Faccionalismo e integración vertical en contextos multinivel. El caso del Partido Nacionalista Vasco

Gómez, Raúl Sánchez; Pérez-Nievas, Santiago

doi:10.5565/rev/papers/v92n0.709

Cited by 2 publications

(2 citation statements)

References 6 publications

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“…New federal bodies, such as a quadrennial general conference, were introduced, and local branches were empowered with direct consultation mechanisms set up by the federal level. Regional autonomy on finances, platforms, campaigns and coalitions was cut down and the federal executive board took over the selection of candidates for all except local elections (Gómez and Pérez-Nievas, 2009).…”

Section: Decentralized Factionalismmentioning

confidence: 99%

Factionalism in multi-level contexts

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Gómez

2011

Party Politics

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This article provides a dynamic framework through which factionalism can be examined and the circumstances of individual parties compared in multi-level contexts. We discuss the interaction between factionalism and party structure by setting out a model of factional organization dependent on the tolerance of host parties to dissent and their degree of vertical integration, their combination yielding four possible strategies for opposition factions: centralized, inter-layered, multi-layered and decentralized. We also consider what implications there are for the party's dominant coalition in episodes of high factionalism. These act as a catalyst for the modification of party rules that regulate dissent and vertical distribution of power. The hypotheses developed are tested on four Spanish political parties that differ on the autonomy of regional branches and factions, the competitive position in the party system and factionalism type -more policy or more patronage-oriented.

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Section: Decentralized Factionalismmentioning

confidence: 99%

Factionalism in multi-level contexts

Verge

Gómez

2011

Party Politics

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“…Similarly, Martin Schulz was first nominated by the party executive as top candidate for the 2017 federal election 15 and two months after a party conference elected him as party leader 16 . In some parties like the Basque Nationalist Party and most of the Belgian parties the same person is even officially prohibited by their internal regulations from holding both positions at the same time (Gómez and Pérez-Nievas, 2009;Pilet and Wauters, 2014).…”

Section: Who Are the Top Candidates?mentioning

confidence: 99%

Party soldiers: The selection of electoral leaders in parliamentary democracies

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The selection of candidates for public office is one of the pivotal functions political parties perform in liberal democracies. Many works have studied the nomination of candidates for the legislative branch. Few studies have looked into the nomination of candidates for the executive branch in presidential democracies. However, very few works have looked at candidates' nomination for the executive branch in parliamentary democracies, who have been called electoral leaders or top candidates. This dissertation contributes to filling this gap by exploring three main research questions. First, what criteria do political parties use when nominating a top candidate? Second, to what extent do political parties nominate their top candidates on electoral considerations? Third, under which conditions is electoral competition more likely to shape party decision-making? I consider that political parties hold two criteria when nominating a top candidate. First, based on top candidates' electoral and campaigning function, parties seek to nominate electable top candidates likely to achieve more votes. Second, considering that top candidates may become prime ministers after the election and perform a series of post-electoral functions, parties will seek to nominate more reliable candidates who stay close to their party’s preferences. Building on the literature on party organization change, this dissertation proposes a new theoretical framework for understanding how different incentives can drive parties to nominate top candidates closer to one or the other criterion. In particular, this dissertation studies four factors: the party’s screening and recruitment capacity, internal demand, external demand, and the type of selectorate. To test the influence of these four factors, this dissertation presents a novel dataset of more than 2500 sub-national top candidates in Canada, Germany and Spain. There have been collecting information about the personal, partisan and political background of top candidates, which been complemented with information about the type of selectorate, the party’s internal structure, and the electorate's state. The main results are summarized as follows. First, parties are heavily dependent on their access to public institutions to recruit and train new members and produce top candidates with high degrees of reliability. Second, the results show that political parties are more reactive to changes in their internal coalitions' composition than to changes in the overall electorate. Finally, the results show that party primaries tend to differ from party conferences and party elites when the party has experienced some environmental change regarding the type of selectorate. This dissertation contributes to the understanding of the role of top candidates in parliamentary democracies and academic knowledge about party organizational change and adaptation.

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Faccionalismo e integración vertical en contextos multinivel. El caso del Partido Nacionalista Vasco

Cited by 2 publications

References 6 publications

Factionalism in multi-level contexts

Factionalism in multi-level contexts

Party soldiers: The selection of electoral leaders in parliamentary democracies

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