2016
DOI: 10.1111/papq.12169
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Abstract: Is propositional religious faith constituted by belief? Recent debate has focussed on whether faith may be constituted by a positive non-doxastic cognitive state, which can stand in place of belief. This paper sets out and defends the doxastic theory. We consider and reject three arguments commonly used in favour of non-doxastic theories of faith: (1) the argument from religious doubt; (2) the use of 'faith' in linguistic utterances; and (3) the possibility of pragmatic faith. We argue that belief is required … Show more

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Cited by 27 publications
(24 citation statements)
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“…The claim that NDF is a kind of fictionalism has been used as an argument against the theory itself. Malcolm and Scott () use it, along with a variety of objections to NDF, to defend the position that belief is a necessary condition for propositional faith. One possible way to distinguish fictionalism from the faith as described by the supporter of NDF is in terms of the importance placed on truth (Malcolm, forthcoming).…”
Section: Fictionalists In the Closetmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…The claim that NDF is a kind of fictionalism has been used as an argument against the theory itself. Malcolm and Scott () use it, along with a variety of objections to NDF, to defend the position that belief is a necessary condition for propositional faith. One possible way to distinguish fictionalism from the faith as described by the supporter of NDF is in terms of the importance placed on truth (Malcolm, forthcoming).…”
Section: Fictionalists In the Closetmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…There are some interesting prima facie similarities between NDT and other pragmatic approaches to a particular domain and, as I have jointly argued in a recent article (Malcolm and Scott (2016)), this is especially true of what we may call "revolutionary fictionalism". The decision to adopt a cognitive attitude toward a proposition and to positively affirm it for pragmatic reasons, despite not believing it, is one also taken by the fictionalist.…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…To understand fully the point raised in Malcolm and Scott (2016) -that fictionalists can have faith according to NDT -we must first outline what fictionalism is, and then explicitly show why the fictionalist can meet the conditions set out above. There are two predominant kinds of fictionalism: "hermeneutic" and "revolutionary".…”
Section: Revolutionary Fictionalismmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…For some taxonomies, seeAudi (2011, 52-65) and Sessions (1994).8 Although it is now widely accepted that propositional faith does not require belief, there is some resistance to this non-doxastic view(Malcolm and Scott 2017). 9 For criticism of this widely held view, seeMalcolm and Scott (MSa) …”
mentioning
confidence: 99%