Executive Orders and Presidential Power

Mayer, Kenneth R.

doi:10.2307/2647511

Cited by 152 publications

(189 citation statements)

References 11 publications

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“…While this hypothesis has been proposed and tested elsewhere (Howell 2003;Mayer 1999), our derivation differs, and we make the theoretical assumptions and mechanism producing the effects of unified government more transparent and precise. The second integrates the potential importance of legislative parties and divided government, irrelevant for the earlier models, and can hold only when assuming that M p constrains presidential action.…”

Section: Partisan Compliance Modelmentioning

confidence: 98%

The Elusive Search for Presidential Power

Chiou

Rothenberg

2013

American J Political Sci

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Unilateral presidential actions, such as executive orders, are widely cited as a key strategic tool for presidential power. However, is unilateral action evidence of unilateralism or might it represent executive acquiescence? We answer this by (1) specifying three competing models, each with a different presidential discretion assumption and generating alternative hypotheses; (2) extending the canonical item-response model to best measure executive-order significance; and (3) comparing competing theoretical models to data for . Theoretically, we show that legislative preferences may impact unilateral actions differently than previously thought and indicate how parties may be influential. Empirically, a model where the president is responsive to the chamber's majority-party median fits the data better than models assuming responsiveness to the chamber median or no presidential acquiescence. Unilateral action appears not tantamount to presidential power, as evidence implies that legislative parties, or the judicial actors enforcing their will, are key conditioning factors.

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Section: Partisan Compliance Modelmentioning

confidence: 98%

The Elusive Search for Presidential Power

Chiou

Rothenberg

2013

American J Political Sci

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“…The role of divided and unified government is important to consider even in a more descriptive study such as this in providing the basic contours of how presidents are using executive orders. The majority of the research has concluded that presidents issue more executive orders during unified government than divided government, which runs counter to conventional wisdom (Gleiber and Shull 1992;Howell 2003;Krause and Cohen 1997;Mayer 1999Mayer , 2001and Warber 2006). On the contrary, there is evidence indicating that presidents are more likely to issue all types of executive orders to "circumvent a [politically] hostile Congress" (Deering and Maltzman 1999, 767).…”

Section: Targeting the Public With Executive Ordersmentioning

confidence: 81%

“…Research on the president's executive order power has flourished during the past 15 years within the discipline of political science (Cooper 2002;Dodds 2008Dodds , 2013Fine and Warber 2012;Howell 2003;Krause and D. Cohen 1997;Krause and J. Cohen 2000;Marshall and Pacelle 2005;Mayer 1999Mayer , 2001Mayer and Price 2002;Taylor 2013;and Warber 2006). Most of the focus by these studies has been on accounting for the number of directives that presidents have issued in office to shed light on whether presidents have expanded presidential power over time with respect to this unilateral tool and whether such actions are justified by the Constitution (see also, Fleishman and Aufses 1976 for an earlier analysis of executive orders in relation to the Constitution).…”

Section: Broadening the Scope Of Executive Order Scholarshipmentioning

confidence: 98%

Public Outreach, Executive Orders, and the Unilateral Presidency

Warber

2014

Congress & the Presidency

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“…Mayer 1999Mayer , 2001. Additional controls include dummy variables for whether the executive order was principally advisory in nature (i.e.…”

Section: Methodsmentioning

confidence: 98%

Who do you trust? Presidential delegation in executive orders

Kennedy

2016

Research & Politics

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How do presidents decide to delegate? Research on unilateral powers has (often informally) assumed that executive orders start and end with the president, but as in all principal-agent relationships, executives rely on subordinates to carry out their directives. Political scientists have explored when and why Congress delegates to the president, but such action often necessitates a response from the White House; namely, the president delegates to the bureaucracy the authority delegated to him by Congress. Bureaucrats may in turn have a wide degree of latitude when implementing the president's orders. I argue that presidents must make strategic decisions in choosing to whom to delegate, much in the same way that Congress makes certain calculations in deciding whether to delegate to the executive branch.

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Executive Orders and Presidential Power

Cited by 152 publications

References 11 publications

The Elusive Search for Presidential Power

The Elusive Search for Presidential Power

Public Outreach, Executive Orders, and the Unilateral Presidency

Who do you trust? Presidential delegation in executive orders

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