Explaining the evolving role of national parliaments under the European Semester

Abstract

This contribution examines and explains the role of national parliaments in the European Semester process. It builds on original survey-based evidence and traces whether national parliaments discuss and vote on Stability/Convergence and on National Reform Programmes; how their involvement changed over time; and what might condition national varieties of parliamentary scrutiny over European Union (EU) affairs. We find significant cross-country variation in whether the debate is taking place at the parliamentary level; whether it is European Affairs or finance committees that are involved; and whether there is involvement ex ante (before submission) and/or ex post (after country-specific recommendations). From 2012 to 2015, finance committees played an increasingly prominent role. Traditional measures of the strength of parliament do not explain what we observe. We do find that non-euro area member states were most likely to monitor EU recommendations under the European Semester and that this effect increased over tim

Democratic legitimation of EU economic governance: challenges and opportunities for European Legislatures

“…In addressing all these questions, this special issue effectively builds upon and complements the existing literature. It delves into the question of how exactly scrutiny is performed and thereby confirms previous studies (Crum 2018;Hallerberg, Marzinotto, and Wolff 2018;Kreilinger 2016) in which national parliaments' attempts to develop ownership over the European Semester procedures was analysed by showing that, even after the seventh cycle of economic coordination, important shortcomings and differences among parliaments remain that may eventually be linked to the individual situation of the Member State at stake. The analysis offered in this special issue also complements previous findings on the ECB's accountability in the monetary domain (inter alia Amtenbrink and van Duin 2009; Jančić 2017) by adding the new dimension of the Banking Union and by contemplating both national and European Parliaments (Amtenbrink and Markakis 2017).…”

Parliamentary accountability in multilevel governance: what role for parliaments in post-crisis EU economic governance?

“…Hallerberg et al (2017) find that it is not in the Euro area but rather in the Eurosceptic countries that are unlikely to ever adopt the euro (the United Kingdom, Sweden, Hungary, Denmark and the Czech Republic) where parliaments are most active in discussing their governments' plans. The scattered evidence on the depth of parliamentary powers (COSAC 2014;European Parliament 2014) suggests furthermore that it is the Nordic parliaments (Latvia, Lithuania, Finland, Estonia), with a tradition of active EU scrutiny (Winzen 2012), where parliaments retain most powers over the government's exchange with the Commission.…”

“…For that involvement to have any impact, one would expect them to be involved before the actual submission of the programmes rather than only after it (cf. Hallerberg et al 2017;Kreilinger 2016: 32). Ideally, one would even want the programmes to be subject to parliamentary approval, as is already the case in some countries.…”

Parliamentary accountability in multilevel governance: what role for parliaments in post-crisis EU economic governance?

“…For sure, there is considerable variation in the ways national parliaments have responded to the European Semester. Hallerberg et al (2017) find that it is not in the Euro area but rather in the Eurosceptic countries that are unlikely to ever adopt the euro (the United Kingdom, Sweden, Hungary, Denmark and the Czech Republic) where parliaments are most active in discussing their governments' plans. The scattered evidence on the depth of parliamentary powers (COSAC 2014; European Parliament 2014) suggests furthermore that it is the Nordic parliaments (Latvia, Lithuania, Finland, Estonia), with a tradition of active EU scrutiny (Winzen 2012), where parliaments retain most powers over the government's exchange with the Commission.…”