Fair Trade, Formal Equality, and Preferential Treatment

Christensen, James B.

doi:10.5840/soctheorpract201541326

Cited by 8 publications

(4 citation statements)

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“…It relates to the social norm of diffuse reciprocity (e.g., Kapstein 2005) and the idea attributed to Aristotle that treating unequals equally is unfair. Equal exchange is not fair due to the unequal capacities of state actors (e.g., Christensen 2015; Stiglitz and Charlton 2005; Wolff 2010; Sohn 2020). In trade policy, for example, asymmetrical fairness would require that actors make unequal concessions based upon their unequal capacities, with stronger actors conceding more than weaker actors.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Asymmetrical fairness in trade preferences

Sohn

Quek

2023

Research & Politics

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Asymmetric capacities across nations are a persistent reality in the global economy, but little is known about how people respond to these disparities. We provide the first experimental evidence on the phenomenon of asymmetrical fairness in trade preferences. We find that trade opinion divides over the relative economic capacity of the trade partner: Citizens treat smaller and less developed economies very differently in trade, even when the asymmetric treatment is disadvantageous to their own country. Across different experimental tests on a national sample in China, we find strong effects on trade opinion that are statistically and substantively significant. We also show that asymmetrical fairness is a phenomenon that applies in both positive (gains) and negative (losses) domains. Thus, while International Relations scholarship often assumes self-centered actors seeking benefits for themselves or their national in-groups, our results show that prosocial considerations over the limited capacities of the weak can influence the preferences of the strong—a phenomenon that refines our understanding of international power asymmetry and its consequences.

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Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Asymmetrical fairness in trade preferences

Sohn

Quek

2023

Research & Politics

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“…However, allowing such institutional diversity raises the question of whether DI will yield a form of EU cooperation all participants could find mutually acceptable. In certain respects, DI within the EU reflects demands for 'special and differentiated treatment' in negotiations within the WTO (Christensen, 2015), and variations in the 'nationally determined contributions', such as 'capacity building' measures, in the Paris Agreement on climate change (Caney, 2010), which seek to balance the needs of developing and developed countries As in these cases, DI within the EU plays a role in fairly accommodating three levels of cooperation: national cooperation between citizens within each of the MS, international cooperation between MS, and supra-and trans-national cooperation among citizens (Sangiovanni, 2013, p. 217). DI operates most straightforwardly in rendering international cooperation consistent with different forms of national cooperation.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Differentiated integration as a fair scheme of cooperation

Bellamy

Kröger

2021

Review of Social Economy

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Differentiated integration (DI), whereby some MS opt out or are excluded from certain common EU policies for sovereignty or capacity reasons, may be thought to undermine the EU's functioning as what John Rawls called a fair scheme of cooperation, grounded in norms of impartiality and reciprocity. However, we argue that different forms of DI can be compatible with either fair cooperation between states on the model of Rawls' Law of Peoples or cooperation among citizens on the model of Rawls' two principles of domestic justice. Meanwhile, the EU has features of both, being an international Union of states and a supraand trans-national Union of citizens. We defend the coherence of this combination and contend that DI can provide a justified mechanism for ensuring fairness between states remains compatible with fairness between citizens both within and across states. Indeed it offers a potential model for other forms of international cooperation.

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“…See for exampleJames (2005), James (2012a), James (2012b),Risse (2007),Kurjanska, & Risse (2008),Risse & Wollner (2014),Risse (2012),Moellendorf (2005),Miller (2017),Stiglitz, Stiglitz, & Charlton (2005),Christensen (2015) andWalton (2014). 3 The problem of odious debts has affected most of the developing countries, as most countries have been ruled by autocratic or corrupt rules, which have used the money for non authorized purposes.…”

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confidence: 99%

Odious Debts and International Fair Trade

Dimitriu¹

2019

Daimon

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I argue that one of the most important reasons why international trade has been unfair is that weaker parties in trading negotiations have been illegitimately forced to accept terms of trade that they would not otherwise accept under normal circumstances, and these terms of trade have been harmful for them. Odious debts are at the center of this kind of injustice. Odious debts are debts that are not binding for the citizens of a country, as they were incurred by illegitimate rulers in the name of all the citizens, but used for private purposes, such as personal benefit, or to oppress the population. Despite the fact that these debts are not binding—that is, that they should not be repaid—creditor countries have coerced debtor countries to repay them and, more importantly for the purposes of this article, they have taken advantage of the fact that countries are burdened with these debts by tailoring trade agreements in their favor. They have done so by telling debtor countries that, unless they trade under terms that creditor countries want; non-binding (i.e. odious) debts will be enforced. The resulting state of affairs is not simply a convenient one for creditor countries and an inconvenient one for debtor countries. It is also an immoral one.

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Fair Trade, Formal Equality, and Preferential Treatment

Cited by 8 publications

References 0 publications

Asymmetrical fairness in trade preferences

Asymmetrical fairness in trade preferences

Differentiated integration as a fair scheme of cooperation

Odious Debts and International Fair Trade

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