Formal Analysis of Sensor Network Encryption Protocol (SNEP)

Tobarra, Llanos; Cazorla, Diego; Cuartero, Fernando

doi:10.1109/mobhoc.2007.4428763

Cited by 28 publications

(11 citation statements)

References 19 publications

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“…However, this claim is not justified, since a node sends data to the base station in encrypted format (note that the node to base station data transmission protocol is explained in Section 2.2), and the intruder is not able to divulge the encryption key. The models we are presenting in this paper are different from the models explained in [17] in many ways that are explained here:…”

Section: Related Workmentioning

confidence: 92%

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Security Property Validation of the Sensor Network Encryption Protocol (SNEP)

Islam

2015

Computers

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Since wireless sensor networks (WSNs) have been designed to be deployed in an unsecured, public environment, secured communication is really vital for their wide-spread use. Among all of the communication protocols developed for WSN, the Security Protocols for Sensor Networks (SPINS) is exceptional, as it has been designed with security as a goal. SPINS is composed of two building blocks: Secure Network Encryption Protocol (SNEP) and the "micro" version of the Timed Efficient Streaming Loss-tolerant Authentication (TESLA), named µTESLA. From the inception of SPINS, a number of efforts have been made to validate its security properties. In this paper, we have validated the security properties of SNEP by using an automated security protocol validation tool, named AVISPA. Using the protocol specification language, HLPSL, we model two combined scenarios-node to node key agreement and counter exchange protocols-followed by data transmission. Next, we validate the security properties of these combined protocols, using different AVISPA back-ends. AVISPA reports the models we have developed free from attacks. However, by analyzing the key distribution sub-protocol, we find one threat of a potential DoS attack that we have demonstrated by modeling in AVISPA. Finally, we propose a modification, and AVISPA reports this modified version free from the potential DoS attack.

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Section: Related Workmentioning

confidence: 92%

“…In [17], an AVISPA model has been developed to verify two security properties: authenticity and confidentiality of SNEP message components. Two separate models have been developed to verify the scenarios: requesting information from the base station to a normal node and key distribution between two nodes.…”

Section: Related Workmentioning

confidence: 99%

Security Property Validation of the Sensor Network Encryption Protocol (SNEP)

Islam

2015

Computers

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“…Where K AB denotes the shared key between two nodes A and B. Besides, because the PFC‐CTR is also based on counter mode, accordingly, the system employ PFC‐CTR is also resilient to replay attacks, like SNEP and ZigBee .…”

Section: Applicationsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Robust stream‐cipher mode of authenticated encryption for secure communication in wireless sensor network

Hwang

Gope

2015

Security Comm Networks

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Authenticated Encryption is a cryptographic process of providing confidentiality and integrity protection of messages in a single pass without any support of conventional checksum, Message Authentication Code (MAC), or hash function. In this paper, at first, we show that how to construct the stream-cipher-based Authenticated Encryption environment, where the key-stream is generated from any secure block algorithm like Advanced Encryption Standard. In order to do that, we introduce two stream-cipher modes of Authenticated Encryption, namely, PFC-CTR (Counter-based Authenticated Encryption environment) and PFC-OCB (OCB-based Authenticated Encryption environment), which are quite robust against several active attacks, for example, message stream modification attacks, known-plain-text attacks, and chosen-plain-text attacks, and at the same time, they can also efficiently deal with some other issues like "limited error propagation" existing in several conventional stream-cipher modes of operation like Cipher Feedback, Output Feedback, and Counter. Finally, we enforce the concept of Authenticated Encryption in the sense of data communication security of the wireless sensor network (WSN), Global Mobility Networks (GLOMONET), and Cloud Computing environment, where only encryption can guarantee both the privacy and integrity in a single pass with the assurance of reasonable computational overhead.

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“…The AVISPA model checker [2] has been used in [40] for an analysis of TinySec [19], LEAP [42], and TinyPK [41], three wireless sensor network security protocols, and in [39] for an analysis of the Sensor Network Encryption Protocol SNEP [32]. In particular, in [40] the authors considered the communication between immediate neighbour nodes which use the pairwise shared key already established by LEAP.…”

Section: Conclusion Related and Future Workmentioning

confidence: 99%

A semantic analysis of key management protocols for wireless sensor networks

Macedonio

Merro

2014

Science of Computer Programming

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We propose a simple timed broadcasting process calculus for modelling wireless network protocols. The operational semantics of our calculus is given in terms of a labelled transition semantics which is used to derive a standard (weak) bi-simulation theory. Based on our simulation theory, we reformulate Gorrieri and Martinelli's timed Generalized NonDeducibility on Compositions (tGNDC) scheme, a well-known general framework for the definition of timed properties of security protocols. We use tGNDC to perform a semantic analysis of three well-known key management protocols for wireless sensor networks: µTESLA, LEAP+ and LiSP. As a main result, we provide a number of attacks to these protocols which, to our knowledge, have not yet appeared in the literature.

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Formal Analysis of Sensor Network Encryption Protocol (SNEP)

Cited by 28 publications

References 19 publications

Security Property Validation of the Sensor Network Encryption Protocol (SNEP)

Security Property Validation of the Sensor Network Encryption Protocol (SNEP)

Robust stream‐cipher mode of authenticated encryption for secure communication in wireless sensor network

A semantic analysis of key management protocols for wireless sensor networks

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