Explaining the Spread of Temporary Jobs and Its Impact on Labor Turnover

Cahuc, Pierre; Charlot, Olivier; Malherbet, Franck

doi:10.1111/iere.12167

Cited by 108 publications

(141 citation statements)

References 48 publications

(61 reference statements)

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“…5 This is not that restrictive since the probation period for workers under TCs in Spain is much shorter (typically 1 or 2 months) than the standard duration of these contracts (2 or 3 years), which are kept alive until their termination (see Cahuc et al 2012). Firms use TCs to hire workers because they yield a larger initial surplus than permanent contracts (PC, hereafter) due to their much less stringent EPL.…”

Section: A Simple Model Of Decisions In a Dual Labour Marketmentioning

confidence: 99%

Does dual employment protection affect TFP? Evidence from Spanish manufacturing firms

Dolado

Ortigueira

Stucchi

2016

SERIEs

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This paper analyzes how changes in the firing-costs gap between permanent and temporary workers affect firms' TFP in a dual labour market. We argue that, under plausible conditions, firms' temp-to-perm conversion rates go down when this gap increases. Temporary workers respond to lower conversion rates by exerting less effort, while firms react by providing less paid-for training. Both channels lead to a decline in TFP. We test these implications in a large panel of Spanish manufacturing firms from 1991 to 2005, looking at the effects of three labour market reforms which entailed substantial changes in the firing-costs gap. Our empirical findings provide some support for the above-mentioned mechanism.

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Section: A Simple Model Of Decisions In a Dual Labour Marketmentioning

confidence: 99%

Does dual employment protection affect TFP? Evidence from Spanish manufacturing firms

Dolado

Ortigueira

Stucchi

2016

SERIEs

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show abstract

“…According to Boeri and Garibaldi (2007), if fixed-term contracts are used as a buffer-stock to boost the number of hiring in a boom, employment may go up at least temporarily, but they find the use of fixed-term contracts in Italy to be associated with lower average productivity. The model by Cahuc et al (2016) shows that the substitution of temporary jobs for permanent jobs induced by job protection does not change much total employment but reduces aggregate productivity.…”

Section: Literature Reviewmentioning

confidence: 99%

Fixed or open-ended? Labor Contracts and Productivity in the Colombian Manufacturing Sector

Castellani¹,

Lotti²,

Obando³

2017

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“…While this does not affect aggregate employment, it does have an adverse effect on aggregate production (Cahuc, Charlot, and Malherbet, 2012). …”

Section: Box 51 Negative Consequences Of Temporary Contractsmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…This legislation often contains provisions that kick in after a certain month, imposing a series of labor costs. There is an entire body of specialized literature in Europe indicating that the vast majority of temporary contracts are not renewed due to the specter of their becoming indefi nite contracts with much higher dismissal costs (Cahuc, Charlot, and Malherbet, 2012;Costain et al, 2010). …”

Section: Box 54 Labor Law and Worker Mobility: A Case Of Reforming Tmentioning

confidence: 99%

Empleos para crecer

Alaimo¹,

Bosch²,

Kaplan³

et al. 2015

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Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives (CC-IGO BY-NC-ND 3.0 IGO) license (http://creativecommons.org/ licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/igo/legalcode) and may be reproduced with attribution to the IDB and for any non-commercial purpose. No derivative work is allowed.Any dispute related to the use of the works of the IDB that cannot be settled amicably shall be submitted to arbitration pursuant to the UNCITRAL rules. The use of the IDB's name for any purpose other than for attribution, and the use of IDB's logo shall be subject to a separate written license agreement between the IDB and the user and is not authorized as part of this CC-IGO license. Note that link provided above includes additional terms and conditions of the licenseThe opinions expressed in this publication are those of the authors and do not necessarily refl ect the views of the Inter-American Development Bank, its Board of Directors, or the countries they represent. SECOND EDITIONThis edition includes some changes from the formatting of the fi rst edition. Changes in the calculation of non-wage costs have also been introduced, affecting Figures 2.6-2.10, 4.5, and 5.7. These changes are due to several adjustments that can be summarized as follows: 1. the inclusion of contributions to training institutions in Nicaragua and Paraguay; 2. changes in taxable income for the calculation of premiums (gross income in some cases and income net of the additional year-end bonus in others); 3. adjustments in the upper and lower thresholds for determining taxable income, which affect the calculation of the total contribution rate (as established by law, largely dependent on the minimum wage).Furthermore, specifi c adjustments were made for some countries. In Nicaragua, the advance notice penalty was eliminated, as it is not provided for in labor law, and in Jamaica, an adjustment was made in the working population obtained from the Labour Force Survey (which was employed to calculate the 2012 GDP per worker).In Figure 5.2, the indicator labeled "other special costs in the event of collective dismissals" for Nicaragua (Item 21 in the calculation of the "protection against collective dismissals of regular workers" indicator) was adjusted from 0 to 0.5. Finally, small changes were made in Figure 2.17, as in some countries, the rate refl ected the percentage of employees who received job training out of the total population (15-64 years old) rather than out of employees of the same age group. Jamaica was excluded from this Figure, since the survey only contains data for the inactive population.The Spanish acronym for youths who are neither in education nor working is "NINIs"; the usual English acronym refers to youths "not in education, employment, or training" (or "NEETs"). However, translating NINIs as NEETs would not be accurate, as the household surveys in Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC) do not capture whether people are enrolled in training institutions. Therefore, this book does not use the standard English acronym NEET. The same applies to youths who are "neith...

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Explaining the Spread of Temporary Jobs and Its Impact on Labor Turnover

Cited by 108 publications

References 48 publications

Does dual employment protection affect TFP? Evidence from Spanish manufacturing firms

Does dual employment protection affect TFP? Evidence from Spanish manufacturing firms

Fixed or open-ended? Labor Contracts and Productivity in the Colombian Manufacturing Sector

Empleos para crecer

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