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Games with permission structures: The conjunctive approach

Cited by 201 publications

References 6 publications

The Effects of Excluding Coalitions

The Effects of Excluding Coalitions

Technology driven organizational structure of the firm

On hierarchies and communication

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