Forgiving and Ceasing to Blame

Milam, Per‐Erik

doi:10.1007/978-3-030-77807-1_8

Cited by 12 publications

(1 citation statement)

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“…The bipar-14 In a recent paper, Brunning and Milam develop an account of "letting go" of blame as a practice directly connected to forgiveness as well as excuses (Brunning & Milam, 2022). 15 For example, Milam, 2022;Nelkin, 2013;Griswold, 2007;Pettigrove, 2007;Baron, 2006;Murphy, 2005;Hieronymi, 2001, to name but a few authors who discuss forgiveness together with excuses. 16 Since blameworthiness entails responsibility, as well as moral objectionability, excuses, on my account, are irrelevant to cases in which the agent who acted in a morally objectionable way but was not responsible.…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

The Grounds of Excuses

van Loon

2023

Philosophia

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According to a popular view, excuses undermine blameworthiness. At the same time, philosophers commonly accept that blameworthiness is composed of two necessary conditions: a moral objectionability condition and a responsibility condition. For excuses to do their job, they must undermine at least one of these conditions. In this paper, I conclude that excuses do neither. By inference to the best explanation, I propose a view that reconciles this conclusion with the function of excuses.

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Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

The Grounds of Excuses

van Loon

2023

Philosophia

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The Beam and the Mote

Lippert-Rasmussen

2023

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Most believe (or at least respond, if subjected to hypocritical blame, as if they believe) that even if one has done something blameworthy, one can dismiss blame on that account when it comes from a hypocritical blamer. This book examines the nature and ethics of standingless hypocritical blame. It argues that hypocrites lack standing to blame by virtue of their lack of commitment to the norms to which they appeal in their blame; that hypocritical blame is pro tanto morally wrong because it involves treating the blamee as an inferior; and that there are many sources of lacking standing to blame other than hypocrisy, e.g., complicity. Next, the book extrapolates these analyses to other moral responses, notably praising and forgiving. So far the literature on standing has focused on blaming, but many other moral responses require standing as well, and, notably, there are such things as standingless—because hypocritical or otherwise deficient—praise or forgiveness. Indeed, it is argued that considerations about standing apply to illocutionary acts not involving appeals to moral norms, e.g., nonmoral encouragements and epistemic blame. In closing, the book uses insights in relation to the idea of standing as a basis for making a grand claim about how part of morality is interpersonal in a sense often ignored in discussions of the main first-order moral theories, e.g., consequentialism and deontology, and to elucidate the nature of the moral wrong involved in relying on negative statistical generalizations about certain groups of people.

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Lippert-Rasmussen

2023

The Beam and the Mote

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Forgiving and Ceasing to Blame

Cited by 12 publications

References 40 publications

The Grounds of Excuses

The Grounds of Excuses

The Beam and the Mote

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