From Catch-all Politics to Cartelisation: The Political Economy of the Cartel Party

Blyth, Mark; Katz, Richard S.

doi:10.1080/0140238042000297080

Cited by 185 publications

(125 citation statements)

References 23 publications

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“…Established parties are said to have formed a cartel on the market for votes to exploit the resources provided by the state, and hence exclude newcomers from representation (cf. Detterbeck 2005;Blyth and Katz 2005;Katz and Mair 1995). In fact, Lipset and Rokkan's (1967, p. 61) own attempt to explain the freezing process resembles this argument.…”

Section: The Problem Of Having Well Established and Powerful Competitorsmentioning

confidence: 85%

Why do party systems tend to be so stable? A review of rationalists' contributions

Erlingsson¹

2009

BJSS

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Abstract:The purpose of this research note is to demonstrate the usefulness of rational choice models in making party-system stability intelligible. First, the 'problem of collective action among potential party-entrepreneurs' makes it puzzling that new political parties emerge at all. Secondly, if the original collective-action problem is overcome somehow, the 'problem of voter coordination' makes it hard for new parties to attract voters. Finally, established competitors have incentives and resources to hold newcomers back. I conclude by maintaining that simple, well-known rational choice models explain the empirical observation by Lipset and Rokkan (1967) that party systems tend to be 'frozen'. Instead, the genuinely puzzling thing is why new political parties emerge and gain support at all. Keywords: Party systems; 'freezing hypothesis'; party formation; stability Ágrip: Tilgangur þessarar greinar er að sýna fram á nytsemi skynsemiskenninga við að útskýra af hverju flokkakerfi eru stöðug. Hugsanlegir flokksfrumkvöðlar lenda fyrst í "vanda sameiginlegra athafna" sem gerir það að ráðgátu að nýir flokkar myndast yfir höfuð. Ef vandi sameiginlegra athafna er leystur, þá eiga nýir flokkar erfitt með að fá kjósendur til fylgis við sig vegna þess að enginn vill kjósa flokk sem enginn annar kýs. Að lokum þá hafa keppinautar til langs tíma hvata og getu til að halda nýjum keppinautum niðri. Niðurstaða mín er sú að einfaldar og vel þekktar skynsemiskenningar útskýri vel þá niðurstöðu Lipset og Rokkan (1967) að flokkakerfi hafi tilhneigingu til að frjósa. Hin sanna ráðgáta felst í því af hverju nýir flokkar verði til yfir höfuð og njóti fylgis.

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Section: The Problem Of Having Well Established and Powerful Competitorsmentioning

confidence: 85%

Why do party systems tend to be so stable? A review of rationalists' contributions

Erlingsson¹

2009

BJSS

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“…Scholars claim that increasingly, 'public policy is less of a governmental dictum and more of an ongoing negotiation among government and non-government actors (Katz & Mair, 1995;Castells, 1996;Blumler and Kavanagh, 1999;Ornstein and Mann, 2000;Bingham et al, 2005a;Blyth and Katz, 2005)' (Crozier, 2008 p. 3). While Crozier makes an empirical claim, other scholars soften the claim arguing, 'the idea of a sovereign state that governs society topdown through laws, rules and detailed regulations has lost its grip and is being replaced by new ideas about a decentred governance based on interdependence, negotiation and trust' (Sørensen & Torfing, 2005, pp.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Creative Coercion in Post-Katrina New Orleans: a Neighborhood Strategy to Address Conflict in Networks

Danley

2015

CCS Journal

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The study of relationships within networks has traditionally focused on concepts such as cooperation, collaboration and other forms of partnership (Brown & Keast 2003). The assumption has been that actors in a network have shared vision and are working together. This study tests that idea by using mixed methods and ethnography to examine 15 neighborhood associations in post-Katrina New Orleans, and 71 of their relationships within policy networks. Contrary to our typical understanding of networks, neighborhood associations engage not just in partnership, but also in power struggles. When excluded from policy networks, neighborhood associations use creative coercion to ensure their voice is heard. Facing a power deficit, these associations look for informal levers to assert themselves into policy negotiation. The result is creative and coercive measures, such as co-opting elections, bribery, blackmail and what one neighborhood activist calls ‘guerrilla warfare.’ These conflicts force a reconsideration of networks. Networks are not solely homes of collaborative action; they are also the location of sharp power struggles over priorities.

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“…Rather than compete for the favours of the voters, they may carve up the benefits of a political system between themselves (Katz and Mair 1995;Blyth and Katz 2005). They may fail to form even where there is an identifiable group capable of being represented (Olson 1965); or they may fail to supply choices in relation to a particular level of government.…”

Section: Introduction Parties and Aggregationmentioning

confidence: 99%

The aggregating function of political parties in EU decision-making

Lord¹

2010

Living Rev. Euro. Gov.

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This Living Review uses concepts of aggregation to analyse what we do and do not know about the contribution of political parties to the politics and democratic performance of the European Union. It suggests that present representative structures are better at aggregating 'choices of policies' than 'choices of leaders'. Much more, however, needs to be done to analyse the causal contribution of party actors to those patterns of aggregation, and to understand why European Union parties do not develop further where aggregation seems to be deficient in the EU arena.This review is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-Non-Commercial-NoDerivs 2.0 Austria License. http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/2.0/at/ How to cite this articleOwing to the fact that a Living Reviews article can evolve over time, we recommend to cite the article as follows:Christopher J. Lord, "The aggregating function of political parties in EU decision-making", Living Rev.

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From Catch-all Politics to Cartelisation: The Political Economy of the Cartel Party

Cited by 185 publications

References 23 publications

Why do party systems tend to be so stable? A review of rationalists' contributions

Why do party systems tend to be so stable? A review of rationalists' contributions

Creative Coercion in Post-Katrina New Orleans: a Neighborhood Strategy to Address Conflict in Networks

The aggregating function of political parties in EU decision-making

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